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Disclaimer	
This document contains information which is proprietary to the ECHO consortium. Neither this document nor 
the information contained herein shall be used, duplicated or communicated by any means to any third party, 
in whole or parts, except with the prior written consent of the ECHO consortium. 
 
 
Executive	summary	
 
As part of the ECHO project, the Early Warning System (EWS) is one of four technologies under development. 
The E-EWS will provide the capability to share information to provide up to date information to all constituents 
involved in the E-EWS. The development of the E-EWS will be rooted in a comprehensive review of information 
sharing and trust models from within the cyber domain as well as models from other domains.  
This deliverable is the result of a qualitative multiple-case study analysis made in Task 3.2. It consists of theory 
development by systematic reviews of academic articles, seven case studies, and cross-case conclusions, 
from which a set of system requirements and features were established to support a model that promotes 
information sharing among partners, while also meeting regulatory requirements. Moreover, the final analysis 
includes the requirements for information sharing within and between partners across organisational 
boundaries as derived from multi-sector analysis. Three of the case studies were presented as research 
papers at DIGILIENCE conference in October 2019. 
This deliverable consists of a comprehensive review of information sharing and trust models from within the 
cyber domain (n > 50, see Annex 2), as well as models from other domains, such as healthcare, maritime and 
critical infrastructure protection. This document can be used as input for the ECHO EWS Information sharing 
model definition that will be required for Task 5.1, Task 5.2 and Task 5.3. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Purpose and scope of the document 
As part of the ECHO project, the Early Warning System (EWS) is one of four technology roadmap under 
development. The E-EWS will provide the capability to share information to provide up to date information to 
all constituents involved in the E-EWS. E-EWS aims at serving as a security operations support tool enabling 
the members of the ECHO network (and other new entities at EU level) to coordinate and share information in 
near real-time. With the E-EWS ECHO stakeholders can retain their fully independent management of cyber-
sensitive information and related data management. E-EWS will work as a parallel part of other mechanisms 
in smart society. The development of the E-EWS will be rooted in a comprehensive review of information 
sharing and trust models from within the cyber domain. 
This deliverable D3.6 consists of a comprehensive review of information sharing and trust models from within 
the cyber domain, as well as models from other domains, such as, healthcare information sharing) From these 
models a set of system requirements and features is established to support a model that promotes information 
sharing among partners, while also meeting regulatory requirements. Deliverable 3.6 defines crucial elements 
of ECHO Early Warning System, further studied and developed within WP5. 
The content of deliverable D3.6 is based on results of analysis of eight case studies carried out in Task 3.2 
and cross-case conclusions of them. Moreover, the final analysis includes the requirements for information 
sharing within and between partners across organisational boundaries as derived from multi-sector analysis.  
During the processing of D3.6, three case studies (cf. Annex 3–5) were presented in DIGILINCE 2019 
Conference, Sofia, 2–4 October, 2019, and published in a peer-reviewed, open source journal [1].  
 
1.2 Structure of the document 
The reporting of D3.6 (see Figure 1) follows the linear-analytic structure of the sequence of subtopics involving 
the issue being studied, the methods used, a review of the relevant literature, the findings from the collected 
and analysed data, and the conclusions and implications from the findings. After the introduction, Chapter 2 
proposes a used methodology of the deliverable. Chapter 3 handles the theory and how it is built. Chapter 4 
present results of the individual case study analysis. Chapter 5 includes cross-case study conclusions and 
gives system requirements and recommendations. Chapter 6 concludes the deliverable. Annex 1 catalogues 
literature review sources, Annex 2 lists analysed information sharing and trust models, and Annex 3–5 contain 
reproduced articles made during Task 3.2. 
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 Figure 1: The outline of D3.6 
 
1.3 Relation to other work in the project 
The document is made as part of WP 3 and is essentially related to WP 5 work. The results of the analysis in 
D3.6 are made for use in the development of the E-EWS (WP5). 
 
1.4 Applicable and reference documents 
The following documents contain requirements applicable to the generation of this document: 
Reference Document Title Document Reference Version Date 
[GA] Grant Agreement 830943 – 
ECHO 
- 1.0 02/04/2019 
[PH] D1.1 Project Handbook ECHO_D1.1_v1.0 1.41 02/05/2019 
Table 1: Applicable documents 
The following documents have been consulted for the generation of this document: 
 
Reference Document Title 
[1]  T. Tagarev (ed.), "Digital Transformation, Cyber Security and Resilience," Information 
Security, vol. 43, pp. 1-398, 2019.  
[2]  R. K. Yin, Case study research and applications: Design and methods, Sixth edition ed., Los 
Angeles: SAGA Publications, Inc., 2017.  
[3]  K. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge, London: 
Routledge Classics, 2009.  
[4]  E. Seshia and A. Sanjit, Introduction to Embedded Systems, A Cyber-Physical Systems 
Approach, 2 ed., MIT press, 2017, p. 2017. 
[5]  J. Simola and J. Rajamäki, "Hybrid Emergency Response Model: Improving Cyber Situational 
Awareness," in Proceedings of the 16th European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security 
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Reference Document Title 
(ECCWS), M. S. &. N. Le-Khac, Ed., Reading, Academic Conferences and Publishing 
International Limited, 2017, pp. 442-451. 
[6]  ENISA, "Information sharing and common taxonomies between CSIRTs and Law 
Enforcement," 2015. 
[7]  The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), “Blueprint for a Secure Cyber Future - The 
Cybersecurity Strategy for the Homeland Security Enterprise,” DHS, 2011. 
[8]  OECD Legal Instruments, "Recommendation of the Council on the Protection of Critical 
Information Infrastructures," 30 04 2008. [Online]. Available: 
https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/121. [Accessed 22 10 2019]. 
[9]  National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), "Guidelines for smart grid 
cybersecurity In Smart grid cybersecurity strategy, architecture," U.S. Department of 
Commerce, USA, 2014. 
[10]  European Union Agency For Network And Information Security (ENISA), "Programming 
Document 2019-2021," ENISA, Heraklion, Greece, 2019. 
[11]  L. Ladid, J. Armin and H. Kivekäs, “The Finish electronic communications regulator 
TRAFICOM - A cybersecurity reference model for Europe.,” SAINT Consortium/ Traficom., 
Helsinki, 2019. 
[12]  ECSO European Cyber Security Organisation, “About ECSO,” 2019. [Online]. Available: 
https://ecs-org.eu/. [Accessed 2 9 2019]. 
[13]  ENISA & ITE, “Information Sharing and Analysis Centres (ISACs) Cooperative models,” 
European Union Agency for Network and Information Security, Greece, 2017. 
[14]  G. White and R. Lipsey, “ISAO SO Product Outline,” ISAO Standards Organization, 2016. 
[15]  Electrical Technology, “Internet of Things (IOT) and Its Applications in Electrical Power 
Industry,” 2016. [Online]. Available: http://www.electricaltechnology.org/2016/07/internet-of-
things-iot-and-its-applications-in-electrical-power-industry.html. [Accessed 10 8 2019]. 
[16]  National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), “Guide for Conducting Risk 
Assessments. 800-30,” U.S. Department of Commerce, Gaithersburg, 2013. 
[17]  National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), “Special Publication 800-37 R.2, Risk 
Management Framework for Information Systems and Organizations,” U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Gaithersburg, 2018. 
[18]  The International Organization for Standardization (ISO), “International Standard ISO/IEC 
27010:2015. Standard edn.,” Switzerland, 2015. 
[19]  National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), “Guide to Cyber Threat Information 
Sharing. NIST Special Publication 800-150,” U.S. Department of Commerce, Gaithersburg, 
2016. 
[20]  S. Munk, "Interoperability Services Supporting Information Exchange Between Cybersecurity 
Organisations1," AARMS, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 131-148, 2018.  
[21]  E. M. Sedenberg and J. X. Dempsey, "Cybersecurity Information Sharing Governance 
Structures: An Ecosystem of Diversity, Trust, and Tradeoffs," 31 May 2018. [Online]. Available: 
https://arxiv.org/abs/1805.12266. [Accessed 30 March 2019]. 
[22]  wikia.org, "Technical threat indicator," [Online]. Available: 
https://itlaw.wikia.org/wiki/Technical_threat_indicator. 
[23]  C. Goodwin and J. Nicholas, "A framework for cybersecurity information sharing and risk 
reduction," [Online]. Available: https://www.slideshare.net/RoyRamkrishna/framework-for-
cybersecurityinfosharing-1. 
[24]  MITRE Corporation, "Trusted Automated eXchange of Indicator Information — TAXII™ 
Enabling Cyber Threat Information Exchange," [Online]. Available:. 
https://makingsecuritymeasurable.mitre.org/docs/taxii-intro-handout.pdf 
[25]  MITRE Corporation, "Cyber Information-Sharing Models: An Overview," 2012. [Online]. 
Available: https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/cyber_info_sharing.pdf 
[26]  RSAC contributor, "RSA conference - Threats Are Omnipresent But You Have Options," 11 
june 2019. [Online]. Available: https://www.rsaconference.com/industry-topics/blog/threats-
are-omnipresent-but-you-have-options. 
[27]  P. McGlone, “Threats Are Omnipresent But You Have Options,” 11 June 2019. [Online]. 
Available: https://securityboulevard.com/2019/06/threats-are-omnipresent-but-you-have-
options/. 
[28]  L. J. Janczewski and W. Caelli, Cyber Conflicts and Small States. New York: Routledge, 2016. 
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Table 2: Reference documents 
 
1.5 Glossary of acronyms 
Acronym Description 
AIS Automated Information Sharing 
AI Artificial Intelligence 
APTs Advanced Persistent Threats 
CCSA Common Cyber Situational Awareness 
CERT Computer Emergency Response Team 
CI Critical Infrastructure 
CIIP Critical Information Infrastructure Protection 
CIP Critical Infrastructure Protection 
CISA Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act 
CSA Cyber Situational Awareness 
CNA CVE Numbering Authority 
CSC Cyber Security Center 
CSIC Cyber Situation Center 
CSIRT Computer Security Incident Response Teams 
CTI Cyber Threat Intelligence 
CYBEX Cybersecurity Information Exchange Framework 
CVE Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures 
CyPR Cybersecurity Professional Register 
CybOX Structured Cyber Observable eXpression 
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Acronym Description 
DNS Domain Name System 
DoS Denial of Service 
DHS Department of Homeland Security 
EC3 European Cybercrime Centre 
ECSO European Cyber Security Organisation 
ECTF Electronic Crimes Taskforce 
E-EWS ECHO Early Warning Systems 
E-FCR ECHO Federated Cyber Ranges  
EIS Europol Information System 
E-MSAF ECHO Multi Sector Assessment Framework  
ENISA European union agency for Network and Information Security 
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 
FSP Full-Scale Pilot 
GA Grant Agreement 
GDPR General Data Protection Regulation 
GUI Graphical User Interface 
H Humans 
HMI Human-Machine Interface 
HERM Hybrid Emergency Response Model 
INDICATOR Indicator may be used to detect suspicious or malicious cyber activity and represent a set 
of malicious domains  
IoCs Indicators of Compromise 
IP Internet Protocol 
ISAC Information Sharing and Analysis Center 
ISAO Information Sharing and Analysis Organisations 
IIOT Industrial Internet of Things 
IOT Internet of Things 
MAEC Malware Attribute Enumeration and Characterisation  
MCSR Multiple Case Study Research 
MISP Malware Information Sharing Platform 
MS Member State 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
NCCIC National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center 
NCSC National Cyber Security Centers 
NDN National Detection Network 
NEC Non-EU Country 
NIS Network and Information Security  
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology 
NRA National Regulatory Authority 
NSA National Security Authority 
NVD National Vulnerability Database 
ORD Open Research Data 
OSINT Open Source Intelligence 
PAP Permissible Actions Protocol 
PH Project Handbook 
PII Personally Identifiable Information 
RAF Risk Assessment Framework 
RMF Risk Management Framework 
SDO STIX Domain Objects 
SA Situational Awareness 
SEB Stakeholders Expert Board 
SIEM Security Information and Event Management 
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Acronym Description 
SIENA Secure Information Exchange Network Application 
SIP Shared Situational Picture 
SME Small- and Medium-sized Enterprises 
STIX Structured Threat Information Expression 
TAXII Trusted Automated eXchange of Indicator Information 
TLP Traffic Light Protocol 
TTP Tactic, technique, or procedure; behaviours and resources that attackers use to carry out 
their attacks  
VPN Virtual Private Network 
WP Work Package 
 
Table 3: Glossary of acronyms, initialises and abbreviations 
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2. Methodology 
 
This chapter presents the research method and research process applied in this deliverable. The applied case 
study method is introduced, along with abductive reasoning as a research approach. The rationales behind 
the selection of information sharing and trust models as case study subjects are discussed. The units of 
analysis and the sources of evidence are described. 
Figure 2 shows how multiple case study research (MCSR) is applied in the creation of this deliverable. The 
initial step in designing MCSR consists of theory development, and the next steps are case selection and 
definition of specific measures in the design and data collection process. Each individual case study consists 
of a whole study, and then conclusions of each case are considered to be the replication by other individual 
cases. The individual cases as well as the multiple result should be the focus of a summary report. For each 
individual case, the report should indicate how and why a particular result is demonstrated. Across cases, the 
report should present the extent of replication logic, including certain and contrasting results [2]. 
Develop 
theory:
Main 
characteristics 
of information 
sharing models
Select 
cases 
Conduct 1st 
case study
Conduct 2nd 
case study
Conduct 8th 
case study
Cross‐case analysis
1. A set of system requirements and 
features to support a model that 
promotes information sharing 
among partners, while also 
meeting regulatory requirements
2. Requirements for information 
sharing within and between 
partners across organizational 
boundaries
D 3.6
Inputs: Academic literature, Earlier 
R&D&I projects
To WP5
Write individual 
case report
Write individual 
case report
Write individual 
case report
 Figure 2: Multiple-case study method of D3.6 
 
2.1 Theory development 
The first step in MCSR is the development of a rich theoretical framework that needs to state the conditions 
under which a particular phenomenon is likely to be found [2].  
The theoretical framework of this deliverable forms by way of a systematic review. Collected and analysed 
materials consist of scientific literatures, research articles and official publications. The research question of 
the literature review was “What are the main characteristics/features of cyber information sharing and trust 
models?” In order to capture a reasonably full range of the literature concerning the main features of cyber 
exchange models, following scientific databases have been used: Database of the JYKDOK library at the 
University of Jyväskylä (wide database concerning cybersecurity and it provides access e.g. to the IEEE 
Xplore). The IEEE Xplore library (provides web access to more than 4.5 million documents from publications 
in computer science and ca. 200 journals and ca. 1700 conference proceedings), Springer link (Database area 
of engineering contains 17000 books) and AI -tool called IRIS which search engine based on 100 entered 
keywords. Also, several studies were based on public sources. Analysed information sharing and trust models 
are listed in Annex 1. 
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The qualitative analysis was made by using traditional half-manual processing and Glue (Orange3) Python to 
explore collected database. As a result, the main characteristics of cyber information sharing models were 
defined. These characteristics were used as embedded units of analysis in the individual case studies. 
 
2.2 Case selection and individual case studies  
According to Yin [2], any use of multiple case design should follow a replication, not a sampling logic, and 
choosing of each case should be made carefully. 
In Figure 2, the dashed-line feedback represents a discovery situation, where one of the cases does not suit 
the original multiple-case study design. This kind of a discovery stands for a need to reconsider the original 
theoretical foundations. This means redesign should take place before proceeding further, and in this view the 
replication approach represents a way of generalising that uses a type of test called falsification or refutation, 
which is the possibility that a theory or hypothesis may be proven wrong or falsified [3]. 
This multiple case study is made up of following individual case studies: 
 Analysis results from the ECHO partners’ research, development and innovation work in earlier 
projects, from which taxonomies for cyber information sharing are defined (Section 4.1). 
 Analysis of sensitive information sharing models from other domains; health information sharing 
(Section 4.2), and maritime information sharing (Section 4.3). 
 Analysis of inter-sector cyber information sharing models; critical Infrastructure protection (Section 
4.4), and smart cities (Section 4.7). 
 Analysis of national cyber security cooperation networks and info sharing models; HAVARO cyber 
threat prevention mechanism in Finland (Section 4.5). 
 Analysis of information sharing and trust models within the cyber domain; comparison of cyber 
information sharing models in the US and EU (Section 4.6). 
 Synergies of information sharing needs with EWS and FCR (Section 4.8). 
The sources of evidence used in the individual case studies consist of documentation, archival records, 
interview, direct observations, participant-observation, and physical artefacts. From these, two to four multiple 
sources of evidence were used in every individual case study. 
Every individual case study is reported separately as a conference paper (cf. ANNEX 3-5) and/or via ECHO 
SharePoint (cf. [PH] for more information about ECHO SharePoint). 
 
2.3 Cross-case conclusions 
Cross-case conclusion were made via a document analysis exercise of the preceding sections and a selection 
of literature sources. The final analysis includes the requirements for information sharing within and 
between partners across organisational boundaries as derived from multi-sector analysis. 
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3. Theory development 
Modern infrastructures include not only physical components, but also hardware and software. These 
integrated systems are examples of cyber-physical systems (CPS) that integrate computing and 
communication capabilities with monitoring and control of entities into the physical world. In CPS, embedded 
computers and networks monitor and control the physical processes. CPS are enabling next generation “smart 
systems” like advanced robotics, computer-controlled processes and real-time integrated systems [4].  
There are separate local situation centres for emerging situations, emergency response systems, separate 
cyber threat functions in national and EU level. All works mainly without synergy [5]. Separate functionalities 
situation centres produce more potential vulnerabilities for vital functions. Therefore, it is important to develop 
functionalities in ecosystem and gather relevant data for the next generations’ early warning solutions. 
How to create connection between old-fashioned procedures and new preventive or (predictive) cyber 
functions concerning preventive cyber-threat procedures?  How to combine and share relevant data between 
stakeholders? What kind of information sharing solutions already exist? How to improve response and 
procedures in case of a hybrid incident? The problem concerns whole ecosystem. The theory development 
has been carried out via a systematic literature review of scientific articles about cyber information sharing, 
and it is going to find out the answers for these questions.  
The structure of the chapter: Firstly, the central concepts and organisations with regard to this deliverable are 
defined. Secondly, main characteristics of information sharing models are presented. Thirdly, we discuss 
cybersecurity information sharing governance structures. Fourthly, some sharing technologies for 
cybersecurity information are presented. Fifth section deals with the theory about situational awareness, and 
finally some remarks are discussed that came up during literature review. 
 
3.1 Central concepts and organisations 
Alert and detection system 
Alert and detection system produces information, which may alert other players to a detected threat and 
develop better means of detection. Clients can determine what sort of data the system processes and the 
ownership of the data remains within the company, in its own devices. The information on situation awareness 
provided by the system increases understanding about the organisation’s own and general state of information 
security. 
CSIRT (Computer Security Incident Response Team) or CERT (Computer Emergency Response Team) 
An organisation that provides incident response services to victims of attacks, including preventive services 
(i.e. alerting or advisory services on security management). The term includes governmental organisations, 
academic institutions or other private body with incident response capabilities [6]. The EU Computer 
Emergency Response Team (CERT-EU) was set up in 2012 with the aim to provide effective and efficient 
response to information security incidents and cyber threats for the EU institutions, agencies and bodies.  
Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP)  
Critical infrastructure (CI) refers to the structures and functions which are necessary for the vital functions of 
society. They comprise fundamental physical facilities and structures as well as electronic functions and 
services. CI includes energy production, transmission and distribution networks, ICT systems, networks and 
services (including mass communication), financial services, transport and logistics, water supply, construction 
and maintenance of infrastructure, waste management in special circumstances. Transforming the nation's 
aging electric power system into an interoperable smart grid enabling two-way flows of energy and 
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communications [7]. That smart network will integrate information and communication technologies with the 
power-delivery infrastructure.  
Critical Information Infrastructure Protection (CIIP) 
Critical Information Infrastructure means any physical or virtual information system that controls, process, 
transmits, receives or stores electronic information in any form including data, voice or video that is vital to the 
functioning of critical infrastructure. “Those interconnected information systems and networks, the disruption 
or destruction of which would have a serious impact on the health, safety, security, or economic well-being of 
citizens, or on the effective functioning of government or the economy” [8]. 
Cyber Threats in Critical Infrastructure  
Cyber threats include denial of service (DoS), unauthorised vulnerability probes, botnet command and control, 
data exfiltration, on-purpose data corruption or even physical destruction via alternation of critical 
software/data. These threats can be initiated and maintained by a mixture of malware, social engineering, or 
highly sophisticated advanced persistent threats (APTs) that are targeted and continue for a long period of 
time. Channel jamming is one of the most efficient ways to launch physical-layer DoS attacks, especially for 
wireless communications [9].  
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) classifies cyber-physical attacks into three broad 
sections [9]. Table 4 presents these classifications. 
Type of attacks Influence  Example of threat progress 
Cyber informed 
physical attacks 
Allows an enemy or attackers 
to plan and execute an 
improved or enhanced 
physical attack. 
Attackers who would like to destroy components 
within a substation though and they are not sure 
which substation or components would have the 
greatest impact. They could try to access 
confidential/sensitive information or aggregate 
unprotected information by cyber and they could 
then physically attack that specific substation 
and lines. 
Cyber-attacks 
enhancing physical 
attacks 
An enemy uses cyber means 
to improve the impacts of a 
physical attack by either 
making the attack more 
harmful with greater 
consequences or interfering 
with restoration efforts by 
increasing the duration of the 
attack. 
An enemy tampering with the integrity of 
protective relay settings prior to a physical 
attack on power lines. The tampered settings 
allow the failure to progress into impacts on a 
wider segment of the grid although the original 
settings were designed to contain the effects of 
a failure. 
Use of a cyber-
system to cause 
physical harm 
An enemy uses a cyber-
system that controls physical 
equipment or units in such a 
manner to cause physical 
harm/damage. 
An enemy or a careless operator could attempt 
to turn on the natural gas inflow without an 
ignition source present. As the burner unit fills 
with natural gas, the adversary could turn on the 
ignition source, potentially causing an explosion 
(the burner management system for a natural 
gas generator). 
Table 4: Classification of cyber-physical attacks 
 
Carefully done cyber, physical and operational security planning and implementations can minimise these 
impacts of cyber-physical attacks. Defensive measures that can be used to minimise the likelihood of 
successful cyber-attacks and physical attacks will also work to minimise the impacts of a cyber-physical attack 
[9]. 
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The European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA)  
The European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) is a centre of network and 
information security (NIS) expertise for the EU, its member states, the private sector and Europe’s citizens. 
ENISA develop with these groups’ advice and recommendations on good practice in information security. It 
supports and assists EU member states in implementing relevant EU legislation and works to improve the 
resilience of Europe’s critical information infrastructure and networks. ENISA provides recommendations on 
cybersecurity, supports policy development and its implementation, and collaborates with other operational 
teams throughout Europe [10]. 
National Regulatory Authority (NRA) 
National Regulatory Authorities can play different roles in relation to cybersecurity. In Finland, the tasks are; 
steering and supervision of telecoms operators' operations, information security and preparedness, for 
example, monitoring compliance with the information security regulation, steering and supervision of strong 
electronic identification and the provision of qualified certificates, for example, monitoring compliance and 
carrying out annual audits of certification authorities providing qualified certificates [11]. 
The European Cyber Security Organisation (ECSO) 
The European Cyber Security Organisation (ECSO) represents the contractual counterpart to the European 
Commission for the implementation of the Cyber Security contractual Public-Private Partnership. ECSO 
members include a wide variety of stakeholders such as large companies, SMEs, research centres, 
universities, end-users, operators, clusters and association as well as European Member State’s local, regional 
and national administrations, countries part of the European Economic Area and the European Free Trade 
Association and H2020 associated countries [12]. 
Information Sharing and Analysis Centres (ISACs)  
ISAC is collaboration community created for sector-specific national or international information sharing. 
Information Sharing and Analysis Centres are trusted entities to foster information sharing and good practices 
about physical and cyber threats and mitigation. The ISAC could support the implementation of new European 
legislation (e.g. NIS Directive) or support economic interests [13]. 
Information Sharing and Analysis Organisation (ISAO) 
An ISAO is any entity or collaboration created or employed by public- or private sector organisations, for 
purposes of gathering and analysing critical cyber related information in order to better understand security 
problems and interdependencies related to cyber systems to ensure their availability, integrity, and reliability. 
Unlike ISACs, ISAOs are not sector-affiliated and they are for any sector or community. Being a member of an 
ISAO does not require of being a part of functions vital for society [14]. 
Industrial Internet of Things (IIOT)  
IIOT collects data from connected devices (i.e., smart connected devices and machines) in the field or plant 
and then processes this data using sophisticated software and networking tools. The entire IIOT requires a 
collection of hardware, software, communications and networking technologies. The major area where IOT 
deals with energy management systems is the smart grid. IOT extends the benefits of smart grid beyond the 
automation, distribution and monitoring being done by the utilities [15]. 
RAF (Risk Assessment Framework)  
A risk assessment framework (RAF) is an approach for prioritising and sharing information about the security 
risks posed to an information technology organization. According to National Institute of Standards and 
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Technology (NIST) [16], the purpose of risk assessments is to inform decision makers and support risk 
responses by  
 identifying relevant threats to organisations or threats directed through organisations against other 
organizations;  
 identifying vulnerabilities both internal and external to organisations;  
 impact to organisations that may occur given the potential for threats exploiting vulnerabilities and  
 likelihood that harm will occur. The result is a determination of risk. 
RMF (Risk Management Framework) 
The RMF is a structured and flexible process for managing security and privacy risk that includes information 
security categorisation; control selection, implementation, and assessment; system and common control 
authorizations; and continuous monitoring [17]. 
Standard ISO/IEC 27010:2015 
ISO/IEC 27010:2015 “Information technology — Security techniques — Information security management for 
inter-sector and inter-organisational communications” is a key component of trusted information sharing. It is 
a “supporting entity”, defined as “a trusted independent entity appointed by the information sharing community 
to organise and support their activities, for example, by providing a source anonymization service” [18] 
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) 
Tactics, techniques, and procedures describe the behaviour of an actor. Tactics are high-level descriptions of 
behaviour, techniques are detailed descriptions of behaviour in the context of a tactic, and procedures are 
even lower level, highly detailed descriptions in the context of a technique [19]. 
Threat Information 
Any information related to a threat that might help an organisation protect itself against a threat or detect the 
activities of an actor. Major types of threat information include indicators, TTPs, security alerts, threat 
intelligence reports, and tool configurations [19]. 
 
3.2 Characteristics of cyber information sharing models 
Goal of Cyber Threat Intelligence Sharing is to create an ecosystem where actionable cyber threat intelligence 
is automatically shared in real-time to enable real-time defence, the detection, prevention and mitigation of 
cyber threats before or as they occur.  
The five issues to be solved are:  
1. What to share?  
2. With whom to share?  
3. Why to share? 
4. What are the main challenges of threat information sharing? 
5. How to share? (Sharing architectures; Sharing methods; Exchange methods; Mechanisms of sharing) 
Below, these issues are addressed. 
 What to share? 
There are different types of cybersecurity-related information that could be shared to improve cybersecurity 
defences and incident response. Munk [20] divides this information into four major groups: information related 
to events, to vulnerabilities, to threats, and other information. Sedenberg’s and Dempsey’s [21] division 
includes incidents (including attack methods), best practices, tactical indicators, vulnerabilities, and defensive 
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measures. According to them, organisations are engaged in sharing tactical indicators (“indictors of 
compromise”, IOCs). IOCs are artefacts that relate to a particular security incident or attack, such as filenames, 
hashes, IP addresses, hostnames, or a wide range of other information. Cybersecurity defenders may use 
IOCs forensically to identify the compromise or defensively to prevent it [21]. As a summary, cyber threat 
information is any information related to a threat (Indicators of compromise, TTPs, Security alerts, etc.) that 
might help an organisation to protect itself against a threat or detect the activities of potential or actual threat 
actor: 
 Indicators of Compromise (IoCs): Indicators are technical artefacts or observables (an observable is 
an event, benign or malicious, on a network or system) that suggest an attack is imminent or is 
currently under way, or that a compromise may have already occurred. Examples of IoCs include 
unusual outbound network traffic, anomalies in privileged-user account activity, suspicious registry or 
system file changes. Other examples: IP addresses, specific strings of data, and file hashes, exploit 
toolkits or payloads. IoCs are specific, common, and repeatable forms of information that readily lend 
themselves to anonymization, standardisation, and rapid forms of distribution. These indicators can 
be effectively anonymised to obscure the target of an attack. Sharing this kind of information poses 
low risk of disclosure of personal information or sensitive company and customer information. 
Technical threat indicators account for the vast majority of threat information that is available. 
Significant gains can be achieved through automated sharing of technical indicators. [22] 
 Security alerts: Security alerts, also known as bulletins, advisories, and vulnerability notes, are brief, 
usually human-readable, technical notifications regarding current vulnerabilities, exploits, and other 
security issues. Security alerts could originate from sources such as CSIRTs, SIRTs, commercial 
security service providers, and security researchers.  
 TTPs: Tactics, techniques, and procedures could describe an actor’s tendency to use a specific 
malware, attack tool, or delivery mechanism.  
 Tool configurations: Tool configurations are recommendations for setting up and using tools that 
support the automated collection, exchange, processing, analysis, and use of threat information. For 
example, tool configuration information could consist of instructions on how to install and use a rootkit 
detection and removal utility, or how to create and customize intrusion detection signatures, router 
access control lists (ACLs), firewall rules, or web filter configuration files.  
 Threat intelligence reports: Threat intelligence reports are generally documents that describe TTPs, 
actors, types of systems and information being targeted, and other threat related information that 
provides greater situational awareness to an organisation. Threat intelligence is threat information that 
has been aggregated, transformed, analysed, interpreted, or enriched to provide the necessary 
context for decision making processes. 
 With whom to share?  
Organisations that collect and share knowledge and experiences typically do this to improve defensive 
capabilities. 
Actors involved are:  
 Governments and Public safety organisations have to defend their own classified and unclassified 
systems, fight cybercrime, and decrease the cybersecurity risk.  
 Private critical infrastructure: it is important to protect critical infrastructures to ensure critical national 
interests like public health and defence.  
 Business enterprises: Business companies have an interest in preserving the security of sensitive 
information (customer and supplier data, trade secrets, contract information, etc.).  
 IT companies: IT companies have an interest in preserving the security and integrity of their products. 
They often share information with regard to vulnerabilities in products or services to make sure that 
security firms can create solutions to fix them, or they may produce and distribute software updates 
that remedy vulnerabilities for their customers.  
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 IT security firms, computer forensics experts, antivirus and antimalware vendors and penetration 
testers, collect and sell cybersecurity information.  
 Security researchers study cyber incidents and find vulnerabilities in software, hardware, and services 
through academic work. They usually help to mitigate threats and remedy weaknesses. [23] 
  Why to share? 
An organisation that has faced an attack acquires valuable information on cyber threats that is potentially 
useful to other organisations. This information can help an organisation to identify, assess, monitor, and 
respond to cyber threats. Organisations that share cyber threat information can improve their own security 
postures as well as those of other organisations. Information sharing among private and public entities is a 
powerful mechanism to better understand a constantly changing environment and learn in a holistic way about 
serious risks, vulnerabilities and threats, as well as solutions.  
In particular, there are some key points regarding the why to share: 
 Improved preventive functions: Development of the cyber-ecosystem among smart societies require 
faster response against hybrid-threats. For example, IIOT sets challenges for the critical infrastructure 
protection in industrial sector. Near real-time information sharing requires further developed sensor- 
and signal techniques.  
 Enhanced threat understanding: By sharing threat information, organisations gain a better 
understanding of the threat environment and can use threat information to enhance their cybersecurity 
and risk management practices. Using shared information, organisations are able to identify affected 
platforms or systems, implement protective measures, enhance detection capabilities, and more 
effectively respond and recover from incidents based on observed changes in the current threat 
environment.  
 Knowledge maturation: When seemingly unrelated observations are shared and analysed by 
organisations, those observations can be correlated with data collected by others. This enrichment 
process increases the value of information by enhancing existing indicators and by developing 
knowledge of actor TTPs that are associated with a specific incident, threat, or threat campaign. 
Correlation can also impart valuable insights into the relationships that exist between indicators.  
 Increase the degree of protection: organisations that act upon the threat information they receive by 
re-mediating threats to themselves afford a degree of protection to those who are yet unprotected (i.e., 
who have either not received or not acted upon the received threat information) by reducing the 
number of viable attack vectors for threat actors, thus reducing vulnerability.  
 Greater defensive agility: Actors continually adapt their TTPs to try to evade detection, circumvent 
security controls, and exploit new vulnerabilities. Organisations that share information are often better 
informed about changing TTPs and the need to rapidly detect and respond to threats.  
 Improve cyber defence: Similar attack methods are used against a wide range of targets so, sharing 
information can help organisations to improve their cyber defence and leverage the resources 
expended by others to improve the value of their investments. The approach, where one organisation’s 
detection becomes another’s prevention, is a modern sophisticated concept that strengthens the 
organisations’ security in advance.  
 Improve awareness: Information sharing enables organisations to leverage the collective knowledge, 
experiences, and analytic capabilities of their partners within a community of interest, thereby 
enhancing the defence capabilities of multiple organisations. Even a single contribution (a new 
indicator or observation about a threat actor) can increase the awareness and security of an entire 
community.  
 Build trust: The ability to repeat ad hoc exchanges over time builds trust and an expectation that parties 
will act in a consistent and repeatable way that minimizes harm and maximizes protection. 
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 What are the main challenges of threat information sharing?  
 Establishing trust: Nothing else but the trust is at first. Trusted relationships form the basis for 
information sharing but require effort to establish and maintain. Ongoing communication through 
regular in-person meetings, phone calls, or social media can help accelerate the process of building 
trust. Trusted relationships foster confidence that information provided will be acted upon and that it 
will be protected and/or shared appropriately. Although trust is powerful, it is also fragile and, if broken, 
can have devastating consequences for all parties. Furthermore, trust is impossible to effectively 
legislate. So, given the complexity of the cybersecurity threats, a private and public collaborative 
approach to information sharing is called for. Laws can compel incident reporting, but they do not 
increase trust or collaboration, nor do they reduce risks.  
 Achieving Interoperability: Standardised data formats and transport protocols are important building 
blocks for interoperability and help enable the secure, automated exchange of structured threat 
information among organisations, repositories, and tools. Adopting specific formats and protocols, 
however, can require significant time and resources, and the value of these investments can be 
reduced if sharing partners require different formats or protocols.  
 Protecting sensitive but unclassified information: Disclosure of sensitive information, such as 
intellectual property, trade secrets, or other proprietary information can result in financial loss, violation 
of sharing agreements, and loss of reputation. The unauthorized disclosure of information may disrupt 
an ongoing investigation, jeopardize information needed for future legal proceedings, or disrupt 
response actions such as botnet takedown operations. Organisations should apply handling 
designations to shared information and implement policies, procedures, and technical controls to 
actively manage the risks of disclosure of sensitive but unclassified information.  
 Protecting classified information: Information received from government sources may be marked as 
classified, making it difficult for broader number of organisations to use. It is also expensive and time-
consuming for organisations to request and maintain the clearances needed for ongoing access to 
classified information sources.  
There are many reasons why entities may restrain to participate in cyber information sharing, including the 
potential liability that could result from sharing internal cyber threat information with other private companies 
or the government.   
More broadly, the legal issues surrounding cybersecurity information sharing – whether it is with regard to 
sharing between two private companies or the dissemination of cyber intelligence within the government are 
complex. 
It is important to create a legal framework for sharing cyber information. The issues of what, with whom, and 
for what (for what purposes) that information can be shared are necessary to be defined. Also, it is necessary 
to determine the whole scope and overall goals of cyber security legislation itself. 
 How to share? Sharing architectures  
There are few existing cybersecurity information sharing architectures and frameworks for the warning systems 
within public organisations divided into main groups as Figure 3 illustrates. MITRE [24] categorises information 
sharing models in three main models. Fourth model comprises combination of the others.  
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Hub‐and‐Spoke
Peer‐to‐Peer
Source‐Subscribe
Hybrid model
 
Figure 3: Traditional classification of information sharing models 
Hub-and-Spoke  
Hub-and-Spoke architecture, according to what The MITRE Corporation said in [25], has a central hub that 
receives data from the participating members (the spokes). The hub can either redistribute the incoming data 
directly to other members or provide value-added services and send the new information to the members. With 
this approach, the hub acts as a clearinghouse that can facilitate information sharing while protecting the 
identities of the members. In addition, the hub may provide value by combining information from multiple 
members, by adding its own data, or by conducting extra analyses on the members’ data. Spokes can produce 
and/or consume information from the Hub. [25] 
Example of private sector associations that use and hub and spoke model are Information Sharing and 
Analysis Centers (ISACs) that are non-profit organisations that provide a central resource for gathering 
information on cyber threats (in many cases to critical infrastructure) as well as allow two-way sharing of 
information between the private and the public sector about root causes, incidents and threats, as well as 
sharing experience, knowledge and analysis. [25] These bodies operate in a hub-and-spoke model in which 
members from a certain industry or region gather to share cyber threat data to centrally located analysts, who 
enrich and disseminate intelligence back to the community. [26] 
In the ISAC model, businesses can engage to exchange security information on phishing campaigns, malware 
attacks, systems vulnerabilities or other threats in order to strengthen each other with indicators and prevent 
incidents before they can impact the broader group. These communities typically adopt rules to manage the 
dissemination of the information, allowing anonymous sharing to protect companies’ reputation. [27] 
An example of network that use hub and spoke model is the Dutch National Detection Network (NDN). The 
National Detection Network (NDN) is a collaboration for a better and faster detection of digital dangers and 
risks. By sharing information about threats, parties can take appropriate measures timeously as part of their 
own responsibility, to limit or to prevent possible damage. [28] 
NDN focuses on two distinct target groups:  
 Private companies in industries that are considered crucial for the proper functioning of Dutch society. 
Examples of such industries are energy, water, and telecommunications.  
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 Departments and agencies of the Dutch national government, e.g., the ministries and executive bodies 
such as the tax and customs administration.  
NDN employs the MISP platform for all automated exchange of (technical) threat information. NDN was set up 
as a centralised service facilitated by centralized technical infrastructure (hub–spoke architecture). This 
approach was chosen to ensure that the uptake of the community would not be hindered by practical 
obstacles.  
 
Figure 4: A national detection network 
 
Other examples of organisations that use hub and spoke model are national CERTs, DHS AIS, US-CERT, 
Electronic Crimes Taskforce (ECTF), FBI’s e-guardian and ECS.  
Advantages: This is a cost-effective model for crowdsourcing additional security but among a vetted, trusted 
group of professionals with a common interest, using common technology and with supporting, independent 
analysis. [27] 
Challenges: According to what The MITRE Corporation said in [25], the entire system relies on the functioning 
of the hub, which makes the system vulnerable to delays and systemic failures. If the hub is not working well, 
then the entire information-sharing mechanism will not work well. The more members that participate in the 
exchange, the more information will be sent to the hub for processing, filtering, analysis, and distribution. While 
more information can provide greater analytic insight, it can also increase the burden on the hub and possibly 
introduce delays into the system. Because the most valuable information is often time-sensitive, delays in 
distribution can reduce the benefits of the information-sharing mechanism. Finally, a hub-and-spoke model 
can be expensive. The more “value-added” services are provided by the hub, the more it will cost. If the costs 
are borne by the members, then those fees will become requirements for entry into the exchange. If those fees 
are high, they may preclude certain companies from joining the group. [25] 
According to what The MITRE Corporation said in [25], a related challenge is that sharing information in this 
model requires a high degree of trust in the hub. It may be difficult to create a hub-and-spoke structure around 
either a for-profit company or a government agency. In the former case, there may be natural conflict-of-interest 
issues and/or members may be reluctant to share information with another company that is trying to maximize 
profits while acting as a trusted third party. In the latter case, companies may be reluctant to share information 
directly with a government agency, due to fears of information being leaked or disclosed by Freedom of 
Information Laws requests that allow access by the general public to data held by national governments. In 
addition, there are cultural barriers that often lead companies to distrust the government. Companies need to 
feel that the benefits they gain by sharing sensitive information with the government must outweigh the risks; 
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often, this barrier is not crossed. For this reason, it is important that common rules and regulations have been 
implemented. 
Peer‐to‐peer		
This model is defined generally by the ability of any member of a community to interact and share with any 
other member, rather than going through a central hub. 
According to what The MITRE Corporation said in [25], because information is shared among participants, 
there must be trust relationships among all members of the exchange or the model will not work well. One way 
to build an atmosphere of trust is to design the information exchange to a specific mission. This will create an 
environment where members face common threats. They will seek to share information and focus the 
community around those threats. Having a specific mission makes it easier to define membership and provide 
direction. Furthermore, trust in a community is a function of how much members believe that other members 
support the same mission, respect the community rules, and are willing to participate on a reciprocal basis. 
Thus, building an information-sharing system for a specific mission can maximize trust, if it is implemented 
properly. In addition, trust is facilitated and strengthened through face-to-face meetings and individuals who 
have a long history of personal rapport. It is important that the information-sharing model develop vetting 
requirements and procedures to facilitate the introduction of new members and to maintain communication 
among existing members. The security, speed, and convenience of these communication mechanisms will 
vary with the mission and requirements of the organisation. [25] 
Peer-to-peer networks can be especially beneficial for smaller communities or when members only interact 
with a part of a community. They may also be especially beneficial for those whose members have 
asymmetrical trust relationships or share under highly dynamic conditions that often change based upon 
content, current threat, and so on.  
An example of a peer-to-peer sharing community is the ETIS CERT-SOC Telco Network. ETIS, the community 
for telecom professionals, is a membership-based organisation that facilitates collaboration among European 
telecom providers. Its member base covers a substantial portion of the European telco landscape. Early 2013, 
ETIS established the so-called CERT-SOC Telco Network, comprised of security operations and incident 
response specialists in the various member organisations. A key activity of this group is the exchange of threat 
information and incident response experiences. [29] 
The telco group used the MISP platform to establish its automated threat exchange channels.  
Very important telecommunication players like Proximus, Kpn, Swisscom and A1 Telekom Austria joined to 
CERT-SOC Telco Network.  
Advantages: Because members share directly with each other, information dissemination is quick and can be 
easily scaled to many participants. A peer-to-peer model can also be inexpensive, because there is no need 
to pay for a central hub. On the other hand, this model does not contain built in “value-added” services; the 
only information that is flowing between members is the data collected and analysed by the members. This 
places a premium on sharing the right kinds of information.  
The greatest benefit would be derived from sharing intrusion attempt information (i.e. information about 
incidents, regardless of actual intrusions).  
There are many good reasons for sharing intrusion attempt information:  
 It is less sensitive than other types of data. Information about attempted intrusions is less revealing 
that information about successful intrusions. Other members will not know if the attempts were 
successful; therefore, they cannot draw conclusions about a given company’s vulnerabilities or its 
information security capabilities;  
 It can be disseminated quickly. Because intrusion attempt information requires less sanitization and 
analysis than other types of incidents, it can be shared quickly with other members. Timeliness is 
critical because adversaries adapt their tactics and techniques quickly;  
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 It is actionable. Intrusion attempt information can be acted upon in a timely fashion. If one organisation 
alerts other organisations that it has detected a specific type of malware or a particular type of social 
engineering attack, other organisations can look for similar patterns. This can be done quickly, without 
revealing sensitive information to each other.  
Challenges: a challenge is the difficulty managing many trust relationships when community membership 
grows. To scale effectively, members must agree on a common taxonomy for incident information and a 
template for sharing relevant information while making information anonymous and removing sensitive data. 
A related challenge of a post-to-all information exchange is that members must have infrastructures that protect 
and support the communication of relevant information and processes that allow for identifying and acting on 
high-priority incidents. If such infrastructures and processes place a heavy burden on member organisations, 
they will be reluctant to exchange information. Information security staffs are often incredibly busy; therefore, 
the information sharing process must be easy. That is one reason why introducing automation can be 
beneficial. If a company can receive an alert in a format that can be ingested and interpreted by a computer, 
then the people involved can focus on analysing and evaluating response actions. [25] 
Then redundant sharing of the same information may be more likely in this model, and it may lead to inefficient 
“churn” depending upon technology and other conditions. 
The peer to peer model is challenging and multi complex model to manage in an international environment 
and can create an unnecessarily confusing operating environment. 
Source‐Subscriber 
A single entity publishes information out to a group of consumers. This is a common model in commercial 
environments, where the data source is a vendor and the subscribers purchase access to the vendor’s 
information. This is also a common model for free alerts from some authoritative source [24]. 
Hybrid		
An information exchange could use a peer-to-peer model for the exchange of intrusion indicators while 
sending incident-response data to a centralized hub. This hub could conduct analysis on the data coming 
from multiple organisations to produce analytic reports for all to use. A second option would allow members 
of the information exchange to send the same data to each other and to a central hub. [25] 
A hybrid model can also mean that there are two or more hubs on EU level. This means strengthening of the 
national hub. A European hub would be the main hub but there would be sub-hubs at national level. Interpol 
and other supranational organisations that investigate crime also need data for crime prevention. For this 
reason, too, one centralized hub may become too challenging. 
Advantages: the benefit would be the ability to act on time-sensitive data through direct, collaborative sharing 
while leveraging the value of the hub’s ability to collect, synthesize, and analyse data across the membership 
and disseminate findings in the longer term. 
The hybrid model extends the ability to exchange sensitive data to and among public safety authorities quickly. 
It also allows to select alternative data sharing paths if for one reason or another, the main line of information 
sharing does not work.  
Challenges: establishing and running a hybrid arrangement is difficult. The mechanics of sharing information 
across two different architectures can become complicated, and the governance of such a model can be a 
challenge. In addition, the costs associated with an exchange using a hybrid model will be greater than those 
for an exchange that relies on a single model. [25] 
In any case, the hybrid model cannot be implemented directly to state infrastructure but the first cycle of 
generating hybrid model is the Hub and Spoke model. Controlled development into a hybrid model also means 
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that national challenges and cultural differences have been resolved. Development of this information sharing 
model as part of continuity management is highlighted at EU level.  
 How to share? Sharing methods  
Publish‐subscribe		
The publish-subscribe method for sharing threat intelligence consists of a producer who publishes information 
on a regular or irregular basis, and whose publications are individually subscribed by one or more community 
members. This approach can be applied in either the peer-to-peer or the hub-and-spoke sharing models. In 
the case of a peer-to-peer network, a producer could, for example, automate cyber threat indicator sharing 
into a repository from which other members pull feeds, or a producer can post to a message board/forum and 
subscribers receive alerts. In the case of the hub-and-spoke model, the publisher may be the hub and the 
producers (members) could submit to the hub for processing, usually to verify, refine, de-duplicate, or correlate 
with other known threat intelligence, before publishing it out to the subscriber base. One of the benefits of the 
publish-subscribe method in a hub-and-spoke model is the ability to aggregate and analyse information in a 
central location and then publish a richer, more complete picture of an incident or actor. This is very useful in 
a rapidly evolving environment when many participants may be sharing different observations and analyses.  
Crowdsourcing		
Crowdsourcing occurs when members collectively contribute to a discussion thread, an automated cyber threat 
sharing repository, or another system to organically transform granular threat data into more coherent threat 
intelligence. By virtue of participating in crowdsourcing the intelligence picture, the information is also shared 
with members. Like the publish-subscribe method above, crowdsourcing can take place in both peer-to-peer 
and hub-and-spoke networks, the key distinction being the presence of a central party directing the 
crowdsourcing through the hub, versus true organic freewheeling among the community. Both, of course, can 
be very effective. One of the benefits of crowdsourcing is that regular social interactions among members help 
to build trust and strengthen the community.  
 
 How to share? Exchanges methods  
Organisations can exchange information any number of ways. The four most commonly used, according to 
what Cristin Goodwin and J. Paul Nicholas said in [23], are formalized, security clearance-based, trust-based, 
and ad hoc. In almost all situations, the method of exchange determines which actors can be included and it 
defines the scope of the program. Therefore, when designing an exchange, it is important to determine the 
method that best corresponds to the group membership and its goals.  
Formalized	exchanges		
A formalized exchange is one based on an agreement, such as a non-disclosure agreement, legal contract, 
or a membership agreement. Its conditions identify the parties and often state what information is to be 
exchanged, how it can be used, and how its confidentiality will be protected. One example of a formalized 
exchange is the Microsoft Active Protections Program (MAPP), a program for security software providers that 
currently brings together more than 80 partners. Members of MAPP receive security vulnerability information 
from the Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC) in advance of the monthly security updates from 
Microsoft. This information enables them to give their customers updated protections, such as antivirus 
software, network-based intrusion detection systems, or host-based intrusion prevention systems. Another 
example is the Asia Pacific Computer Emergency Response Team, a membership-based organisation 
established to enhance cooperation among more than 30 CERTs in the Asia Pacific region. [23] 
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Security	clearance‐based	exchanges		
Certain information-exchange programs, especially those involving intelligence services, need to exchange 
classified and other sensitive information through protected channels, sometimes directly with a single party. 
A security clearance-based exchange represents a subset of a formalized exchange, one that is narrower in 
scope and participation. In the long term, the security clearance process builds trust between participants. 
However, it can also severely constrain the actors involved, such as limiting participants to those of a particular 
country—a challenging requirement in a global market. Getting private sector participants cleared can be 
difficult and slow and is made even more complex by the international workforces found in large technology 
companies. Such classified exchange is more likely to be successful when involving defence contractors or 
other entities which are accustomed to working with classified material. [23] 
Trust‐based	exchanges		
Trust-based groups are often closed groups of like-minded cybersecurity actors who inform one another on an 
ad hoc basis when they see security issues of common concern. They work on the principle that trust is 
extended to unknown members through chains of trusted relationships with other known members. They 
generally do not have formal agreements or contracts covering the exchange of information between 
members, but they may implement systems like the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP). The TLP uses a color-coded 
system to identify those with whom information may be shared, thus signalling originator’s intent and easing 
fears about the extent of disclosure. The TLP also speeds information exchange, since recipients intrinsically 
know with whom they can share that information—without having to refer to the originator for permission to 
share it. Systems to establish and maintain trust among members can range from simple nominations by 
existing members to rigorous vouching and vetting systems. Trust is often afforded to individuals and not 
directly to the organisations for which they work. This means that, if an individual leaves an organisation, the 
organisation may not have the right to nominate another representative. Trust is built among participants based 
on their contributions, collective actions, and shared experiences. [23] 
Ad	hoc	exchanges		
Episodic or ad hoc information sharing often occurs in response to particular events, such as a new challenge 
or crisis, and is often of limited duration. This type of sharing is highly relevant and very focused on solving a 
particular set of problems. When successful, it can lay the foundation for more organized exchanges. [23] 
 
 How to share? Mechanisms of sharing  
An information exchange may use multiple mechanisms, depending on the nature of the information, actors 
involved, and the issues being addressed. To identify the most appropriate mechanism, the levels of 
automation required, and the format of the information being exchanged need to be considered. According to 
what Cristin Goodwin and J. Paul Nicholas said in [23], information exchange mechanisms are two: Person-
to-person exchange mechanism and machine-to-machine mechanism. 
Person‐to‐person	exchanges		
Many information exchanges are person-to-person exchanges of unstructured information. The most common 
mechanisms are email and phone calls, although encrypted email and web portals may also be used. For 
example, the Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center (FS-ISAC)4 and the US CERT allow 
participants to submit threat data that they collect through a web portal. Another example is the UK self-help 
portal for small communities, “Warning, advice and reporting point” (WARP),5 which is based on ISO 270106 
and which encourages information sharing. Such an exchange mechanism is potentially valuable because it 
can handle large amounts of data and can allow participants to anonymously submit information. However, 
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the challenge with person-to-person exchanges is that they are difficult to scale, requiring significant personal 
relationships with history and trust to facilitate the exchange of information. [23] 
Machine‐to‐machine	exchanges		
Among security professionals, there is currently a lot of focus on developing systems that automate the 
exchange of information. It is believed that such systems enable actors not only to identify information 
important to them more quickly, but also to automate mitigations to threats as they occur. In the United States, 
recent examples of machine-to-machine information exchanges include: the Security Event System and its 
Collective Intelligence Framework component, from the Research and Education Networking Information 
Sharing and Analysis Center (REN-ISAC); Public Regional Information Security Event Management 
(PRISEM), from the state of Washington; and the Enhanced Cybersecurity Services (ECS) offered by the US 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Microsoft Interflow10 is a security and threat information exchange 
platform for professionals working in cybersecurity that works with a similar set of principles. It uses industry 
specifications, such as Structured Threat Information eXpression (STIX) and Trusted Automated eXchange of 
Indicator Information (TAXII), to create an automated, machine-readable feed of threat and security information 
that can be shared across industries and groups in near real time. This can help reduce cost and increase the 
speed of defense by automating processes that are currently often performed manually. [23] 
 
3.3 Cyber information sharing governance structures 
Annex 3 has a section that discusses cyber information sharing governance structures. Its Table 1 introduces 
some articles with regard to cyber situational awareness information sharing, and Table 2 presents the 
taxonomy on information sharing models developed by Sedenberg and Dempsey [21]. They identify the 
following different cyber information sharing models: 
 Government-centric is centralised model where one central organisation may share the information 
exchange or perform processing to enrich the data to others [30], [31]. The Department of Homeland 
Security is one kind of hierarchical Government-centric organisation. The central infrastructures use 
open, standard data formats and transport protocol [30]. 
 Sector-based Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs) are examples of Government-
Prompted, Industry-Centric Sharing Models. Centres are non-profit, member-driven organisations 
formed by critical infrastructure owners and operators to share information between government and 
industry. ISACs work through the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP13) [32]. The National 
Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) works in close coordination with all of 
the ISACs via the National Council of ISACs. They serve as collection and analysis points for private 
sector entities to share data on a peer-to-peer basis, to feed information into the federal government, 
and to provide a channel for federal information to flow out to the private sector. The purpose of 
Information Sharing and Analysis Organisations (ISAOs) is to gather, analyse, and disseminate cyber-
threat information, but unlike ISACs, ISAOs are not sector-affiliated and they are for any sector or 
community. ISAOs do not need to be part of the 16 critical infrastructures.  
 Corporate-Initiated, Peer Based Groups are privately sponsored cybersecurity information sharing 
entities. These companies have undertaken on their own initiative without government intervention to 
coordinate information sharing. These information exchanges can be tailored to fit the specific needs 
of their members [21]. 
 Individual-Based Groups are small online communities of peers to share sensitive information with the 
goal of combat attacks immediately. These groups require a high degree of trust [21]. 
 Open Communities and Platforms are open-source sharing platforms. For example, STIX indicators 
and open source intelligence feeds are this kind of format. The Malware Information Sharing Platform 
(MISP) is a free, open –source platform developed by researchers from the Computer Incident 
Response Center of Luxemburg, the Belgian military and NATO.  
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 Proprietary Products and Commercialised Services consists e.g. antivirus software and firewalls that 
disseminate cybersecurity information through software updates. Companies offering these products 
and services may participate in any of the other information exchanges [21]. 
 
3.4 Sharing Technologies for Cyber Security Information 
Table 3 of Annex 3 presents the most popular technical standards for sharing cybersecurity information 
required in cyber situational awareness. 
The U.S Department of Homeland Security uses a system called Automated Indicator Sharing (AIS)1 for 
providing the bidirectional sharing of the cyber security threat indicator information. AIS participants are 
connect to the DHS-managed system in the Department’s National Cybersecurity and Communications 
Integration Center (NCCIC) that allows bidirectional sharing of cyber threat indicators. A server housed at each 
stakeholder´s location allows them to exchange indicators with the NCCIC as Figure 5 illustrates. Participants 
receive and can share DHS-developed indicators that they have observed during their own network defence 
efforts. DHS will then share these indicators to all AIS participants [33]. 
 
Figure 5: Cyber information sharing model in the U.S.A 
 
Stakeholders who share indicators through AIS will not be identified as the original source of those indicators 
to other participants unless they affirmatively consent to the disclosure of their identity. Senders are 
anonymous unless they want DHS to share it. Indicators are not validated by DHS as the emphasis is on 
velocity and volume: our partners tell us they will vet the indicators they receive through AIS. The Department’s 
goal is to share as many indicators as possible as quickly as possible.  The U.S. Government also need useful 
information about indicators [33]. 
AIS utilises the Structured Threat Information Expression (STIX) and Trusted Automated eXchange of 
Indicator Information (TAXII) specifications for machine-to-machine communication. STIX is a language and 
                                                
1 https://www.us-cert.gov/ais 
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serialisation format that enables organisations to exchange Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) in a consistent and 
machine-readable manner. TAXII is an application layer protocol used to exchange CTI over HTTPS. Figure 
1 of Annex 3 presents the architecture of STIX, and its Figure 2 demonstrates STIX use cases where also 
cyber security information sharing between organisations is implemented 
OASIS is a non-profit consortium that drives the development, convergence and adoption of open standards 
for the global information society. It defines twelve STIX Domain Objects. Attack Pattern is a type of TTP that 
describes ways threat actors attempt to compromise targets. Campaign is a grouping of adversarial behaviours 
that describes a set of malicious activities or attacks that occur over a period of time against a specific set of 
targets. Course of Action is an action taken to either prevent an attack or respond to an attack. Then Identify 
Individuals, organisations, or groups, as well as classes of individuals, organizations, or groups. Indicator 
means a pattern that can be used to detect suspicious or malicious cyber-activity. Intrusion Set is a grouped 
set of adversarial behaviours and resources with common properties believed to been organised by a single 
threat actor. Malware is a type of TTP (also malicious code and malicious software), used to compromise the 
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of a victim’s data or system. Observed Data means conveys information 
observed on a system or network (e.g., IP address). Report consists collections of threat intelligence focused 
on one or more topics, such as a description of a threat actor, malware, or attack technique, including 
contextual details. 
TAXII is the main transport mechanism for cyber-threat information represented in STIX. As Figure 6 shows, 
collection based communications means the situation when a single TAXII client makes a request to a TAXII 
server and the TAXII Server carry out that request with information from a database. A TAXII channel in TAXII 
Server enables TAXII clients to exchange information with other TAXII clients in a publish-subscribe model. 
TAXII clients can push messages to Channels and Subscribe to Channels to receive published messages. A 
TAXII Server may host multiple channels per application programming interface root. Stakeholder may share 
indicators with DHS through an ISAC or an ISAO without TAXII client [34]. 
 
Figure 6: Flow of cyber threat information in TAXII (Modified from [35]) 
 
Kokkonen, et al. [36] implement and evaluate a model for creating the information sharing communities for the 
cyber security situational awareness information. The model is presented and discusses in Annex 3. 
Traffic Light Protocol (TLP) facilitates a four-colour category for information sharing (red, amber, green, white). 
Red means "not for disclosure, restricted to participants only" and the meaning of white is "disclosure is not 
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limited". The TLP categories can be applied as a part of information sharing rules and topology construction 
for filtering data between organisations [37]. 
 
 Information sharing methodologies between CERTS/ CSIRTS and Law 
Enforcement 
Enhancing cooperation between EU member states, EU agencies and related Network and Information 
Security (NIS) communities as CERTS is also a crucial part of the cyber-ecosystem. It is not enough that small 
closed groups share information with each other without synergy to public safety organisations.  
The main goal of the Europol Information System (EIS) is to be the reference system for offences, individuals 
involved, and other related data to support EU Member States, Europol and its cooperation partners in their 
fight against organised cybercrime, terrorism, and other forms of serious crime.  For example, European 
Cybercrime Centre (EC3) as a part of Europol uses open source Malware Information Sharing Platform (MISP) 
[6].  
MISP is a tool for information sharing about malware samples and related malicious campaigns related to 
specific malware variants. It offers architectural flexibility allowing the utilisation as a centralised platform (e.g. 
CIRCL and FIRST instances), but also as a decentralised (peer-to-peer) platform2. MISP project designed the 
Permissible Actions Protocol (PAP) to indicate how the received information can be used. 
Europol’s Secure Information Exchange Network Application (SIENA) has been established to allow EU 
Member States to communicate and share intelligence. SIENA is a Virtual Private Network (VPN) designed to 
enable swift, secure and user-friendly exchange of operational and strategic crime- related information and 
intelligence between Member States, Europol, law enforcement cooperation partners and public safety 
organisations. 
In USA, National Information Exchange Model is an XML-based partnership mechanism between the U.S. 
Departments of Justice (DOJ) and Homeland Security (DHS), and enables information-sharing focusing on 
information exchanged among organisations as part of their current or intended business practices [38].  
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) hosted InfraGard’s Secure Web Portal allows secure messaging 
that promotes communication among members. Memberships give access to iGuardian, the FBI’s cyber-
incident reporting tool designed specifically for the private sector. InfraGard membership allows also Peer-to-
peer collaboration across InfraGard’s broad membership and Information sharing and relationship building 
with FBI and law enforcement. InfraGard engages subject matter experts and addresses threat issues across 
each of the 16 critical infrastructure sectors, DHS, and the National Infrastructure Protection Plan [32]. 
Digital Forensics XML toolset is intended to represent the following types of forensic data [39]:  
 Metadata describing the source disk image, ﬁle, or other input information.  
 Detailed information about the forensic tool that did the processing (e.g., the program name and where 
the program was compiled, linked libraries).  
 The state of the computer on which the processing was performed (e.g., the name of the computer; 
the time that the program was run; the dynamic libraries that were used).  
 The evidence or information that was extracted (how it was extracted, and where it was physically 
located). Cryptographic hash values of speciﬁc byte sequences. Operating-system-speciﬁc 
information useful for forensic analysis. 
                                                
2 https://misp-project.org/  
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The Cybersecurity Information Exchange Framework (CYBEX) will advance the development of automating 
cybersecurity information exchange. CYBEX Forensics domain is an operation domain that supports law 
enforcement operations by collecting evidences. The necessary information for this operation is stored in the 
Evidence Database. CYBEX provides a framework for exchange information between a network mediation 
point and a law enforcement facility to provide an array of diﬀerent real-time network forensics associated with 
a designated incident or event [40]. 
CYBEX-P and Privacy-Preserving Cybersecurity Information Exchange mechanism are modified from CYBEX 
and both based on an information sharing platform with a robust operational and administration structure. 
Privacy-Preserving Cybersecurity Information Exchange mechanism enables the organisations to share their 
cybersecurity information without revealing their identities [41]. CYBEX-P platform addresses the inefﬁciency 
in dealing with cybersecurity problems by an individual entity. Real-time exchange of threat data helps 
organisations analyse threats to predict and prevent future cyber-attacks. There are three parties involved 
throughout the complete lifecycle of the threat data: 1) Client organisation 2) CYBEX-P 3) Analysts and 
Researchers. The client organisation acts as the source of threat data. It can be any external or internal threat 
data source willing to share threat data with others. CYBEX-P works as the intermediary between all 
organisations and data analysts. Threat data may be machine generated or curated by a security specialist 
[42]. The processing server in CYBEX-P has a TPM Trusted Platform Module (TPM). The TPM veriﬁes the 
integrity of the software and hardware running in the processing server [42].  
When the aim is to share essential information between stakeholders as soon as possible, information sharing 
must be automatized. 
 
3.5 Shared situational awareness  
Theory of Situational Awareness (SA) is discussed in Annex 4, in which e.g. Endsley’s [43] situational 
awareness model is presented (Figure 2 of Annex 4). Annex 4 considers also the general requirements for 
situation awareness. But what the terms “shared situational awareness means”? Public safety actors like 
European law enforcement agencies need common shared situational picture for the cross-boarding tasks in 
a way that operational co-operation be based on reliable platform. 
According to [44], good team SA dependent on team members understanding the meaning of the shared 
information between them. This means that teams need to share pertinent data and the higher level of SA [44], 
[45]. According to [20], cooperation between cybersecurity organisations based on effective and efficient 
exchange of information. Information interoperability is the joint capability of different actors like persons, 
organisations and groups necessary to ensure exchange and common understanding of information needed 
for their successful [20]. Humans are not as good at processing large volumes of data, quickly and consistently. 
Flexible autonomy should provide smooth, simple, seamless transition of functions between human and the 
system [43]. 
Shared (cyber) Situational Awareness is closely related to (cybersecurity) information exchange, because 
without trusted information sharing a common situation or situational awareness is insufficient [46]. The 
development of shared Situational Awareness consists four factors as follows [46]:  
1. Shared SA requirements (team members degree to understand which information is needed by other 
team members),  
2. Shared SA devices (communications),  
3. shared SA mechanism (shared mental models) and  
4. Shared SA processes (effective team processes for sharing relevant information). 
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3.6 Remarks 
The literature review indicates that “cyber security information sharing” is not precisely defined in the area of 
cyber security. As mentioned above, the structures of the information sharing models are generally very sector-
specific and created in different environments. There is a need for a common early warning solution. Usually 
a word “warning” means also preventive functions as US intelligence services operates. The fight against 
hybrid threats means not only preventing cyber-attacks, but also identifying, tracing and prosecuting a criminal 
/ criminal group. This means an even deeper integration of government systems in the future. 
Relevant information from the site of major hybrid incident must be directly shared to the national participant’s 
e.g.  cyber security centres. To determinate discrepancies of limits is relevant to allocate additional reliable 
data. Combining pieces of information to ensure the correct and reliable information to be shared is primary 
importance. The essential information should process to the desired shape for the participants. In the future 
cyber-defence operations are more integrated and automated according to local capabilities, authorities and 
mission needs. Shared common operational picture means that real time communication link from local level 
to nation and EU level exist. A common cyber situational awareness is needed for both operating CPS and for 
emergency and crisis management. There should be the connection between cyber situational awareness and 
emergency management. 
When developing an early warning system at the EU level, three requirements exist: 1) The possibility that 
some EU Member State may leave an early warning system; 2) engaging participants in the values of western 
world; and 3) the possibility of joining Cyber Threat Warning System to NATO Cyber Situational Awareness 
Solutions. These factors have a direct link to sharing confidential information.  
It is important to take into account how national Cyber Security Centres cooperate with other organisations 
within critical infrastructure in national level. The states departments of the United States work closely together 
in the fight against threats in the field of cyber security. The organisations of public administration in European 
Union work together more formally. This is important noticed when cyber security expertise is being 
strengthened. The fundamental problems of the European community must be solved before permanent 
solutions can be built.  However, this does not prevent the development of operating models, but this factor 
must be taken into account when developing new systems. Firstly, confidence between member states must 
be on a stable basis.  
What are those fundamental differences of administrative functions between European Union and The United 
States? Mainly there are more similarities than differences. Legislation and regulation between USA and EU 
are coming closer with each other. NIS directive in EU will help to develop next generation early warning 
systems. USA and EU have made quite fundamental agreements to generate a common base for fluent 
information sharing. 
As Ilves et.al [47] mentioned there is no crucial barriers to increase collaboration concerning early warning 
solutions between US, NATO and EU. US’s Cyber security sharing act and Europe´s directive on Network and 
Information Security (NIS) have similar goals. In addition to this, EU and NATO signed a technical arrangement 
in 2016 to increase information sharing between the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability and EU 
Computer Emergency Response Team [47]. 
Public safety actors like European law enforcement agencies need common shared situational picture for the 
cross-boarding tasks in a way that operational co-operation will be based on reliable platform.  
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4. Analysis results 
This section present the analysis results of individual case studies carried out in Task 3.2 of the ECHO project.  
Section 4.1 Taxonomies for cyber information sharing is based on analysis results from the ECHO partners’ 
research, development and innovation work in earlier projects. It provides a definition of taxonomies as used 
in the cyber domain for cyber information sharing model for collaborative incident response. 
Health information sharing was selected as an example of sensitive information sharing models from other 
than cyber domain. Section 4.2 analyses Health Information Exchange (HIE) methods and models, and 
studies, for example, how to share and analyse the detected physiological profiles. 
Section 4.3 analyses the information sharing models applied in maritime domain. The main research question 
is “how can cyber information sharing models be understood in maritime domain?” 
Section 4.4 analyses inter-sector cyber information sharing models in critical infrastructure protection. It studies 
how the cyber situational awareness of an organisation can be developed; how do the organizations exchange 
their cyber security related information; and how an organisation’s cybersecurity capability can be utilised more 
extensively? 
Section 4.5 analyses cyber threat prevention mechanisms in Finland. It finds out the pros and cons of the 
national HAVARO system, and studies what are the factors (requirements), which effect for implementing 
national EWS system to common early warning ecosystem in EU level. Every EU member country has its own 
system for monitoring and protecting cyber domain among vital functions.  
Section 4.6 compares information sharing between US and EU emphasising cyber information sharing models 
in US. In addition, it handles legislative factors, organisational factors and features of the models.  
Effects of national fundamental risks to the international trust warning system and information sharing policy 
are crucial factors within smart societies. Political decision makers are elective, and also many of highest 
authorities are chosen based on political selection criteria. Hybrid or cyber influencing can create instability to 
the society in many ways, one key aim is to influence political decision-making. In practice, this means that 
there is a need to integrate organisational, administrative and operative functions. A trust model with cyber 
information sharing in CIP is a part of the preventive early warning solution. Secure national and international 
decision making needs a trust model. Section 4.7 studies these questions. 
The E-EWS and E-FCR are two of the four vital technologies developed within the ECHO project. Both can 
exploit each other in order to maximise their capabilities and offerings to the users. Section 4.8 deals with the 
synergies of information sharing needs with E-EWS and E-FCR. 
 
4.1 Taxonomies for cyber information sharing  
This section provides a definition of taxonomies as used in the cyber domain for cyber information sharing 
model for collaborative incident response. These taxonomies can be used as a reference for model design 
and as a source for cross-case conclusions in Section 5. 
The cyber domain information sharing model is comprised of multiple taxonomies to capture as much of the 
collaborative incident response workflow as possible in a normalised model. 
The cyber information sharing model which is presented here is based on public taxonomies in support of a 
collaborative incident response. 
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 Source information taxonomies 
A list of the public taxonomies that were used as source for the cyber information sharing model for 
collaborative incident response is presented below. 
 Structured Threat Information eXpression (STIX™) 
Structure language for cyber threat intelligence for sharing storing and analysed in a consistent 
manner. Lead by the OASIS Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) Technical Committee (TC) developments 
are ongoing. 
STIX 1.1.1: https://stixproject.github.io/about/ 
STIX 2.0: https://oasis-open.github.io/cti-documentation/ 
 Malware Attribute Enumeration and Characterization (MAEC™) 
MAEC 5.0: https://maecproject.github.io/ 
 Incident Categories 
FIRST CASE Classification: www.first.org 
 Traffic Light Protocol (TLP) 
TLP 1.0: https://www.first.org/tlp/ 
 Shared coordination ticket 
The cyber information sharing model within the cyber incident handling domain is based on two types of data;  
 Unstructured information which can be shared in the context of wiki pages, or using an open-source 
tool such as MITRE ATT&CK. 
 Structured information that is shared as reference data (i.e. STIX, CVE) and tickets to handle ongoing 
cyber incidents in a shared coordination mode. 
Structured reference data entries are gathered from (public) repositories and shared with all participants in an 
effort to provide a global unified view on the current threats and vulnerabilities. 
Tickets are shared as part of a collaborative incident response. The shared ticket is used to share the contained 
information across the organisational boundary. The shared fields of the ticket can be extended during the 
handling of the ticket. These groups of fields are specifically tailored to record information related to the ticket 
and are known as facets.  
A shared ticket is comprised of the following fields as Table 5 illustrates: 
Field Description Value type 
Template The template that defines the 
ticket fields and workflow  
Template definition 
Title The name of the ticket Text 
Description Description of the ticket Text 
Security 
Classification 
The security classification of 
the ticket 
Text 
Handler The assigned user to handle 
the ticket 
The handler of the ticket 
State The workflow state of the 
ticket 
Shared workflow state 
Shared with List of organisation the ticket 
is shared with 
Sharing partners 
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Field Description Value type 
Traffic Light 
Protocol 
Distribution classification Source: Traffic Light Protocol FIRST 
TLP: RED, TLP: AMBER, TLP: GREEN, TLP: 
WHITE 
Category Ticket categories Source: Incident category vocabulary STIX 1.1.1 
Exercise/Network Defense Testing, Unauthorised 
Access, Denial of Service, Malicious Code, 
Improper Usage, Scans/Probes/Attempted Access, 
Investigation 
Source: Incident Categories FIRST 
Denial of service, Forensics, Compromised 
Information, Compromised Asset, Unlawful activity, 
Internal Hacking, External Hacking, Malware, Email, 
Consulting, Policy Violations 
Table 5: Cyber-information sharing model for collaborative incident response fields 
Next to ticket base fields, additional shared information includes reference links to reference information 
entries, attachments, and comment entries. 
 
 Shared Facets 
A shared ticket can be extended with additional fields to allow more specific recording of contextual values; 
these groups of fields are called facets. The facets used for the cyber-information sharing model for 
collaborative incident response are detailed below. 
Affected	Assets		
Record affected assets in the context of a ticket. 
Field Description Value type 
Name The name of the affected 
asset 
Text 
Description Description of the affected 
asset 
Text 
Security 
Classification 
The security classification of 
the affected asset 
Text 
Location The location of the asset Text 
Asset Type: The type of asset Source: Asset type vocabulary STIX 1.1.1 
Backup, Database, DHCP, Directory, DCS, DNS, 
File, Log, Mail, Mainframe, Payment switch, POS 
controller, Print, Proxy, Remote access, SCADA, 
Web application, Server, Access reader, Camera, 
Firewall, HSM, IDS, Broadband, PBX, Private WAN, 
PLC, Public WAN, RTU, Router or switch, SAN, 
Telephone, VoIP adapter, LAN, WLAN, Network, 
Auth token, ATM, Desktop, PED pad, Gas terminal, 
Laptop, Media, Mobile phone, Peripheral, POS 
terminal, Kiosk, Tablet, Telephone, VoIP phone, 
User Device, Tapes, Disk media, Documents, Flash 
drive, Disk drive, Smart card, Payment card, Media, 
Administrator, Auditor, Call center, Cashier, 
Customer, Developer, End-user, Executive, 
Finance, Former employee, Guard, Helpdesk, 
Human resources, Maintenance, Manager, Partner, 
Person, Unknown 
 Project Number: 826293 
D3.6  ECHO information sharing models 
 
 
www.echonetwork.eu - @ECHOcybersec        page 39 of 155 
Field Description Value type 
Source: System Type Vocabulary STIX 1.1.1 
Enterprise Systems, Enterprise Systems - 
Application Layer, Enterprise Systems - Database 
Layer, Enterprise Systems - Enterprise 
Technologies and Support Infrastructure, Enterprise 
Systems - Network Systems, Enterprise Systems - 
Networking Devices, Enterprise Systems - Web 
Layer, Enterprise Systems - VoIP, Industrial Control 
Systems, Industrial Control Systems - Equipment 
Under Control, Industrial Control Systems - 
Operations Management, Industrial Control 
Systems - Safety, Protection and Local Control, 
Industrial Control Systems - Supervisory Control, 
Mobile Systems, Mobile Systems - Mobile Operating 
Systems, Mobile Systems - Near Field 
Communications, Mobile Systems - Mobile Devices, 
Third-Party Services, Third-Party Services - 
Application Stores, Third-Party Services - Cloud 
Services, Third-Party Services - Security Vendors, 
Third-Party Services - Social Media, Third-Party 
Services - Software Update, Users, Users - 
Application And Software, Users - Workstation, 
Users - Removable Media 
Table 6: Affected asset facet fields 
Data	Exfiltration	
Record information concerning data exfiltration. 
Field Description Value type 
Description Description of the exfiltration Text 
First recorded 
exfiltration 
When was the first 
exfiltration event recorded 
Datetime 
Containment 
achieved 
When was the containment 
achieved 
Datetime 
Containment 
actions 
The actions taken Text 
Exfiltration Targets Targets of the exfiltration Text 
Table 7: Data exfiltration facet fields 
Forensic	Analysis	
Record results of forensic analysis. 
Field Description Value type 
Type of Analysis The type of analysis 
requested 
Source: Analysis types MAEC 
static, dynamic, combination 
Initial compromise 
time 
When was the initial 
compromise recorded 
Datetime 
Last activity Time of the last recorded 
activity 
Datetime 
Detailed results The detailed results of the 
analysis 
Text 
Table 8: Forensic analysis facet fields 
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Impact	Assessment	
Record assessment of impact. 
Field Description Value type 
Impact effects The possible effects of an 
incident. 
Source: incident effect vocabulary STIX 1.1.1 
Brand or Image Degradation, Loss of Competitive 
Advantage, Loss of Competitive Advantage - 
Economic, Loss of Competitive Advantage - Military, 
Loss of Competitive Advantage - Political, Data 
Breach or Compromise, Degradation of Service, 
Destruction, Disruption of Service / Operations, 
Financial Loss, Loss of Confidential / Proprietary 
Information or Intellectual Property, Regulatory, 
Compliance or Legal Impact, Unintended Access, 
User Data Loss 
Asset losses The level of asset-related 
losses that occurred in the 
Incident, including lost or 
damaged assets, stolen funds, 
cash outlays, etc 
Source: impact rating vocabulary STIX 1.1.1 
None, Minor, Moderate, Major, Unknown 
Business-mission 
disruption 
The level of business or mission 
disruption impact that occurred 
in the Incident including 
unproductive man-hours, lost 
revenue from system 
downtime, etc. 
Source: impact rating vocabulary STIX 1.1.1 
None, Minor, Moderate, Major, Unknown 
Response and 
Recovery Cost 
The level of response and 
recovery related costs that 
occurred in the Incident 
including cost of response, 
investigation, remediation, 
restoration, etc. 
Source: impact rating vocabulary STIX 1.1.1 
None, Minor, Moderate, Major, Unknown 
Impact Level The subjective level of impact Source: impact qualification vocabulary STIX 
1.1.1 
Insignificant, Distracting, Painful, Damaging, 
Catastrophic, Unknown 
Table 9: Impact assessment facet fields 
Indicator	of	Compromise	
Record the indicators of compromise.  
Field Description Value type 
Name The name of the IOC Text 
Description Description of the IOC Text 
IOC Type The type of the IOC Source: Indicator Type Vocabulary STIX 1.1.1 
Malicious E-mail, IP Watchlist, File Hash Watchlist, 
Domain Watchlist, URL Watchlist, Malware Artifacts, 
C2, Anonymization, Exfiltration, Host Characteristics, 
Compromised PKI Certificate, Login Name, IMEI 
Watchlist, IMSI Watchlist 
Source: Indicator Label STIX 2.0 
Anomalous-activity, Anonymization, Benign, 
Compromised, Malicious-activity, Attribution 
Table 10: Indicator of compromise facet fields 
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Malware	
Record malware information. 
Field Description Value type 
Name Name of the malware Text 
Description Description of the analysis to 
be performed 
Text 
Initial compromise When was the initial 
compromise 
Datetime 
Containment 
achieved 
When was malware 
containment achieved 
Datetime 
Restoration 
achieved 
When was full restoration 
achieved 
Datetime 
References References to information for 
this malware 
Text 
Removal actions Course of action, mitigation 
steps 
Text 
Characteristics The characteristics attributed 
to the malware under analysis 
Source: Malware Type Vocabulary STIX 1.1.1 
Automated Transfer Scripts, Adware, Dialer, Bot, Bot - 
Credential Theft, Bot - DDoS, Bot - Loader, Bot - Spam, 
DoS / DDoS, DoS / DDoS - Participatory, DoS / DDoS 
- Script, DoS / DDoS - Stress Test Tools, Exploit Kits, 
POS / ATM Malware, Ransomware, Remote Access 
Trojan, Rogue Antivirus, Rootkit 
Source: Malware Label STIX 2.0 
Adware, Backdoor, Bot, ddos, Dropper, Exploit-kit, 
Keylogger, Ransomware, Remote-access-trojan, 
Resource-exploitation, Rogue-security-software, 
Rootkit, Screen-capture, Spyware, Trojan, Virus, 
Worm 
Source: Malware Labels MAEC 
adware, appender, backdoor, boot-sector-virus, bot, 
cavity-filler, clicker, companion-virus, data-diddler, 
ddos, downloader, dropper, exploit-kit, file-infector-
virus, file-less, fork-bomb, greyware, implant, 
keylogger, kleptographic-worm, macro-virus, malware-
as-a-service, mass-mailer, metamorphic-virus, mid-
infector, mobile-code, multipartite-virus, parental-
control, password-stealer, polymorphic-virus, 
premium-dialer-smser, prepender, ransomware, 
remote-access-trojan, resource-exploiter, rogue-
security-software, rootkit, scareware, screen-capture, 
security-assessment-tool, shellcode, spyware, 
trackware, trojan, virus, web-bug, worm 
Table 11: Malware facet fields 
Malware	Analysis	
Record results of malware analysis. 
Field Description Value type 
Name Name of the malware Text 
Description Description of the analysis to 
be performed 
Text 
Analysis Results The detailed results of the 
analysis 
Text 
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Field Description Value type 
Initial compromise When was the initial 
compromise 
Datetime 
Containment 
achieved 
When was malware 
containment achieved 
Datetime 
Restoration 
achieved 
When was full restoration 
achieved 
Datetime 
References References to information for 
this malware 
Text 
Removal actions Course of action, mitigation 
steps 
Text 
Type of Analysis The type of analysis to be 
performed 
Source: Analysis types MAEC 
static, dynamic, combination 
Characteristics The characteristics attributed 
to the malware under analysis 
Source: Malware Type Vocabulary STIX 1.1.1 
Automated Transfer Scripts, Adware, Dialer, Bot, Bot - 
Credential Theft, Bot - DDoS, Bot - Loader, Bot - Spam, 
DoS / DDoS, DoS / DDoS - Participatory, DoS / DDoS 
- Script, DoS / DDoS - Stress Test Tools, Exploit Kits, 
POS / ATM Malware, Ransomware, Remote Access 
Trojan, Rogue Antivirus, Rootkit 
Source: Malware Label STIX 2.0 
Adware, Backdoor, Bot, ddos, Dropper, Exploit-kit, 
Keylogger, Ransomware, Remote-access-trojan, 
Resource-exploitation, Rogue-security-software, 
Rootkit, Screen-capture, Spyware, Trojan, Virus, Worm 
Source: Malware Labels MAEC 
adware, appender, backdoor, boot-sector-virus, bot, 
cavity-filler, clicker, companion-virus, data-diddler, 
ddos, downloader, dropper, exploit-kit, file-infector-
virus, file-less, fork-bomb, greyware, implant, 
keylogger, kleptographic-worm, macro-virus, malware-
as-a-service, mass-mailer, metamorphic-virus, mid-
infector, mobile-code, multipartite-virus, parental-
control, password-stealer, polymorphic-virus, premium-
dialer-smser, prepender, ransomware, remote-access-
trojan, resource-exploiter, rogue-security-software, 
rootkit, scareware, screen-capture, security-
assessment-tool, shellcode, spyware, trackware, 
trojan, virus, web-bug, worm 
Behaviours The behaviours attributed to 
the malware under analysis 
Source: Behaviors MAEC 
access-premium-service, autonomous-remote-
infection, block-security-websites, capture-camera-
input, capture-file-system-data, capture-gps-data, 
capture-keyboard-input, capture-microphone-input, 
capture-mouse-input, capture-printer-output, capture-
system-memory, capture-system-network-traffic, 
capture-system-screenshot, capture-touchscreen-
input, check-for-payload, check-language, click-fraud, 
compare-host-fingerprints, compromise-remote-
machine, control-local-machine-via-remote-command, 
control-malware-via-remote-command, crack-
passwords, defeat-call-graph-generation, defeat-
emulator, defeat-flow-oriented-disassembler, defeat-
linear-disassembler, degrade-security-program, 
denial-of-service, destroy-hardware, detect-debugging, 
detect-emulator, detect-installed-analysis-tools, detect-
installed-av-tools, detect-sandbox-environment, 
detect-vm-environment, determine-host-ip-address, 
disable-access-rights-checking, disable-firewall, 
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Field Description Value type 
disable-kernel-patch-protection, disable-os-security-
alerts, disable-privilege-limiting, disable-service-pack-
patch-installation, disable-system-file-overwrite-
protection, disable-update-services-daemons, disable-
user-account-control, drop-retrieve-debug-log-file, 
elevate-privilege, encrypt-data, encrypt-files, encrypt-
self, erase-data, evade-static-heuristic, execute-
before-external-to-kernel-hypervisor, execute-non-
main-cpu-code, execute-stealthy-code, exfiltrate-data-
via-covert channel, exfiltrate-data-via- -dumpster-dive, 
exfiltrate-data-via-fax, exfiltrate-data-via-network, 
exfiltrate-data-via-physical-media, exfiltrate-data-via-
voip-phone, feed-misinformation-during-physical-
memory-acquisition, file-system-instantiation, 
fingerprint-host, generate-c2-domain-names, hide-
arbitrary-virtual-memory, hide-data-in-other-formats, 
hide-file-system-artifacts, hide-kernel-modules, hide-
network-traffic, hide-open-network-ports, hide-
processes, hide-registry-artifacts, hide-services, hide-
threads, hide-userspace-libraries, identify-file, identify-
os, identify-target-machines, impersonate-user, install-
backdoor, install-legitimate-software, install-
secondary-malware, install-secondary-module, 
intercept-manipulate-network-traffic, inventory-
security-products, inventory-system-applications, 
inventory-victims, limit-application-type-version, log-
activity, manipulate-file-system-data, map-local-
network, mine-for-cryptocurrency, modify-file, modify-
security-software-configuration, move-data-to-staging-
server, obfuscate-artifact-properties, overload-
sandbox, package-data, persist-after-hardware-
changes, persist-after-os-changes, persist-after-
system-reboot, prevent-api-unhooking, prevent-
concurrent-execution, prevent-debugging, prevent-file-
access, prevent-file-deletion, prevent-memory-access, 
prevent-native-api-hooking, prevent-physical-memory-
acquisition, prevent-registry-access, prevent-registry-
deletion, prevent-security-software- -from-executing, 
re-instantiate-self, remove-self, remove-sms-warning-
messages, remove-system-artifacts, request-email-
address-list, request-email-template, search-for-
remote-machines, send-beacon, send-email-message, 
send-system-information, social-engineering-based-
remote-infection, steal-browser-cache, steal-browser-
cookies, steal-browser-history, steal-contact-list-data, 
steal-cryptocurrency-data, steal-database-content, 
steal-dialed-phone-numbers, steal-digital-certificates, 
steal-documents, steal-email-data, steal-images, steal-
password-hashes, steal-pki-key, steal-referrer-urls, 
steal-serial-numbers, steal-sms-database, steal-web-
network-credential, stop-execution-of-security-
software, suicide-exit, test-for-firewall, test-for-internet-
connectivity, test-for-network-drives, test-for-proxy, 
test-smtp-connection, update-configuration, validate-
data, write-code-into-file 
Source: Common Attributes MAEC 
applicable-platform, archive-type, autonomy, 
backdoor-type, cryptocurrency-type, encryption-
algorithm, erasure-scope,file-infection-type, file-
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Field Description Value type 
modification-type, file-type, frequency, infection-
targeting, network-protocol, port-number, persistence-
scope, propagation-scope, targeted-application, 
targeted-file-architecture type, targeted-file-type, 
targeted-program, targeted-sandbox, targeted-vm, 
targeted-website, technique, trigger-type, user-
privilege-escalation type, vulnerability-id-cve, 
vulnerability-id-osvdb 
Table 12: Malware analysis facet field 
Policy	Violation	
Record violated policies. 
Field Description Value type 
Description Description of the policy 
violation 
Text 
First Occurrence When did the policy violation 
first occur 
Datetime 
User ID The user identification 
number recorded as part of 
the policy violation 
Text 
Username The username recorded as 
part of the policy violation 
Text 
User contact 
information 
The user contact information Text 
Response actions Description of the actions 
taken 
Text 
Table 13: Policy violation facet fields 
Point	of	Contact	
Record point of Contact details. 
Field Description Value type 
Type Type of the PoC Issue Reporter, Point of Contact 
Name The (full) name of the PoC Text 
Contact information The PoC contact information Text 
Role Description A description of the role of the PoC Text 
Organisation name The name of the organization of the PoC 
(if applicable) 
Text 
Table 14: Point of contact facet fields 
 Shared workflow 
A ticket for coordination and collaboration is governed by a shared workflow as shown in Figure 7. The ticket 
workflow is simple to ensure cross-boundary applicability to multiple organisations. The originating 
organization is in control of the workflow state for the coordination ticket. 
 Project Number: 826293 
D3.6  ECHO information sharing models 
 
 
www.echonetwork.eu - @ECHOcybersec        page 45 of 155 
 
Figure 7 Shared ticket workflow 
 
A coordination ticket starts in the NEW state. In this state the ticket is being prepared in advance of sharing. 
Once a coordination ticket is moved to the IN-PROGRESS state the ticket is shared with the selected partners. 
While in this state the sharing partners collaborate on the ticket handling. Once the ticket has been handled it 
is moved to the APPROVE CLOSURE state. In this state the shared ticket is inspected by the originating 
organisation to ensure compliancy and that it is ready to be closed. At this stage the ticket might be set back 
to IN PROGRESS or moved on to the CLOSED state. 
A shared ticket that is CLOSED is in a read-only state. The originating organisation can reopen the ticket by 
setting it back IN PROGRESS if required. 
 
4.2 Health information sharing  
In 2019, millions of people are collecting and real-time monitoring remotely their vital signs, such as blood 
pressure and respiratory rate, or other physiological data such as the posture and gait, the skeletal muscle 
movement (electromyogram or electromyography, EMG), temperature, sleeping, and brain activity 
(electroencephalograms, EEG), skin hydration, blood oxygen level, medication ingestion, eye moving tracking 
(electrooculogram, EOG), on everyday devices like smartwatches and iPhones. These physiological signals 
from smart wearable sensors are collected, stored, and analysed with smartphone and cloud computing for 
the further applications to the disease management and healthcare. 
The pipeline of collection of physiological data from wearable sensors and mining these data for healthcare 
wisdoms is scratched in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8: The pipeline of physiological data collection to healthcare wisdoms 
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In the new era, an increasing number of patients are going online to access information about their health and 
talk to other patients with a shared condition. Many patients share advice and details about their treatments 
and symptoms with one another as well as researchers. Clinical trial researchers increasingly use the Internet 
for recruiting subjects, communicating with participants, and even collecting data. [48] 
 
 
 Health Information Exchange (HIE) 
Health Information Exchange (HIE) refers to the electronic transmission of health care data among facilities 
and professionals within a particular community, area, or hospital. In other words, HIE is the ability to 
appropriately access and securely share patients’ health information between different HealthCare 
Organizations (HCOs) according to national standards. It involves healthcare and government institutions, 
health information organizations, and qualified health care providers. The purpose of HIE development is to 
improve healthcare delivery by offering reliable and secure ways to access and retrieve health information 
among diverse systems. It is an inherent part of the health information technology infrastructure as it aims to 
improve data gathering and medical care. 
While nowadays most medical information is still gathered through written records and is stored in paper form, 
HIE managed to develop three main methods to innovate current healthcare procedures. These methods are 
defined as: consumer-mediated exchange, directed exchange, and query-based exchange: 
 Consumer-mediated exchange is done by providing patients with access to their own electronic 
records, thus allowing them to track their health conditions, determine whether there is erroneous 
billing or medical data, and update their self-reports; 
 Directed exchange is conducted when a healthcare organization transfers such vital information as 
lab test results and medication dosage to other specialists involved in the care of the same patient; 
 Query-based exchange usually occurs in unplanned medical care when a healthcare organization 
needs the previous health records of a new patient. This is done by requesting access to these records 
through the HIE system.  
A patient’s medical records should follow him or her wherever and whenever needed, despite barriers that 
may occur due to the involvement of multiple facilities in different geographic areas. Thus, current HIE 
governance should be done through effective collaboration between entities while considering implementation 
costs. Unfortunately, not all facilities are able to afford electronic exchange, and this is why this issue should 
be further addressed by both reducing the overall cost of HIE and searching for substantial financial support 
for the development of the system. Furthermore, governance policies and models should be introduced and 
constantly updated to efficiently manage the system and solve arising issues. Finally, since health-related 
information is too private to be retrieved by non-professionals, HIE relies on secure data transfer among 
various electronic systems. This is why HIE should be done with regards to privacy policies, strictly limiting the 
access to patients’ records in order to prevent any outsider from gaining unauthorized access to the system. 
The information should be exchanged among entities without leaking out of the system, which may occur 
because of the faults of the system itself or liability issues. 
Governance	
Governance in the context of Health Information Exchange (HIE) refers to the establishment and oversight of 
a common set of behaviours, policies, and standards that enable trusted, electronic HIE among a set of 
participants. Before data can be shared, the parties involved must establish a governing body with a set of 
broad and representative stakeholders. The governing body defines what data will be shared, how they will be 
shared, and under what circumstances they will be shared. The governing body creates a governance 
framework to ensure compliance with legal, technical, and operational requirements related to the protection, 
use, and disclosure of Protected Health Information (PHI). Data sharing agreements codify the policies and 
procedures established by the governing body. These elements are essential for competing health care 
organizations to agree to share data. As outlined in Figure 9, a governance framework begins with the 
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formation of a governing body, which creates policies and procedures and establishes a series of data sharing 
agreements.  
 
 
Figure 9: A governance framework for Health Information Exchange 
As the volume and type of data exchanged expands, the importance of governance grows. The governance 
framework must be able to scale, sustain, and respond over time. A governance framework requires active 
engagement with participating organizations to establish transparency and achieve consensus. Governance 
is important for all types of Health Information Organizations (HIOs), but it is more critical as membership 
diversity, approved use cases, and the geographic footprint of the HIO expands. [49] 
Data sharing agreements must be specific enough to constrain the use of shared data to specific use cases. 
However, such agreements also need to be flexible enough to incorporate new use cases as they are approved 
or modified. Creating these agreements is not easy in the early stages of establishing HIE. For this reason, 
formal governance may be deferred as the exchange develops and the use cases are being defined and 
approved. As policies are developed and procedures are defined, formal governance processes should also 
develop. Formal contracting agreements provide the necessary controls and protections for all participating 
stakeholders.  
Governance describes how data are handled, shared, used, and secured. It creates a mechanism for 
monitoring compliance with the policies and procedures of the exchange. The HIO must be trusted to provide 
information to improve the safety, efficiency, and effectiveness of patient care. For this reason, trust 
agreements are critical to successful governance programs.  
HIOs create a set of contractual documents, referred to as trust agreements because they engender trust 
amongst the parties involved in the agreements. Trust agreements include documents such as Data Use 
Agreements and Participation Agreements. 
Data	security	
Healthcare organizations store, maintain and transmit huge amounts of data to support the delivery of efficient 
and proper care. Nevertheless, securing these data has been a daunting requirement for decades. 
Complicating matters, the healthcare industry continues to be one of the most susceptible to publicly disclosed 
data breaches. In fact, attackers can use data mining methods and procedures to find out sensitive data and 
release it to public and thus data breach happens. While implementing security measures remains a complex 
process, the stakes are continually raised as the ways to defeat security controls become more sophisticated. 
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As a result, it is crucial that organizations implement healthcare data security solutions that will protect 
important assets while also satisfying healthcare compliance mandates. 
 
Various technologies are in use for protecting the security and privacy of healthcare data. Most widely used 
technologies are [50]: 
1. Authentication: Authentication is the act of establishing or confirming claims made by or about the 
subject are true and authentic. It serves a vital function within any organization: securing access to 
corporate networks, protecting the identities of users, and ensuring that a user is who he claims to be. 
Most cryptographic protocols include some form of endpoint authentication specifically to prevent man-
in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. For instance, Transport Layer Security (TLS) and its predecessor, 
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), are cryptographic protocols that provide security for communications 
over networks such as the Internet. TLS and SSL encrypt the segments of network connections at the 
Transport Layer end-to-end. Several versions of the protocols are in widespread use in applications 
like web browsing, electronic mail, Internet faxing, instant messaging and voice- over-IP (VoIP). One 
can use SSL or TLS to authenticate the server using a mutually trusted certification authority. 
Additionally, Bull Eye algorithm can be used for monitoring all sensitive information in 360°. This 
algorithm has been used to make sure data security and manage relations between original data and 
replicated data. It is also allowed only authorized person to read or write critical data. In a healthcare 
system, both healthcare information offered by providers and identities of consumers should be 
verified at the entry of every access.  
2. Encryption: Data encryption is an efficient means of preventing unauthorized access of sensitive 
data. Its solutions protect and maintain ownership of data throughout its lifecycle, from the data center 
to the endpoint (including mobile devices used by physicians, clinicians, and administrators) and into 
the cloud. Encryption is useful to avoid exposure to breaches such as packet sniffing and theft of 
storage devices. Healthcare organizations or providers must ensure that encryption scheme is 
efficient, easy to use by both patients and healthcare professionals, and easily extensible to include 
new electronic health records. Furthermore, the number of keys hold by each party should be 
minimized. Although various encryption algorithms have been developed and deployed relatively well 
(RSA, Rijndael, AES and RC6, DES, 3DES, RC4, IDEA, Blowfish ...), the proper selection of suitable 
encryption algorithms to enforce secure storage remains a difficult problem. 
3. Data Masking: Masking replaces sensitive data elements with an unidentifiable value, but is not truly 
an encryption technique so the original value cannot be returned from the masked value. It uses a 
strategy of de-identifying the data sets or masking personal identifiers such as name, social security 
number and suppressing or generalizing quasi identifiers like data-of-birth and zip-codes. Thus, data 
masking is one of the most popular approach to live data anonymization. K-anonymity first proposed 
by Swaney and Samrati protects against identity disclosure but failed to protect against attribute 
disclosure. Truta et al. have presented p-sensitive anonymity that protects against both identity and 
attribute disclosure. Other anonymization methods fall into the classes of adding noise to the data, 
swapping cells within columns and replacing groups of k records with k copies of a single 
representative. These methods have a common problem of difficulty in anonymizing high dimensional 
data sets. A significant benefit of this technique is that the cost of securing a big data deployment is 
reduced. As secure data is migrated from a secure source into the platform, masking reduces the need 
for applying additional security controls on that data while it resides in the platform. 
4. Access Control: Once authenticated, the users can enter an information system but their access will 
still be governed by an access control policy which is typically based on the privilege and right of each 
practitioner authorized by patient or a trusted third party. It is then, a powerful and flexible mechanism 
to grant permissions for users. It provides sophisticated authorization controls to ensure that users 
can perform only the activities for which they have permissions, such as data access, job submission, 
cluster administration, etc. A number of solutions have been proposed to address the security and 
access control concerns. Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) and Attribute-Based Access Control 
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(ABAC) are the most popular models for EHR. RBAC and ABAC have shown some limitations when 
they are used alone in medical system. 
Data	privacy	
Recent years have seen the emergence of advanced persistent threats, targeted attacks against information 
systems, whose main purpose is to smuggle recoverable data by the attacker. Therefore, invasion of patient 
privacy is considered as a growing concern in the domain of big data analytics, which make organizations in 
challenge to address these different complementary and critical problems. In fact, data security governs 
access to data throughout the data lifecycle while data privacy sets this access based on privacy policies and 
laws which determine, for example, who can view personal data, financial, medical or confidential information. 
An incident reported in the Forbes magazine raises an alarm over patient privacy. In the report, it mentioned 
that Target Corporation sent baby care coupons to a teen-age girl unbeknown to her parents. This incident 
impels big data to consider privacy for analytics and developers should be able to verify that their applications 
conform to privacy agreements and that sensitive information is kept private regardless of changes in the 
applications and/or privacy regulations. Privacy of medical data is then an important factor which must be 
seriously considered. 
More than ever it is crucial that healthcare organisations manage and safeguard personal information and 
address their risks and legal responsibilities in relation to processing personal data, to address the growing 
thicket of applicable data protection legislation. Different countries have different policies and laws for data 
privacy. Data protection regulations and laws in some of the countries along with salient features are listed in 
the Table 15. 
 
Country / 
Union 
Law  Salient Features  
U.S.A  HIPAA Act, Patient Safety 
and Quality Improvement 
Act (PSQIA) and HITECH 
Act  
The HIPAA privacy rule declares a set of standards, which describe how 
healthcare providers keep, store, protect, and share patients’ health 
information.  
The HIPAA security rule defines security standards to protect the privacy of 
individuals’ electronic Protected Health Information (e-PHI). It specifically 
mentions the requirements of ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of all e-PHI created, received, maintained or transmitted. It also 
requires the identification and protection of e-PHI against anticipated threats 
to the security or integrity of the information. 
EU European Data Protection 
Directive 95/46/EC Protect people’s fundamental rights and freedoms and in particular their right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data.  
Canada  Personal Information 
Protection and Electronic 
Documents Act (‘PIPEDA')  
Individual is given the right to know the reasons for collection or use of 
personal information, so that organizations are required to protect this 
information in a reasonable and secure way.  
UK  European Data Protection 
Directive 95/46/EC, 
Data Protection Act (DPA)  
After Brexit, UK will be considered as a so called secure third country, under 
the scope of GDPR. DPA provides a way for individuals to control information 
about themselves. Personal data shall not be transferred to a country or 
territory outside the European Economic Area unless that country or territory 
ensures an adequate level of protection for the rights and freedoms of data 
subjects.  
Russia  Russian Federal Law on 
Personal Data  Requires data operators to take “all the necessary organizational and technical measures required for protecting personal data against unlawful or 
accidental access”. 
Table 15: Data protection laws in some of the countries  
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Differentiation	between	security	and	privacy	
Security and privacy in big data are important issues. Privacy is often defined as having the ability to protect 
sensitive information about personally identifiable health care information. It focuses on the use and 
governance of individual’s personal data like making policies and establishing authorization requirements to 
ensure that patients’ personal information is being collected, shared and utilized in right ways. While security 
is typically defined as the protection against unauthorized access, with some including explicit mention of 
integrity and availability. It focuses on protecting data from pernicious attacks and stealing data for profit. 
Although security is vital for protecting data but it’s insufficient for addressing privacy. Table 16 focuses on 
additional difference between security and privacy [50]. 
Security Privacy 
Security is the “confidentiality, integrity and 
availability” of data 
Privacy is the appropriate use of user’s information 
Various techniques like Encryption, Firewall, etc. are 
used in order to prevent data compromise from 
technology or vulnerabilities in the network of an 
organization 
The organization can’t sell its patient/user’s 
information to a third party without prior consent of 
the user 
It may provide for confidentiality or protect an 
enterprise or agency 
It concerns with patient’s right to safeguard their 
information from any other parties 
Security offers the ability to be confident that 
decisions are respected 
Privacy is the ability to decide what information of an 
individual goes and where to 
Table 16: Differentiation between security and privacy  
EHR	standards	
Standards in representing EHRs are important in that they provide a common language and a set of 
anticipations to enable interoperability among systems and devices. The standards for EHRs are aimed at 
increased coordination of care. There are groups formed to harmonize the challenges faced by shared 
Electronic Health Record systems. The groups include: HL7 (Health Level Seven International), which is 
responsible for developing a standard for the clinical document architecture and templates, openEHR, which 
deals with the technical activities like architecture, implementation projects, and clinical activities like 
archetypes, standard activities, and CEN (a standardization committee for Europe dealing with EHR 
communication standards). The following standards derived from the above groups should be observed when 
presenting Electronic Health Record systems:  
1. EHRs should have the ability to generate, send, obtain and present standardized evolution of care 
documents. 
2. EHRs should have the ability to offer electronic prescription, reconciliation between patients’ past and 
present medical information, incorporation of laboratory test outcomes, and creation of patients’ care 
summaries. 
3. EHRs should be capable of working with standardized documents, which is referred to as 
interoperability. 
4. EHRs must have the ability to use the consolidated clinical document architecture (CCDA) for the 
transfer of care documents summaries. 
HIE	architectures	
Since the role of HIE is to provide care facilities with the ability to circulate EHRs among varied medical 
information systems, HIE systems can have centralized, federated or patient-controlled architectures.  
 Project Number: 826293 
D3.6  ECHO information sharing models 
 
 
www.echonetwork.eu - @ECHOcybersec        page 51 of 155 
The centralized HIE system, also referred to as the consolidated model, involves storing all health information 
in a single data repository or warehouse (e.g., cloud). Each member of the centralized HIE system (hospitals, 
clinics, and other health care stakeholders) is expected to transmit patients’ health information to the remote 
repository, where the information is securely stored. The health information is continuously updated through 
interfaces connected directly to each healthcare organization’s information repository in order to improve 
security and confidentiality. These interfaces usually allow for unaltered patient information flow to the central 
authority. Whenever a member organization requests access, it is subjected to pre-defined unique patient 
identifiers before being authorized. 
The federated structure requires local patient information storage at each healthcare organization to ensure a 
higher level of data security and privacy. Data are captured and maintained separately within disparate 
hospital, clinic, and other data repositories then queried on demand when they are needed for individual care 
or a population level analysis. To access the information the entity must be a member of an association, and 
at the same time, must commit itself to sharing the information with other members of the network. The 
participants in this model are often held responsible for ensuring that information is accessed by the authorized 
members only. In other words, when a health system interconnects its affiliates, we refer to this as Federated 
HIE because the exchange is only within the membership group. For example, the U.S. Department of 
Veterans Affairs (VA) operates 153 medical centers as well as 909 ambulatory care and community-based 
outpatient clinics across the United States and its territories. In the early 2000s, the VA interconnected its 
facilities using a software program referred to as VistaWeb. [51] 
In contrast to the centralized and federated models of HIE, in which the principal design is HIE between 
providers and other health system stakeholders, patient-controlled or “consumer-mediated” forms of HIE have 
been proposed. In patient-controlled forms of HIE, health care consumers are responsible for either (1) 
depositing their health records into consumer-controlled data repositories referred to as “health record banks” 
or (2) downloading their medical records onto secure disk drives or “smart cards” that can be carried with them 
as they traverse the health system. While these approaches have an advantage of being patient-centered 
meaning patients would be in control of their data, critics argue that such models face a number of challenges 
including cost, sustainability, and scalability similar to other HIE approaches. [49] 
ICT	systems	
HIE, according to what Dixon, Brian E. said in [49], necessitates electronic transfer between ICT systems. 
Therefore, ICT systems need technical methods for facilitating exchange of information. In ICT speak, there 
must be a sender and a receiver. For example, a laboratory information system (LIS) sends lab test results to 
an EHR system to record the results in a patient’s records. Yet a LIS can also receive an order to perform a 
lab test from an EHR system. These electronic transactions provide the technical foundation for HIE. Almost 
any ICT system in health care can be either a sender or a receiver depending on the scenario. Therefore, the 
potential configuration of technical networks involving ICT is many. Regardless of which ICT systems are 
involved in HIE or the direction in which information flows, there will be senders and receivers. [49]  
Transactions	or	messages	
Electronic transactions in health care can be conceived of as messages between two people or organizations. 
In the physical world, messages take the form of envelopes and packages. Envelopes and packages come in 
all shapes, sizes, and weights. So do electronic transactions. For example, electronically transmitting 
information that a particular patient has arrived at the clinic and is waiting to see the doctor is akin to putting a 
single, small piece of paper into a small envelope. Exchanging a discharge summary is like sending a multiple 
page document in a large envelope. This transaction requires additional “overhead” or structure so that the 
receiving ICT system can interpret the information inside the envelope. Still greater requirements are needed 
for the exchange of an MRI scan which includes large, detailed images. A special envelope would be 
necessary to protect the image from getting bent or damaged in transit. Similarly, ICT systems would require 
a specialized, structured message and sufficient storage as well as transport capacity for transferring the MRI 
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images. Specialized, structured messages are referred to in the HIE world as technical standards. When ICT 
systems can send and receive messages, we say they can interoperate or possess interoperability. [49]  
Content	or	Payload	
Inside of messages are contents such as patient demographics, lab results, images. ICT speak sometimes 
refers to contents as payloads. While in transit from one ICT system to another, the technologies that facilitate 
the transport do not care about the contents inside the message. However, for the information exchanged to 
be stored and used by the receiving ICT system (as well as the system’s users—humans), ICT systems need 
methods for understanding the message contents. In HIE we refer to these methods as data standards, which 
we say create semantic interoperability between ICT systems. [49] 
 
 What kind of data could be detected by the wearable sensors? 
The	Traditional	Methods	for	Physiological	Data	‐	Collection	and	Analyses	
Human health states are always associated with some basic physiological indices such as body temperature, 
blood pressure, heart rate, pulse, respiratory rate, ECG, EEG, EOG, EMG, etc. Traditionally, these data are 
often checked and collected periodically when the patients visit hospitals. Special conditions and devices are 
often needed. The collection of the dynamic physiological data is often time-consuming, labor-intensive, and 
costly. The analyses of these data are often statistically averaged to identify the patterns at the population 
level, as described in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10: Cohort data collection and statistical analysis to identify healthcare-associated factors 
The advantage of this traditional method is that it can identify general physiological patterns at population level 
and it could provide facts, evidence, and reference for the policy making and disease screening. But it will be 
not precise when applied to individuals since the averaged indices are not personalized. [48] 
The	 Longitudinal	 Self‐Measurements	 Wearable	 ‐	 Sensors	 and	 the	
Smartphone‐Based	Cloud	Computing	 for	Data	Storage,	Extraction,	and	
Analysis	
In the past two decades, the popularization of wearable sensors and smartphone is changing of our life rapidly. 
The whole-body monitoring by wearable sensors is becoming more and more practical. We nowadays have 
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the potential to monitor the whole body’s physiological signals for disease prevention from head to foot. In the 
head part, we can use wearable sensors to detect the brain activity by electroencephalograms (EEG) for 
monitoring of epilepsy, fatigue, mental stress, anxiety states, etc. The eye’s movement could be measured 
with electrooculogram (EOG) to monitor older adults and patients with Parkinson’s disease. The facial 
expression could be detected for emotional recognition; the gait and balance and the fall risk could be detected 
to monitor the foot part. The other detectable physiological signals of the human body include the 
electrocardiogram (ECG) for the heart rhythm, electromyogram (EMG) for skeletal muscle movement, etc. All 
these physiological signals could be detected and applied to the monitoring of a wide spectrum of diseases. 
Comparing to the traditional methods, the wearable sensors are cheap and convenient. It could be applied to 
both patients and health individuals, and the data could be collected in real time, dynamic, and personalized 
as shown in Figure 11. The volume of these physiological data will be accumulated very fast. With different 
sensors, we will have diverse data formats, and the velocity of the data generating will be also high. So, the 
physiological data from the wearable sensors possess distinct characterization of big data. All the tools and 
methods for big data management therefore could be applied here for the big physiological data storage, 
extraction, and analysis. 
 
Figure 11: Real-time and personalized analyses of longitudinal measurements by wearable sensors 
Thanks to the cloud computing technologies, the big physiological data could be stored, extracted, or even get 
analysed results from the cloud with smartphone linked to the internet. The cloud computing providers can 
offer a user different service including software tools (SaaS), platforms (PaaS), and infrastructure (IaaS). As 
displayed in Figure 11, the detected personalized data could be collected, accumulated, and stored in cloud 
databases as reference data. A personalized physiological data could be compared to the reference data to 
find similar profiles and then screen better treatment strategies. The individual’s previous health data or 
disease data could also be applied to the diagnosis and treatment of complex diseases. This smartphone-
based cloud service was reported to be used to manage type 1 diabetes (T1D) and chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease (COPD) patients with comorbidities. [48] 
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 How to share and analyse the detected physiological profiles? 
Data	 Standardization	 and	 the	 Privacy	 of	 Personal	 Physiological	
Information	
Data standardization is important to the exchange and sharing of big data between researchers, companies, 
organizations, and other data users. The physiological data could be generated from different resources with 
various structures, formats, or terminologies. Ontology-based standardization is the first step to make these 
diverse data sharable and reusable as Figure 12 illustrates. 
 
Figure 12: Models for mining physiological data 
Ontology is a knowledge framework with a controlled vocabulary and defined relationship between them to be 
used in a subject or a domain for identification of themes and patterns in a given data set. At present, several 
ontologies are developed and applied to physiological data and can be extended to the storage and analyses 
of the data collected from different wearable sensors. Some of the developed ontologies for the standardization 
of physiological data are listed in Table 17. More ontologies are still needed for the diversity of physiological 
data from smart wearable sensors, including the basic and high-level physiological information like the pulse, 
the blood pressure, and the dynamic patterns of the personalized signals. The ontologies will not be only useful 
for the data sharing as they could be very powerful tools for the annotation and explanation of the data and 
the ontological functional analysis, then enabling and accelerating the researches.  
Ontologies Description and availability References 
Ion Channel 
ElectroPhysiology 
Ontology (ICEPO) 
Ontological representation for 
extracting quantitative information 
from text 
http://openbionlp.org/mutd/supple
mentarydata/ICEPO/ICEPO.owl 
Elayavilli RK, Liu H (2016) Ion Channel Electro 
Physiology Ontology (ICEPO) – a case study of text 
mining assisted ontology development. AMIA Joint 
Summits Transl Sci Proc AMIA - Joint Summits Transl 
Sci 2016:42–51 
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Ontologies Description and availability References 
OntoVIP The annotation of the models used 
in medical image simulation 
http://bioportal.bioontology.org/ont
ologies/OntoVIP 
Gibaud B, Forestier G, Benoit-Cattin H, Cervenansky 
F, Clarysse P, Friboulet D, Gaignard A, Hugonnard P, 
Lartizien C, Liebgott H et al (2014) OntoVIP: an 
ontology for the annotation of object models used for 
medical image simulation. J Biomed Inform 52:279–
292 
Cook DL, Neal ML, Bookstein FL, Gennari JH (2013) 
Ontology of physics for biology: representing physical 
dependencies as a basis for biological processes. J 
Biomed Semant 4 (1):41 
Ontology of Physics for 
Biology (OPB) The representations of the thermodynamics and dynamics of 
physiological processes 
http://bioportal.bioontology.org/ont
ologies/OPB 
Cook DL, Neal ML, Bookstein FL, Gennari JH (2013) 
Ontology of physics for biology: representing physical 
dependencies as a basis for biological processes. J 
Biomed Semant 4 (1):41 
Epilepsy and Seizure 
Ontology (EpSO) A suite of informatics tools for representation and study of 
epilepsy 
http://prism.case.edu/prism/index.
php/EpilepsyOntology 
Sahoo SS, Lhatoo SD, Gupta DK, Cui L, Zhao M, 
Jayapandian C, Bozorgi A, Zhang GQ (2014) Epilepsy 
and seizure ontology: towards an epilepsy informatics 
infrastructure for clinical research and patient care. J 
Am Med Inform Assoc AMIA 21(1):82–89 Gundel M, 
Younesi E, Malhotra A, Wang J, Li H, Zhang B, de 
Bono B, Mevissen HT, Hofmann-Apitius M (2013) 
HuPSON: the human physiology simulation ontology. J 
Biomed Semant 4(1):35 
Human Physiology 
Simulation Ontology 
(HuPSON) 
A framework for biomedical 
physiological simulation 
http://bishop.scai.fraunhofer.de/sc
aiview/ 
Gundel M, Younesi E, Malhotra A, Wang J, Li H, Zhang 
B, de Bono B, Mevissen HT, Hofmann-Apitius M (2013) 
HuPSON: the human physiology simulation ontology. J 
Biomed Semant 4(1):35 
Cellular Phenotype 
Ontology (CPO) Ontology for characterization of cell morphology and physiological 
phenotypes 
http://cell-
phenotype.googlecode.com 
Hoehndorf R, Harris MA, Herre H, Rustici G, Gkoutos 
GV (2012) Semantic integration of physiology 
phenotypes with an application to the cellular 
phenotype ontology. Bioinforma (Oxford, England) 
28(13):1783–1789 Tinnakornsrisuphap T, Billo RE 
(2015) An interoperable system for automated 
diagnosis of cardiac abnormalities from 
electrocardiogram data. IEEE J Biomed Health Inform 
19 (2):493–500 
ECG Ontology Ontology based on the HL7 
standard Tinnakornsrisuphap T, Billo RE (2015) An interoperable system for automated diagnosis of cardiac 
abnormalities from electrocardiogram data. IEEE J 
Biomed Health Inform 19 (2):493–500 
Hierarchical Event 
Descriptors (HED) Semi-structured tagging for EEG http://sccn.ucsd.edu/eeglab Bigdely-Shamlo N, Cockfield J, Makeig S, Rognon T, La Valle C, Miyakoshi M, Robbins KA (2016) 
Hierarchical Event Descriptors (HED): semi-structured 
tagging for real-world events in large-scale EEG. Front 
Neuroinform 10:42 
Table 17: Ontologies developed and applied in physiological data  
For the data sharing, the privacy of the personalized data is another important issue needed to be resolved 
before the data distributed to public. Several concepts and frameworks are proposed for the privacy preserving 
of data from wearable sensors. The stringent CIA (confidentiality, integrity, and availability) and Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) principles are suggested to follow for the information 
security. [48] 
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Databases	for	the	Mining	of	Physiological	Signals	
After the data standardization, different databases specific to various physiological data are then needed. In 
the past, some physiological databases have been built for public accessing. Comparing to the databases at 
gene level, physiological phenotype databases are still demanded. One of the most comprehensive databases 
is the PhysioBank database from PhysioNet resource, which includes physiological signals like ECG, interbeat 
interval, gait and balance, neuroelectric and myoelectric, image, etc. In the PhysioNet webpage, you can also 
download software tools for viewing and analysing of physiologic signals. Many associated physiological 
databases are also collected there, including MIT-BIH Arrhythmia, European ST-T, Long-Term ST, MIT-BIH 
Noise Stress Test, Creighton University Ventricular Tachyarrhythmia, MIT-BIH Atrial Fibrillation, and MIT-BIH 
Supraventricular Arrhythmia and Normal Sinus Rhythm.  
As indicated in Figure 12, one of the big challenges to understand the complex physiological signals for 
healthcare or disease management is the building of specific data analysis models, such as (1) clustering or 
classifying individuals’ physiological data to distinct groups based on their profile similarities (M1 in Figure 12), 
(2) comparing an individual’s physiological feature to the population samples to identify similar health/disease 
profiles (M2), (3) classifying the individual’s physiological signals from known groups (M3), and (4) optimizing 
a score function or model to classify a given physiological profile to predict the health state (M4 and M5). [48] 
 
4.3  Maritime information sharing  
This case study analyses the information sharing models applied in maritime domain. The main research 
question is “how can cyber information sharing models be understood in maritime domain?” The complete 
case study report is in Annex 3. 
The EU’s Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP) focuses on cross-sector and/or cross-border issues. EU 
Commission’s communication COM(2007) 575 gives outlines for an IMP for enhanced and sharing of 
information. European Commission’s publication “A Draft Roadmap towards establishing the Common 
Information Sharing Environment for the surveillance of the EU maritime domain” gives principles for the EU’s 
Maritime Authorities’ cooperation on surveillance and information sharing cross-border and cross-sector [52].  
There are seven user communities (or sectors) at EU level, as shown in the following figure.  
 
Figure 13: Seven maritime user communities at the European Union level. (Adopted from [53]) 
Namely, these user communities (sectors) are: Border Control, Fisheries, Defence, Maritime Safety and 
security, Marine Environment, Customs and General Law Enforcement (LEA). Integrated Maritime 
Surveillance (IMS) interlinks user communities and builds a technical framework for integration and the 
interoperability [54]. The main shareholders of sensitive cyber information sharing in maritime domain and 
their User Communities’ EU wide organisations and their used IT systems are introduced more specifically in 
Annex 3. 
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The need and importance for information sharing has been comprehended in maritime domain. With the EU 
funded projects the common information sharing has been developed from the fundamental idea to the pre 
operational sharing system within a decade. The latest maritime environment project EUCISE2020 developed 
an information-sharing environment (CISE) jointly by the European Commission and EU/EEA member states 
with the support of relevant agencies such as the EFCA. The CISE integrates existing maritime surveillance 
systems and networks and gives all those authorities concerned access to the information they need for their 
missions at sea. The CISE makes different systems interoperable so that information can be exchanged easily 
through the use of modern technologies without any changes to the national legacy systems. Today CISE is 
a situational awareness information sharing channel for EU maritime authorities in its way to operational use 
by 2021 but it could be developed to other purposes also. The key word is data model. For ECHO, CISE could 
be seen as an option for cyber information sharing platform. Technically CISE is information sharing system 
for maritime information and therefore not a Plug and Play system for ECHO but could be enlarged for cyber 
information sharing including the critical E-EWS information. The description of CISE testbed is presented in 
Annex 3. 
In the course of BluemassMed, MARSUNO, CoopP and EUCISE2020 projects the Responsibility to Share 
principle has been formulated as the cornerstone vision of maritime information sharing. The rules for the 
distribution of information in EUCISE2020 is illustrated with the following words: “This principle means that an 
individual in possession of a piece of information is responsible for disseminating it to anyone that may have 
a legitimate use for it, and would be accountable if any harm happens as a consequence of the non-distribution” 
[55]. 
The maritime domain could not escape the cyber-attack either. The maritime environment could be classified 
in several different ways pending on in which forum it is discussed. Normally, people assume that navigational 
systems are the most vulnerable systems in which cyber-attack could cause most serious harm. On the other 
hand, the information in CISE environment would be useful for cyber criminals while the information is 
formulated by cross sectorial and cross border authorities. From that perspective, the CISE consortium has to 
take the cyber threat seriously, and the CISE could be a valuable or potential partner for the ECHO project. 
 
4.4 Situational awareness and cyber information sharing between critical 
infrastructure organizations 
This case study analyses inter-sector cyber information sharing models in critical infrastructure protection in 
Finland. It studies how the cyber situational awareness of an organization can be developed; how do the 
organizations exchange their cyber security related information; and how an organization’s cybersecurity 
capability can be utilised more extensively? The complete case study report is in Annex 4. 
 
4.5 HAVARO: Cyber threat prevention mechanisms in Finland   
The aim of this case study is to find out crucial national elements for a common Early-Warning System to EU 
level. In this context the elements mean functionalities and procedures but also technical solutions concerning 
cyber information sharing.  
Case evidences are based on scientific literatures, interviews of IT specialists, research articles and official 
documents. This case study will find out the pros and cons of the HAVARO system and what are those factors 
(requirements), which effect for implementing national EWS system to common early warning ecosystem in 
EU level. Every EU member country has its own system for monitoring and protecting cyber domain among 
vital functions. It must be understood that national systems must find common procedural models in the name 
of the common good. Workable common system requires also common direction to develop a common 
systemThe research question is: What are the main features of the cybersecurity information sharing model 
called HAVARO and how the early warning solution HAVARO and GovHAVARO (for public organizations) can 
be integrated and implement to the ECHO Early warning system solution? Also, following sub-questions are 
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discussed: How to create connection between existing procedures and new generation system with preventive 
or (predictive) cyber functions concerning preventive cyber-information sharing?  How to combine and share 
relevant data between stakeholders in national level and in international level? It is important to take into 
account that private-public, private-private, public-private and public-public features must be included in 
multidirectional information sharing functions?  
The end result of this case study is only one suggestion for connecting the national HAVARO and a European 
level EWS system. 
 HAVARO 1.0 
NCSC-FI’s HAVARO service has been built for use of organisations as the help of the observation of serious 
information security threats. From the HAVARO system, the NCSC-FI has visibility to practically all the 
upcoming and outgoing traffic (metadata and content data). Many critical companies for security of supply and 
the state administration operators have put to use the HAVARO service, which indicates the trust in the NCSC-
FI. That way, the information security breaches targeted at the organisation can be reported automatically to 
the authority without a chance for censoring the incidents before-hand. The system has been implemented in 
collaboration with the National Emergency Supply Agency (NESA). 
The companies and public administration operators participate in the HAVARO operation voluntarily. The 
operation of the system is based on the information security threat identifiers coming from different sources. 
With the help of the identifiers, harmful or anomalous traffic can be detected from the organisation’s network 
traffic. The NCSC-FI receives the information about the anomalies and analyses them. In case of an 
information security threat, the organisation is warned about it. Based on the information got from the 
HAVARO, also the other operators can be warned about the detected threat. That way, the system helps not 
only individual organisations but also in forming a general view about the information security threats against 
Finnish information networks. 
The observation ability of information security threats is an important part of a comprehensive risk 
management. For its own part, HAVARO secures the organisation’s business continuity against the threats of 
the operational environment. However, HAVARO is not meant to be an organisation’s only information security 
solution, but it is designed to complete the other information security solutions of an information security 
investing organisation. 
In addition, Traficom provides the GovHAVARO service for the state administration operators. It completes the 
information and cyber security threat detection of the state administration’s Internet traffic. The service 
providers are Traficom, Valtori – Government ICT Centre and Telia. The GovCERT services, in turn, support 
the state’s round-the-clock information security operation by producing the support services for preventing, 
detecting and investigating information security breaches, as part of the GovSOC operation. They are provided 
by Traficom and Valtori. [56] 
The incident management of the state administration and other public administration organisations, so called 
VIRT operation, is cross-administrative operational level collaboration, which prepares for severe and 
extensive information security incidents. It consists of operational planning and rehearsing for different 
information security incidents. [56] 
The industry-specific cyber information sharing groups (ISAC, Information Sharing and Analysis Centre) are 
established as collaboration organs between the organisations of different industries. Their operation enables 
1. Confidential handling of information security matters between the participants. 
2. Augmentation of the organisations’ information security know-how. 
3. Development of the NCSC-FI’s overall situation awareness. 
The ISAC operation is based on regular meetings and specified operational models and participants. The ISAC 
information sharing groups have been established for the following industries: state administration (VIRT), 
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Internet service providers, chemistry and lumber industry, banks, media, energy industry, food production and 
distribution, social and health care, and software manufacturers. 
The main problem about the HAVARO 1.0 concerns the monitoring ability. It mainly monitors information 
security incidents only in internet traffic as Figure 14 illustrates, and it is incapable of monitoring the 
communication of the individual user behaviour. In the near future, it is not enough to monitor only internet 
traffic of companies. There should be wider right to access into the organisations information systems and 
communication, because Internet of Things is changing our way of understanding artificial intelligence 
atmosphere. When the combined electrical and telecommunication cable is placed on the same place 
possibilities for the vulnerabilities increases.   
 
Figure 14: HAVARO 1.0 in enterprise level. 
   
 HAVARO 2.0 
Now the HAVARO service is at the phase of development. The foundation of the operation will be the Havaro 
2.0 system on the development work of which an agreement with Reaktor Oy was made in September 2018. 
Instead of being a government service, HAVARO 2.0 will be jointly provided by commercial operators and the 
NCSC-FI. Some of the events will be processed and reported by information security operations centers 
(SOC). The objective of the HAVARO 2.0 project is to create the trust network in which the members can 
change information better than before among themselves. The quick and reliable information exchange can 
be used to maintain the HAVARO service and however, the corresponding of the quantitative and qualitative 
development of information security threats to develop an early warning dimension, with the moderate 
resources. In the future, the service will be financed by market-based terms.  
HAVARO 2.0 consists also GovHAVARO feature. That means a connection between public organisations and 
HAVARO early warning features. This information is classified more confidential, but sector-based sharing 
requires sharing of this information to all public safety organisations and central government. In EU level this 
information is important to be shared in real time to the stakeholders if threat-information regarding 
cybersecurity relate to other countries or threat information generate a common risk to vital functions. Therefor 
description of the HAVARO 2.0 software development has changed. 
HAVARO 2.0 software development work is divided as follows: 
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1. Development of a network monitoring device; the sensor system needs more specialised detection 
features. Increasing cyber-threat atmosphere forcing to develop better and more efficient system. 
Gathering logs, gathering information, reverse engineering and analysing risks are not enough in the 
future.  
2. A portal providing an interface for service centres and users; 
3. An interface serving as a service bus between sensors, central system and external systems; 
4. A repository where HAVARO 2.0 information is stored. 
Developers are required to have knowledge of Python programming language, open source security software 
(including Snort, Suricata, and NFDump) and programming languages and technologies used in portals and 
user interfaces. System development requires experience in service design and usability design, as well as 
testing and automated software distribution technologies and management (e.g. Puppet or similar). Those who 
are working on the development of the new system require proactivity in following new cyber security and 
cyber security trends and solutions. 
 
 Shared digital library 
HAVARO 2.0 will exploit identifiers to detecting threats. As MITRE Corporation mentioned [57], Common 
Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) or (CVE-ID and CVEs) comprise a list of common identifiers for publicly 
known cybersecurity vulnerabilities. Each CVE Identifier consists of the following information:  
 CVE identifier number  
 Indication of candidate status or/and entry 
 Summary description of the security vulnerability or exposure 
 All essential references (i.e., vulnerability reports or OVAL-ID CVE) 
CVE Numbering Authorities (CNAs) are authorised organisations which assign CVE IDs to vulnerabilities 
affecting products within their distinct, agreed-upon scope for inclusion in public notifications of new 
vulnerabilities [57]. Information security product or service vendors and researchers use CVE Identifiers as a 
standard method for identifying vulnerabilities and for cross-linking with other repositories that also use CVE 
Identifiers [58].  
The National Vulnerability Database (NVD) is the US government repository of standards based vulnerability 
management data represented using the Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) [56]. This data enables 
e.g., automation of vulnerability management. The NVD consists databases of security checklist references, 
security-related software flaws, misconfigurations, product names, and impact metrics [59]. – The NVD is 
synchronised with the CVE List so that any updates to CVE appear directly in NVD. The CVE List feeds NVD, 
and CVE Entries provide enhanced data for each entry such as fix information, severity scores, and impact 
ratings NVD also supplies advanced searching features [60].   
 
 Information sharing possibilities between HAVARO and E-EWS 
NCSC-FI and NESA have made industry-specific classification for sharing cyber information. The classification 
is demonstrated as follow: VIRT (cross-administrative operational level collaboration), public organizations, 
defence industry, energy sector, Finance, industry automation, chemical and process industry, logistic sector, 
food industry, health sector, industrial companies, equipment and product manufacturers, ICT, media industry, 
security consultants, security researches, CERT-actors. Despite the classification, there is a need to expand 
collaboration within public and private actors. NESA working under the Ministry of economic affairs and 
employment is responsible for functions vital for society in Finland. This classification follows mainly European 
level model, but also sector-based classification in the US.   
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The cyber information sharing model used in the US (Figure 5 in Chapter 3) is possible to replicate in EU level. 
Automated information sharing (AIS) mainly based on centralised ISACs which consists all actors of specific 
sector. Almost similar national level structure of information sharing is used in Finland, based on the 
classification of critical infrastructure sectors. The US has 16 critical infrastructure sectors; the same sector-
specific frame is in use almost everywhere in western countries. AIS participants’ connection to a EWS-
managed system in NCSC allows bidirectional sharing of cyber threat indicators. A EWS server housed at 
each stakeholder´s (community) location allows them to exchange indicators with the NCSC, and participants 
receive and can share EWS-developed indicators they have observed in their own network defence efforts, 
which national cyber situation centre will then share back out to all AIS participants.  
This is one kind of hybrid model, but the model consists also secure part of architecture, which allows to share 
trust level information.  It is more important that e.g. national bureau of investigation have capability to gather 
trust level information concerning vital functions of society and have possibility to be connected in the system. 
It is relevant that the early warning data is shared from the central server to the affected sectors. International 
researches support controlled information sharing model where national public safety actor share relevant data 
to the international stakeholders via centralised centre (EWS centre) as Figure 5 illustrates. Two-way model 
allows also public safety organisations to use gathered information for the prevention against hybrid threats 
before separate phenomena illustrates as a domino effect. It is important that cross-border cooperation works 
directly and instantly. 
 
 An example concept 
The future HAVARO 2.0 reflects a tendency to develop early warning functions at national level. However, this 
is not enough. Cross-border cyber-threats force to share critical information between EU member countries. 
HAVARO 2.0 will improve early detection and preventive functions. Operative public safety functions require 
quick response or even prediction. HAVARO 2.0 should utilise artificial intelligence (AI) to detect threats.  
Figure 15 illustrates a formation of cyber information sharing between countries in which HAVARO 2.0 may 
join. This example consists separate national sub-hubs and one centralised hub. Information sharing 
participants does not exchange information with each other. All threat-informed data is shared via hub. Figure 
16 demonstrates information sharing relationships and organisational structure concerning information sharing 
within a centralised hub system. Assume that HAVARO EWS in Country 1 (Finland) detects a weak signal of 
cyber-threat concerning internet traffic in multinational enterprise, but NCSA of Country 2 has not noticed 
signal of cyber-threat. Automated Information Sharing functionalities produce crucial data for the central EWS 
hub which share relevant information in near real-time to the situation centres (CERT or CIRT team). Sensitive 
data will be shared directly to the international public safety organisations and/or to the governments which 
are associated with the cyber-threat. 
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Figure 15: Centralised EWS hub and sub-hubs 
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Figure 16: Example of the E-EWS information sharing 
There could be own subsystem for the public organisations. NCSC of Finland use a parallel subsystem for 
them; HAVARO consist separate early warning solutions “GovHavaro” for all public organisations. Participants 
don’t need to share information directly with each other, but there is need to establish communities called e.g. 
ISAC and ISAO that collect crucial information concerning targeted sector of CI. This cyber security information 
is monitored and handled by national CERT or CIRT and cyber security centers will share all new indicators 
between stakeholders (ISACs). All law enforcement related information will be shared directly via EWS hub to 
the public safety authorities such as EUROPOL or INTERPOL.  
From national systems’ point of view, such as Finnish HAVARO system, centralised EWS hub and sub-hubs 
is the simplest option. On the other hand, a big challenge will be who maintains the central hub, and what its 
governance model would be. 
 
4.6 Comparison of information sharing models between U.S. and EU 
One of the eight case studies carried out during Task 3.2 compares cyber information/intelligence sharing in 
and between the US and the EU emphasising cyber information sharing models in US. In addition, it handles 
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legislative factors, organisational factors and features of the analysed models. The complete case study report 
is in Annex 5. 
 
4.7  Towards the trust-based model of the decision support mechanism 
This case study aims to understand those fundamental risks that expose society to hybrid threats and to be a 
step towards building a trust-based model for the decision support mechanism. These threats affect to 
protection of critical infrastructure and prevent detection of threats. There are separate local situation centres 
for emerging situations, emergency response systems, separate cyber threat functions in national and EU 
level. All works mainly without synergy. Separate functionalities concerning artificial intelligence solutions 
produce more potential vulnerabilities for vital functions. Therefor it is important to develop common 
functionalities in cyber-ecosystem and gather relevant data for the next generation’s early warning solutions. 
EU needs cooperation between MSs and their smart cities, because without smart cities smart societies cannot 
be created. Financial competition between MSs create the need for intelligent technology development. Thus, 
smart information systems are being developed, it is important that there is already infrastructure where to 
connect the system.  Every smart city should be construct from a long-term view. Every smart city needs urban 
built environment where different kind of intelligent systems communicate with each other.   
According to Horizon 2020 work program, disruption in the operation of EU MSs within critical infrastructure 
may result from hazards and physical or cyber-physical events. Several public safety organisations have 
noticed that modern critical infrastructures and vital functions need not only physical components, but also 
hardware and software. These integrated systems are examples of cyber-physical systems (CPS) that 
integrate computing and communication capabilities with monitoring and control of entities in the physical 
world. Therefore, it is important to create system which gather cyber-threat-related information to all participant.  
In EU level, several ongoing projects such as MARISA and RANGER are producing better common situational 
awareness among MSs.  Also, almost implemented EU-funded systems and mechanisms like RAPID exist. 
The main limitation to exploit the RAPID system is related to lack of real-time features of the mechanism. In 
addition, lack of leadership causes problems in collaboration. 
Technical solutions need wider understanding of user needs, which means that infrastructure of smart city 
environment, cannot be developed separately. There is also wider need to develop common emergency 
response ecosystem for European public safety actors. This means that communication solutions that are 
used within public safety authorities must suite well in urban and rural area.   
Public safety actors like European law enforcement agencies need common shared situational picture for the 
cross-boarding tasks in a way that operational co-operation is based on a reliable platform. Formal integration 
in European Union and between member countries has developed rapidly. This does not mean that co-
operation between organisations has developed in the same proportion.  Digitalisation cannot evolve in 
isolation from the society. There are fundamental needs within European public safety organisations that 
should be in a same level in every country.  
The structure of central and local government in Finland challenges utilisation and implementation of new 
technology. Technological development, development of infrastructure, architecture of constructions and 
changes in legislation are inner-country challenges but also European common needs concerning safety 
development agenda. State level factors should be added in European safety framework.  There are many 
strategy plans in the European level concerning safety functions, but national implementation realises in 
different order.   
Political decision makers are elected in election, but highest authorities are chosen based on political selection 
criteria. Hybrid influencing can made unstable the society in many ways. One of the main key aims is to 
influence political decision-making. In practice, this means that there is a need to integrate organisational, 
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administrative and operative functions. Flow of reliable information between decision-makers, intelligence 
authorities and data protection authorities must be ensured by using artificial intelligence systems. In an ideal 
model, national protection of vital functions would be ensured automatically as a part of functionalities of cyber 
platform where human based decisions are also analysed.  
Security and intelligence agencies in Europe have acquired new rights under the law. In Finland, acceptation 
of Intelligence legislation package concerning civilian and military intelligence legislation is under the process. 
Time will show how prepare our politicians are to develop the legislative base for new cyber-ecosystem. It has 
been said that Finland need to update whole intelligence atmosphere to the same level as the other European 
countries has been done.  
 
 Development of Emergency response system solutions for PPDR authorities 
Emergency Response Centre uses Emergency Response system. It is one kind of decision support system. 
Decision support systems are used to track key incidents and the progress of responding units, to optimise 
response activities and to act as a mechanism for queuing ongoing incidents [43].  
In Finland, traditional emergency response functions has been copied from the other countries, but still we 
have fundamental problems concerning the possibilities on how to transfer emergency data correctly and in 
time to the Emergency response centre. There was separate emergency response unit in the Police 
organisations until the 1999. For example, regional Radio Police consisted of their own dispatch personnel 
who answered to citizens'’ emergency calls and managed the use of emergency units to the site of an accident; 
also, municipal rescue services handled their own emergency calls. In the 21st century, separate emergency 
call centre units and functions were united into one regional emergency response centre. Very soon after the 
organisation changes, PPDR authorities found the need to manage their emergency resources.  PPDR 
organisations established own situation centres to allocate emergency resources concerning the field workers 
cooperation. It is impossible to develop technological solutions without understanding the culture of the 
organisation. Public safety organisations have common working culture, but also separate inner-organisational 
subcultures. That same issue concerning the meaning of the working culture relation to organisational reform 
occur also in different atmosphere and in different field.  
In practice, this means that smart city infrastructure is the fundamental framework, which govern minor factors 
inside on it. Technological solutions cannot create its own separate entity regardless of the organisations 
culture.  
 
 Smart nations and cities   
 Political power relations effect to the national future of digitalisation. Urbanisation changes our style of living 
and the modern environment create new safety culture. Citizens meet other people in public places e.g., they 
go to the shopping mall for shopping goods. The time has changed, because of many terror attacks. There are 
many historical similarities between countries in northern Europe. That helps to understand the safety needs 
of other neighbouring country. While separate European societies are evolving, societies are developing their 
cooperation on digitalisation. It´s necessary to see the development of digitalisation of northern countries from 
the same perspective. There are different political aspects between countries concerning energy policy and 
security policy. EU as the commercial operator brings its own needs into discussion. Russia-China cooperation 
challenges our culture and western way of thinking.  We need cooperation, but cybersecurity threats appear 
too often [61]. Nord Stream2 and different kind of 5g and cable projects may expose national security under 
to cross-boarding hybrid risks [62]. It is impossible to create entirety of smart society without understanding 
continuity management of society.  
If departments of the central government design separate digitalisation projects without common 
understanding of the future needs, society’s expenses and management of digitalisation becomes more 
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difficult. The governance of digitalisation needs common goals for all participants. It means that the regional 
and local administrative operators need exact central steering concerning all municipal constructions of 
infrastructure.  
 
 Risk management and preparedness 
The NIST risk management framework consist three elements of critical infrastructure (physical, cyber, and 
human) which are explicitly identified and should be integrated throughout the tiers of the framework [32]. The 
critical infrastructure risk management framework as Figure 17 illustrates supports a decision-making process 
that CI actors or partners together promise to inform the selection of risk management actions. It has planned 
to provide flexibility for use in all sectors, across geographic regions, and by different partners. It can be tailored 
to different operating environments and applies to all kind of threats [32]. 
 
Figure 17: Elements of critical infrastructure [32] 
Risk management concept enables the CI actors to focus on those threats and hazards that are likely to cause 
harm and employ approaches that are designed to prevent or mitigate the effects of those hazards or incidents. 
It strengthens resilience by identifying and prioritising actions to secure continuity of vital functions and services 
[32].  
The first point recommends to “set infrastructure Goals and Objectives” which are supported by objectives and 
priorities developed at the sector level. The second point recommends to “manage CI risk effectively”, which 
means that stakeholders need identify the assets, systems, and networks that are crucial to their continuity 
management, considering associated dependencies and interdependencies. This dimension of the risk 
management process should identify information and communications technologies that facilitate the provision 
of essential services [32]. 
Third point recommend to “assessing and analysing risks”. Those risks may comprise threats, vulnerabilities 
and consequences. Threat can be natural or manmade occurrence, individual, entity or action that has or 
indicates the   potential to harm life, information, operations, the environment and/or property.  Vulnerability 
based risk may happen as physical feature or operational attribute. It may render an entity open to exploitation. 
[32]. Consequence can be effect of an event, incident, or occurrence. “Implementing risk management” 
activities and functions means that decision makers prioritise activities to manage critical infrastructure risk 
based on the criticality, the costs of the affected infrastructure and the potential for risk reduction [32]. The last 
element “measuring effectiveness” means that the actors and stakeholders of the critical infrastructure 
evaluate the effectiveness of risk management efforts from national, to local levels by developing metrics for 
direct and indirect indicator measurements [32]. 
In this case study, we have applied a modified combination of NIST [17] and Octave Allegro Risk Assessment 
Frameworks. According to [63] Octave allegro is a strategy for prioritising and sharing information about the 
security risks   to an information technology.  
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According to [64] NASA risk informed risk is the potential for performance shortfalls, which may be realised in 
the future. Risk Management by NASA integrates Risk-Informed Decision Making (RIDM) process and 
Continuous Risk Management (CRM) process into a single framework. The RIDM process focuses the risk-
informed choice of decision alternatives to assure efficient approaches to achieving objectives. The CRM 
process addresses implementation of the selected alternative to ensure that requirements are fulfilled.  RIDM 
and CRM generate effective risk management as NASA programs [63, 65]. 
 
 Research process   
There have been many state level discussions concerning digitalisation and robotics between decision makers 
in media. At present public safety authorities (PPDR) or state level decision makers do not use cyber dimension 
in their daily routine at all. The problem is that public safety authorities have separate Cyber security 
organisations with own administrations. Organisations, which have responsibilities for cyber security 
operations, are separated from PPDR services. As a part of TRAFICOM, The National Cyber Security Centre 
Finland (NSCS-FI) produce information of Cyber threats for stakeholders, but that data does not reach e.g. 
emergency response centres or situation centres.  Separate organisational cyber security functions, methods 
and procedures prevent effective response for cyber physical threats.  That is not only problem. New kind of 
emergency response systems are all useless if our politicians and other decision makers are not faithful or 
decisions are made for the benefit for a foreign country. It´s important to understand the source and degree of 
threat. Infrastructure of smart cities and all smart information systems may can be built on an unstable ground 
level, which may consist e.g. energy supply solutions and dicey communication equipment.  Combining Open 
Source Intelligence data and traditional intelligence sources, overall situational awareness arises. Hybrid 
threats need coordinated hybrid responses, therefore also a cyber-situational picture is needed. 
It is easier to detect fundamental level risk factors when basic threats and risks are categorised and classified.  
These threats affect to protection of vital functions and prevent detection of threats. We have used combination 
of different methodologies to find out those factors, which affect to the decision-making in society. As Table 
18 illustrates separate risks are divided into the main areas as follows: Administrative risks, conflict risks, 
emergency functions related risks, socioeconomic risks and infrastructure related risks. 
Main risk classification and  subcategories 
A 
Administrative 
risks 
B 
Conflict risks 
C 
PPDR services 
and functions 
related risks 
D 
Socioeconomic 
risks 
E 
Infrastructure 
related risks 
Problems in local 
continuity 
management 
(C,D) 
Cyberattacks  
(A,C, E) 
Overloaded 
Emergency 
management 
system (B, E) 
Unemployment (A) Structural 
problems in the 
built urban area 
(A,B,C) 
Problems in  
cooperation 
between decision 
makers (B,C,D,E) 
Human made 
disasters or  
pandemic  € 
Lack of human 
resources in PPDR 
services (A,D,E) 
Refugees (A,B) Structural 
problems in the 
rural area 
(A,B,C,D) 
Separate 
municipal 
activities € 
Cross-border 
radiation (C,D,E) 
Lack of resources 
in PPDR services/  
(A,D,E) 
Cultural change 
(A,B) 
Recovery 
problems 
(A,B,C,D) 
Organisational 
problems (B,C) 
Physical war 
(A,C,D,E) 
Emergency event 
(D,E) 
Use of substances 
(B,C) 
Secrets cyber 
influences 
(A,B,C,D) 
Leadership 
problems in 
government 
(B,C,D,E) 
Hybrid warfare 
(A,C,D,E) 
Resource 
awareness of 
volunteers (A,D,E) 
Citizens poverty 
(A) 
Communication 
problems (A,B,C) 
 Project Number: 826293 
D3.6  ECHO information sharing models 
 
 
www.echonetwork.eu - @ECHOcybersec        page 68 of 155 
Main risk classification and  subcategories 
 Unidentified 
people (A,C,E) 
   
Table 18: Risk classification 
Separate risks are categorised and ranked on a three risks level process. 
The first measure is valued “frequency of the phenomenon” (1 = phenomenon not occurs every year, 2 = 
phenomenon occurs yearly and 3 = a phenomenon is permanently).  The second value is titled “predictability 
and measurability of risks” (1= phenomenon is neither predictable nor measurable, 2= phenomenon is 
predictable. 3 = phenomenon is predictable and measurable.) The third value is named “impact of risk on 
overall security” (1= impact of the risk on one vital function, 2=impact of the risk on two to three vital functions 
and 3 = impact of risk to more than three selected vital functions.)  Coefficients for variables are 1 to “frequency 
of the phenomenon” 2 to predictability and measurability of risks and 3 to “Impact of risk on overall security.   
The one goal of the research is to create decision support sub-system for the proposed Hybrid Emergency 
Response system that could assist politicians and public sector actors. This is an important issue, because 
there is a need to detect sources of threats much earlier. We have used the methodology model and framework 
by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration In the designing of the subsystem of Hybrid emergency 
response systems. Continuous Risk Management (CRM) process stresses the management of risk during 
implementation.  The Risk-Informed Decision Making (RIDM) methodology is part of a systems engineering 
process, which emphasises the proper use of risk analysis in its broadest sense to make risk-informed 
decisions that affect all mission execution domains, including safety, technical, cost, and schedule. RIDM helps 
to ensure that decisions between alternatives are made with an awareness of the risks associated with each 
helping to prevent late design changes, which can be key drivers of risk and cancellation [66] . 
The main goal of the study is to find out fundamental societal factors, which affect to effective protection of 
critical infrastructure. This research divides the types of risks into four sections. Ground Level indicate 
fundamental risks with scenarios, which includes factors, events and actions of society.  The fundamental 
factors of scenarios put all other societal factors, events or actions into secondary threats level. Fundamental 
factors also make it possible to realise lower-level threats.  
This causes that the effective protection of critical infrastructure depends on external factors. Operator who 
controls external factors also dominates critical infrastructure. Therefor fundamental ground level risk factors 
should be recognised and minimise. 
 
 Findings  
Table 19 shows that different elements of society between risks levels exist. Higher risk levels are in the right. 
These elements set the greatest threats to the vital functions. If ground level threats realised, protection of 
critical infrastructure loses its meaning. Finland as a member of the EU it is possible that we gave away part 
of the sovereignty of parliament concerning national regulation. This kind of problems may happen when 
supranational legislation gives away power of decision-making from government to the commercial operators. 
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Classified basic risk levels (1= low, 4 =high) 
1 2 3 4 
levels 6-10 =1 levels 11-13 =2 levels 14-16 =3 levels 17-18 = 4 
Refugees  X Overloaded 
Emergency 
management 
system  
XX Structural 
problems in the 
rural area     
XX Cyberattacks  XXX 
Cultural 
change  
X Lack of 
resources in 
PPDR 
services/   
XX Human made 
disasters or  
pandemia    
XX Separate 
municipal 
activities   
XXX 
Use of 
substances  
X Resource  
awareness of 
volunteers  
X Structural 
problems in the 
built urban area  
XXX Secrets 
cyber 
influences  
XXX 
Unemployment  X Emergency 
event  
X Leadership 
problems in 
government   
XXX Hybrid 
warfare   
XXX 
   Cross-border 
radiation  
X Lack of human 
resources in 
PPDR services   
XX Unidentified 
people  
XXX 
  Organisational 
problems   
XX Communication 
problems   
XXX     
  Problems in 
local 
continuity 
management  
XX Problems in  
cooperation 
between 
decision 
makers  
XXX     
  Citizens 
poverty  
X Recovery 
problems   
XXX     
      Physical war  XXX     
Table 19: Impacts of risks 
Findings indicate that lower level risks of critical infrastructure do not cause problems to the ground level risks. 
Higher level risks indicate also structural governance problems in society.  Effectiveness level indicate threats 
impacts to the vital functions. Three x means that basic independent level risk becomes more dangerous due 
to connection fundamental ground level scenario.  
As Table 20 illustrates, if higher (4) level risk support 4 or more scenarios and consequences, impact level is 
occasional for the all vital functions. This change of situation is caused by the domino effect. E.g., a separate 
cyberattack is not so dangerous, but if it is due to a political decision, the danger of the event will change 
essentially. 
Ground level - Scenario Consequences   
A) Legislation – Lack of possibilities to intervene 
in internal security. 
Lack of internal self-determination and internal 
sovereignty 
B) Political decisions – Lack of  continuity Line changes in security policy - development of 
unstable decision-making culture 
C) Energy solutions – Dependence on imported 
energy management, short-term political 
purposes 
Exposure to extortion by an external actor 
D) Equipment for Communication systems – E.g-
5g solutions, devices, network equipment. 
Foreign state spying and foreign country get a role in 
infrastructure 
E) International public projects - smart cable 
projects, gas pipeline projects 
 Vulnerability to sabotage; foreign state may use 
cables and pipelines for hybrid influencing 
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Ground level - Scenario Consequences   
F) Decision makers credibility- corruption, 
discrimination,  criminal contacts to foreign 
state 
Ability to prevent disturbances will decrease. 
National overall security and resilience level 
decreases. As a result management of overall 
security becomes uncontrollable.  
Table 20: Scenarios and Consequences 
Threats like serious disruptions to power supply, serious disruptions to telecommunications and information 
systems risks are noticed in Finland security strategy for society report, but the same fundamental risk types 
occur as the causes which has not taken to account in decision-making 
 
 Remarks 
In our research, the need for the technology development was expressed as an overload of work environment 
and shortening of the life cycles of information systems. At present e.g. in Finland designed solutions of public 
operators based on old-fashioned technology. In the near future the victim of an accident may have to wait 
longer for the respond of emergency response centre, because call centre personnel have the learn how to 
use the new system. In Finland the main problem concerning interaction between artificial intelligence features 
of the new emergency response system and human being. Time to handle calls will initially be extended 
despite of new AI tools of the system. However, there are no more officers than before, but the need of dispatch 
workers will increase. Everything starts with cultural understanding and process management. The subcultures 
of different PPDR authorities should be coordinated through systems. Currently everyone actors have their 
own separate operating model. 
For example, if a complete emergency response system requires a significant additional workforce, designing 
has failed. Technological opportunities have not been exploited in Finland, such as in the U.S. The introduction 
of an immature system on a holiday weekend does not at least reflect the understanding of the situation in the 
operating environment. Fully automated call centre can be a reality within a decade. Fully automated decision 
support system for the highest decision makers can be in use in the near future, because vital functions require 
proof political decisions. When human weaknesses are left out of decision-making procedure, for example 
data leakage to third parties becomes more difficult. It could increase citizens' confidence in the smart system's 
activities and increase trust in government institutions, because credibility and reliability of decision-making 
process can be calculated. At present emergency response functions and procedures are dependent on 
human ability. Early detection of a threat and rapid response often help to save human lives and properties 
during disasters. 
We cannot hide our history and culture, but if we are developing cybersecurity smart ecosystem, we need to 
make changes to the decision-making processes. The research has been shown that different kind of structural 
fundamental threats may occur before any classified threat has been illustrated. Engineers, architects and 
designers cannot develop nothing new concerning smart solutions if fundamental base is unstable. An 
unsecured platform causes fundamental problems to develop solutions for the vital functions of the smart 
society. European Union level Legislation set challenges to the national politicians and authorities, but also 
power relations between union countries.  
The micro and macro levels will be encountered if a foreign state party intervenes to interfere with the 
functioning of data traffic in maritime areas. For example, there is a northeast cable project designed to connect 
networking activities between different continents. Nowadays the problem is that fiber optical and power supply 
are transmitted through the same hybrid-cable. So called unexpected happenings effects to all elements of 
ecosystem. This kind of threats come true and happens out of public safety control. In the future its occasional 
issue to found right balance between national security and good bilateral relations 
The case study shows that the most troublesome and most significant threats to national security and vital 
functions are related to human factors which based on politician´s decisions and political projects. It is difficult 
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to anticipate the real direction of national policy in the macro level, because good inter-state relations may 
indicate ignoring security issues.  The study suggests that the use of artificial intelligence should be enhanced 
to support decision-making. Subsystem could also operate as a part of the next generation emergency 
response model as Figure 18 illustrates. At present state level political decision-making dimension may prevent 
the utilisation and usefulness of the proposed smart hybrid emergency model. Politicians and other decision 
makers of Finland need to take into consideration that cyber preparedness, operational preparedness and 
reliability of decision making are not a separate part in the continuity management. If fundamental risk factors 
are not recognised technical early warning solutions become useless. 
 
Figure 18: Hybrid Risk Management system 
 
4.8 Synergies of information sharing needs with E-EWS and E-FCR 
The role of the ECHO Federated Cyber Range (E-FCR) is to interconnect existing cyber-range capabilities 
through a convenient portal operating as a broker between user requirements and a pool of available cyber 
range capabilities. 
The E-EWS and E-FCR are two of the four vital technologies developed within the ECHO project. Both can 
exploit each other in order to maximise their capabilities and offerings to the users. The following are the three 
most relevant use cases where data exchange is required: 
1) The Early Warning System can be a part of an exercise or a training that runs on one of the cyber 
ranges which is also connected to the E-FCR. The data and incident reports that are produced from 
the exercise/training can be fed into the EWS which will then make an analysis of this. This analysis 
can be used to by the organisers of the exercise or training to maximise the impact of the 
exercise/training on the participants. 
2) The EWS can collect threat intelligence data from the realistic simulation environment running on E-
FCR. This in turn can be used as input by the EWS for alarms or any further analysis done on the 
EWS. Potentially a digital twin can be set up for the E-FCR where various simulations and scenarios 
can be run and tested. The EWS in turn can use this input for analysis. 
3) EWS can share quarterly data and analysis with the E-FCR’s Content Providers in order to allow them 
to design training and exercise scenarios based on real world needs.  
  
 Project Number: 826293 
D3.6  ECHO information sharing models 
 
 
www.echonetwork.eu - @ECHOcybersec        page 72 of 155 
 
5. Cross-case conclusions & System requirement  
This section presents the recommendations for the E-EWS following a document analysis exercise of the 
preceding sections and a selection of literature sources. 
5.1 Context  
At the kernel of information sharing lies the intelligence data item (IDI). In the context of ECHO, an intelligence 
data item is defined as any piece of data that potentially contains actionable information relating to cyber 
security. Appreciating the enormous value of information and its potential, an information sharing framework 
is required in order to appropriately manage the lifecycle of the corresponding data items, from their generation, 
processing, dissemination all the way to their destruction. ECHO envisages the creation of a community of a 
large pool of stakeholders who will engage in joint intelligence activities and reliably share information and 
collaborate in handling security incidents in an effective and timely manner. As such, establishing and ensuring 
trust is a key factor for the successful adoption of the EWS.  
ECHO’s information sharing and its instantiation as the E-EWS will adopt the joint intelligence process 
comprising of the 6 operations (planning and direction; collection; processing and exploitation; analysis and 
production; dissemination and integration; evaluation and feedback) and adapt and extend - if necessary - the 
MISP taxonomies. 
 
 Characteristics of intelligence data items 
At a first level of discrimination, IDIs can be structured, semi-structured or unstructured. Typically unstructured 
data refer to primary sources of information that are normally processed by automated or human means for 
extracting the necessary information. This process would generate structured IDIs that would allow automated 
processing. It should be noted though that there can be primary sources ingested into the EWS that are 
structured (e.g. log files).   
IDIs can also be distinguished as reference information or operational information. Reference information 
refers to the IDIs that contribute in achieving situational awareness, allowing the beneficiary to make informed 
judgements on the cyber risks of the organisation. Operational information relates to those IDIs that support 
the actual decision making, handling incidents and so forth.  
The IDIs should be accompanied by metadata that will contextualise the contained information but also enable 
the EWS to implement and enforce authorisation and access control mechanisms. Common identifiers and 
enumerations should be used whenever possible.   
Figure 19 shows the key components and benefits and goals of the ECHO intelligence information sharing 
approach. 
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Figure 19: ECHO’s information sharing at a glance 
Table 21 presents an initial list of the categories of information and their expressions as IDIs. IDIs that 
potentially contain Personal Information will need to also meet the privacy requirements (see subsection 
below). The categories will be further expanded and refined following the requirements elicitation and 
specification of the E-EWS (WP5). 
Information 
category  
IDI  structured/  
unstructured  
reference/  
operational  
Personal 
Information  
Technical threat 
indicator  
IOC (email, IP 
address, file hash, 
mutex, domain)  
S  R    
  
Intrusion attempt  Threat Actor  
IOC (atomic, 
composite, 
behavioural)  
S  
S  
O  
O  
X  
Security alert  Ticket  
Readiness level  
Semi  
S  
O  
R/O  
  
  
Vulnerability 
information  
CVE  
CVSS  
Threat 
identification  
Geopolitical  
Exploitability  
S  
S  
Semi  
 
U  
S  
R/O  
R/O  
O  
R  
R  
  
  
Vulnerability 
report  
Vulnerability 
scanning report  
S  R    
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Information 
category  
IDI  structured/  
unstructured  
reference/  
operational  
Personal 
Information  
Incident report  Report  U  O  ?  
TTP   ATT&CK  
STIX object  
S  
S  
R/O  
R/O  
  
  
Remediation 
actions  
Operating 
procedure  
Playbook  
U  
U  
O  
O  
  
  
Asset  CPE to describe 
system platforms  
CCE (common 
configuration 
enumeration)  
S  
  
  
S  
R/O  
  
  
R/O  
  
  
Discussion  Discussion item  U  R/O  ?  
Blog post  Reference  U  R/O    
  
Poll  Poll item  U  R/O    
  
Raw data  Log-file  
Netflow  
Packet capture  
RAM image dump  
Malware sample  
VM Image  
File  
Email  
S  
S  
Semi  
Semi  
Semi  
U  
U  
U  
O  
O  
O  
O  
O  
O  
R/O  
R/O  
X  
  
  
X  
  
?  
X  
X  
Table 21: Intelligence items 
 Information sharing model assumptions 
Against all the above, the proposed ECHO information sharing model is based on the following assumptions 
or premises:  
 There will be a clear and concise governance model for the intelligence data items, where each item 
will be described by a comprehensive list of contextual information (metadata) to allow fine-grained 
decision making on the management and handling of the data.  
 There will be a clear process for on-boarding and off-boarding of participating organisations.  
 It is expected that it would be easier for organisations being in the same sector or having similar goals 
and purpose to form easier clusters for sharing threat intelligence information, as they are more likely 
to have established and mature exchange arrangements; therefore they are more likely to reach 
consensus. On the contrary, organisations that operate in orthogonal industries (i.e. where their 
respective industries have virtually nothing in common) is expected that would be less forthcoming in 
sharing information.   
 Stakeholders and participants are expected to join pre-defined and ad hoc groups.  
 Trust will be delivered through technical, organisational and human means.  
 Due to the nature and diversity of sectors, in order for information sharing to provide a meaningful and 
accurate services, the scope of the data items should be extended to encompass Cyber Physical 
Systems; indicatively, this can consider the practices found in the Maritime Sector where there is a 
clear distinction between cyber (e.g. IT networks) and Physical (e.g. Operational Technology 
networks) highlighting the existence and interdependencies between the physical and cyber plane.  
 Translation and normalisation services will allow the standardisation of intelligence data items. The 
underlying taxonomies and schemas should cater for the verticals by including optional fields.  
 Existing standards for information processing and sharing will be adopted wherever possible. 
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5.2 Information sharing architecture 
Information sharing is highly dependent upon and influenced by the regulatory frameworks as well as the 
cultural norms both within a sector and the organisation itself. In academia for example, barriers to sharing are 
expected to be lower than the other sectors, due to the culture of freedom of academic expression and an 
academic citizen mentality of peer review and dissemination of research output. On the other hand, in critical 
infrastructure type of sectors such as Energy, or in banking, information sharing is more intensely regulated, 
and this also is reflected in the respective organisational cultures. This creates a tessellation of regulatory 
frameworks and cultural antecedents on the following levels: 
1. Intra-Organisational, influenced by specific internal policies and procedures. 
2. Intra-Sector, imposed by the respective sector. 
3. National-governmental, governed by the respective strategic decisions on a national level. 
4. Transnational, through the international agreements, treaties and EU legislation and directives, in the 
case of the organisation operating within the EU. This may include frameworks for information sharing 
with Law Enforcement entities. 
The above are also complemented by horizontal legislation such as the GDPR that cuts across all sectors. 
Provided that:  
 The ECHO pilot is part of the EU initiative on establishing a network of competency centres, and  
 ECHO aims to support information sharing among and between a multitude of sectors with Healthcare, 
Energy and Maritime being initially considered.  
A modified  hybrid model architecture is recommended as this appears to best fit the requirements following 
the cross-case analysis. In essence, the hybrid approach will allow to maintain a basic form of hierarchy, and 
at the same time it will allow the connection of different hubs, forming a higher level peer to peer. This is also 
in accordance to how CERTs operate and share information, which is done on a peer to peer basis but also 
within their level of operation (e.g. national, organisational, etc.). Allowing some degree of centralisation will 
also enable centralised decision making and support the emergence of Coordination Centres. A hub could 
represent a variety of communities, such as a specific sector, an interest group or a national point. It is 
recommended that each hub will refer to organisations of common characteristics, goals or sector, simplifying 
its management, internal governance and deployment complexity.  This would be in line with the E-EWS 
architecture supporting tenants allowing also seamless integration through the sharing API capability that will 
connect EWS instances.  
From a governance perspective, the immediate consequence of this would be to have trust realms, two tiers 
of cross organisational boundaries, as shown in Figure 20. 
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Figure 20: Information sharing architecture 
In the figure above, three trust realms are presented. Each realm can correspond to any type of organisational 
cluster, e.g. realm 1 could be academic CERTs, realm 2 national cyber security competency centres and 
realms 3 maritime sector. Every trust realm can have more than one EWS instances, for scalability and 
resilience purposes. The governance model could refer to policies and security certification requirements for 
deploying an E-EWS instance.  
The first step for an organisation or individual joining the E-EWS ecosystem is to complete the on-boarding 
process. Upon successful application, the organisation is allocated a tenant slice. This will host all information 
provided by the participating organisation. Organisation boundaries can be crossed within a given trust realm 
and these are specified through the inner boundary data governance. It is expected that these will be the first 
to be formed, upon the emergence of the E-EWS.  
Inter-realm information sharing is controlled by the outer boundary data governance models. These are 
expected to be more complex and diverse and will require a longer maturity period. It should be noted that not 
all trust realms will necessarily connect to each other; such configurations imply that some realms will emerge 
to be more authoritative and trustworthy than others, but should also indicate that transitive trust should not be 
guaranteed or offered.   
IDIs containing personal information will be go through anonymization and redaction layers prior to leaving a 
tenant’s area. For structured IDIs, automated processes would seamlessly and efficiently implement the 
underlying privacy policy. Information classification schemes will be enforced at the organisational boundaries 
(coarse grained access control) as well as internally (fine grained).   
As the organisation participation and connectivity between the hubs increases, the value of the network is 
expected also to increase, in accordance to Metcalfe’s Law. However, as this increase is very likely to result 
to generation of large volumes of data, the perceived usefulness is expected to decrease. In order to 
compensate for this, information sharing should not only be limited by access control criteria, but additional 
contextual features to enable effective filtering of non-relevant information (noise). A representative feature for 
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this task is asset information. For example, by using the Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) convention, 
an organisation can describe their assets in a standardised way. By doing this it would be possible to quickly 
filter out attacks and vulnerabilities that are not applicable to a particular organisation’s attack surface. 
 
5.3 Stakeholders 
These operate at different levels, having potentially diverse agendas and priorities:  
CERTS/CSIRTS:  
 National/EU CERTS – protect national and critical infrastructure  
 ISP CERTS – protect Internet related services and backbone  
 Organisational CERTS – protect organisation  
 ICT Vendor CERTS – protect products  
 Academic CERTS – protect academic infrastructure, facilitate research and innovation   
Public safety organisations:  
 Law enforcement Agencies. These are secondary users that may be involved when handling incidents. 
As such, the E-EWS will allow the collection and preservation of evidence in a forensically sound 
manner.  
Information sharing entities:  
 Individuals   
 Researchers   
 Organisations  
 National  
 Private  
 Critical infrastructure  
 Research 
 
5.4 Features of the information sharing system 
A modular approach for the E-EWS is considered. The core EWS should comprised of a ticketing system 
supporting distributed workflow among a number of different partners and organisations. The EWS should 
allow the enrichment and contextualisation of the introduced and ingress information. As such, a standard 
description and an expandable information taxonomy should be considered. 
An initial list of features of the perspective E-EWS is presented below: 
 A suitable confidentiality model, such as the traffic light protocol.   
All intelligence items will need to be assigned with a designation to ensure that the sensitive 
information is shared with the appropriate audience. TLP is recommended because it is less formal, 
does not really require NDAs, etc., it is more of a “gentlemen’s agreement” and allows a faster 
communication of incident data. TLP will of course run in conjunction with the standard system’s 
access control mechanisms, such as RBAC. For the E-EWS system in particular and upon a joint 
decision, FIRST’s TLP definition is adopted to support future interoperability and standardisation with 
all pilots. Moreover, the confidentiality model – due to the nature of the EWS – should include 
introduction of information by protecting source attribution (Chatham House rule), in order to facilitate 
the submission of any information that can be vital when handling security incidents. A direct 
consequence of this is the consideration of the reliability of the data, defined further below. 
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 An access control scheme, capable of making fine-grained access control decisions.  
The audience accessing intelligence items shall be controlled through access classifiers such as 
organisations, groups, and roles. 
 Support of multiple taxonomies and standards for intelligence sharing.  
This will allow the hosting of organisations belonging in different sectors. 
 Capabilities for a structured  sharing of intelligence data  
e.g. use of Structured Threat Information eXpression (STIX)  
 The system should facilitate the exchange of intelligence between CERTS/CSIRTS and LEAs. 
Terminologies used in the two communities are sometimes different. ENISA recommends using the 
‘Common Taxonomy for Law Enforcement and The National Network of CSIRTs’.  
 Common data and document formats support.   
Use of common formats e.g. Word, PDF, and CSV facilitate intelligence sharing where the use of 
specialised formats is not an option.  
 Capability to evaluate the reliability of the source of an intelligence data item.  
All information sources should be assessed for reliability based on a technical assessment of their 
capability, or in the case of human intelligence source, their history.  
 Assessment of the credibility of an intelligence data item based on likelihood and levels of 
corroboration by other sources.   
An EWS allowing a quick turnaround and fast decision making requires that the ingress information is 
trusted. The system should have mechanisms to assess the credibility of the information and include 
fake news protection mechanisms. 
 A shared workflow management system for incident handling.   
This is one of the main purposes and core functionalities of the E-EWS, allowing also to monitor the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the system. 
 Trust-boosting security technologies. 
Supporting the creation of closed communities and encrypted peer to peer communication. 
 Data redaction capabilities, for privacy compliance.   
The system will need to redact personal information for data items marked to contain PI when 
exporting them to other EWS instances based on a privacy protection policy. For structured data, this 
can be done automatically. For unstructured data, this can be done semi-automatically, but may 
require human inspection and approval.  
 Attribution capabilities, identification of the origins of the source of information. 
For traceability, disseminated information shall contain appropriate origin describing meta-data.  
 Anonymous sharing of information.  
Despite the attribution requirements, it is advised that the system would still allow anonymous 
information, however, these items will need to be clearly marked as anonymous and is expected to 
have an impact on the reliability of the information. 
 Customisable exchange of intelligence data.  
Customisation may be in accordance with internal (originating organisation) or external requirements.  
 Predefined criteria for data dissemination.  
This relates to both the originator of the information (e.g. the criteria a set in accordance with audience, 
trust realms etc.) and the consumer of the information (e.g. data versions and revisions, severity, etc.) 
 Data normalisation.  
The system shall normalise all ingress data under a common format, or data model. This will enable 
compatibility, interoperability and other functions (correlation)  
 A flexible data model.  
Expansion of the data model is a prerequisite to allow E-EWS to grow across different domains and 
verticals. The system can allow custom creation of tags and the enrichment of existing IDIs. This could 
be automatic or manual. For example an IDI may be enriched by external information from OSINT 
activities. 
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 Correlation capabilities. 
At a minimum level, the system should automatically link newly imported IDIs with existing IDIs. 
 Data items curation.  
The system shall curate and de-duplicate IDIs imported from different sources and datasets. This is 
for ensuring that the integrity and accuracy of analytics is offered. 
 Advanced data analytics.  
Situational awareness will be considerably supported from data analytics techniques (e.g. clustering 
and classification).  This could include production of trends over time related data to support predictive 
analytics. 
 Visual analytics.  
The system should provide visual analytics through a dynamic, interactive UI. 
 Pivoting capabilities.  
In order to support the analytics processes and allow complex correlations and analytics, the system 
should offer pivoting capabilities over data. 
 Data exporting formats.  
The system shall support exporting of data in different formats e.g. STIX, OpenIOC, CSV, Yara, sigma, 
etc.  
 Filtering capabilities.  
The system should support filtering of information across a number of parameters and features. This 
also includes both whitelisting, blacklisting, to filter out benign activity and to pin down 
suspicious/malicious events.  
 Triaging.  
The system should provide a high level overview of the data so that the analyst can quickly get a “gist” 
of what they contain. For example, for numerical data, the basic statistical information should be 
presented.  
 Alerting and communication.  
This feature is required to improve the response times to incidents. This involves capabilities to match 
asset configuration with vulnerability information (for example describing assets as CPE and pairing 
with CVE and CVSS items) and sending a message to a designated contact point if a criticality level 
of an event exceeds some threshold.  For example, this can be done if an asset described through a 
configuration is detected to be vulnerable to an exploit with a CVSS score. 
 Intelligence report generation. 
The information shared should be available to the stakeholders in an appropriate format and level of 
detail.  
 
5.5 Privacy requirements 
In order to identify the personal information to be managed and processed by ECHO, the consortium carried 
out a detailed analysis of the different categories of personal information to be processed and its lifecycle. This 
analysis is described in the Data Protection Impact Analysis Report [67]. 
ECHO is underpinned by a series of privacy statements. These comply with the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) and are managed and overseen by the Data Controller and Data Protection Officer (DPO) 
for the project, RHEA System SA (RHEA).  
In addition to these statements, each consortium member will liaise with the DPO to establish a Data Protection 
Impact Assessment (DPIA) must be conducted prior to any data collection or processing taking place. This 
decision will be reviewed whenever the data category, type or the nature and/or scope of the processing 
changes.  
Data Processing refers to any handling of data whether this is capturing, creating, modifying, adding, deleting, 
sharing or otherwise handling of data. Therefore, any and all data captured/to be captured and processed, 
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whether manually or by automation as part of this project will be processed in some way and potentially fall 
within the remit of the General Data Protection (GDPR).  
Collecting of IDIs having personal information such as a threat actor, log-file, RAM image dump, etc. (see 
Table 21) will be processed and stored in accordance with the following privacy requirements:  
P1. Lawful basis for processing:  
a. the lawful basis for processing data will be specified, recorded and justified;  
b. the data will be classified in accordance with sensitivity as either:  
I. Personally Identifying (PI)  
II. Non-personal (N)  
III. Other (O) (meaning the classification is to be confirmed pending discussion with project lead, 
privacy officer or DPO)  
P2. Purpose Limitation: personal data should only be processed for needed and specified purpose; no personal 
data should be reused without informed consent first being obtained. Informed consent templates are provided 
within the ECHO project documentation (Reference Materials, documents folder);  
P3. Data Minimisation:  only necessary data for the specified purpose will be processed;  
P4. Accuracy:  the data will be accurate and kept up to date;  
P5.  Storage Limitation: data will be pseudonymised or anonymised as soon as practicable and kept for no 
longer than absolutely necessary (‘the data life’). At the end of the data life, data will be securely deleted and/or 
destroyed.  
P6.  Integrity and Confidentiality:  
a. Confidentiality: Ensuring data is only accessible to authorised stakeholders  
b. Integrity: Ensuring non-repudiation and reliability for each piece of data, i.e. processing correct, 
authentic, and unmodified data.  
c. Availability: Ensuring data is usable on demand and accessible to authorised stakeholders  
d. Unlinkability: Ensuring data cannot be sufficiently distinguished to linked across platforms or domains 
with similar context or purposes  
e. Unobservability/ Undetectability: Ensuring data is anonymised so that the anonymity and undectability 
of the individual is preserved  
f. Anonymity: Obfuscating links between data and identity i.e. the ability to distinguish any one individual 
from the data  
g. Pseudonymity: Replacing identifying data with pseudonyms ensuring any links to original data cannot 
be made by unauthorised parties  
P7. Intervenability: Enabling data subject access and/or supervisory authority access to affect action on the 
records (e.g. request modification and/or deletion). In that way it can be seen as a safeguarding measure that 
must be included within any process or system involving personal data  
a. Transparency: Openness - Providing assurance, accountability and traceability for internal and 
external stakeholders.  
P8. Proportionality: Proportionality requires that any limitation on the rights of the individual have to be justified. 
For example, making sure that the measure(s) taken in processing the data do not disproportionally limit the 
rights of the individual whose data is being processed. A pre-condition is that the measure(s) taken in 
processing or safeguarding are sufficient to achieve the objective while only relevant personal data for the 
purposes of the processing is collected and processed.  
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These privacy goals comply with the GDPR and are based on the privacy principles of GDPR (P1-7) and those 
in the Privacy Lifecycle PLAN (i-ix), that forms part of the Privacy and Compliance framework (PACT) [68].  
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6. Conclusions  
 ECHO envisages the creation of a community of a large pool of stakeholders who will engage in joint 
intelligence activities and reliably share information and collaborate in handling security incidents in 
an effective and timely manner. The main goals of ECHO intelligence information sharing are: 1) trust, 
2) enhanced threat understanding, 3) situational awareness, 4) knowledge maturation, 5) increased 
degree of protection, and 6) improved preventive functions.  
 ECHO’s information sharing and its instantiation as the E-EWS will adopt the joint intelligence process 
comprising of the 6 operations (planning and direction; collection; processing and exploitation; analysis 
and production; dissemination and integration; evaluation and feedback) and adapt and extend - if 
necessary - the MISP taxonomies. 
 In ECHO, Intelligence Data Item (IDI), the kernel of information sharing, is any piece of data that 
potentially contains actionable information relating to cyber security. An information sharing framework 
is required to manage IDIs’ lifecycle; generation, processing, dissemination all the way to destruction.  
 The main IDI categories in ECHO: Technical threat indicator, Intrusion attempt, Security alert, 
Vulnerability information, Vulnerability report, Incident report, TTP, Remediation actions, Asset, 
Discussion, Blog post, Poll, Raw data. 
 ECHO information sharing model will be based on the following assumptions or premises:  
o IDIs have a clear and concise governance model, where each item is described by metadata 
to allow fine-grained decision making on the management and handling of the data 
o A clear process for on-boarding and off-boarding of participating organisations exists.  
o Organisations from the same sector have similar goals; form easier clusters for sharing threat 
intelligence information, and are more likely to reach consensus.   
o Stakeholders and participants are expected to join pre-defined and ad hoc groups.  
o Trust will be delivered through technical, organisational and human means.  
o The scope of IDIs should be extended to encompass Cyber Physical Systems; indicatively, 
this can consider the practices found in the Maritime Sector where there is a clear distinction 
between cyber (e.g. IT networks) and Physical (e.g. Operational Technology networks) 
highlighting the existence and interdependencies between the physical and cyber plane.  
o Translation and normalisation services allow the standardisation of IDIs. Taxonomies and 
schemas should cater for the verticals by including optional fields.  
o Existing standards for information processing and sharing are adopted wherever possible. 
 The ECHO pilot is part of the EU initiative on establishing a network of competency centres, and aims 
to support information sharing among and between a multitude of sectors with Healthcare, Energy and 
Maritime being initially considered in this deliverable. 
 A hybrid model architecture best fit the requirements following the cross-case analysis. In essence, 
the hybrid approach will allow to maintain a basic form of hierarchy, and at the same time it will allow 
the connection of different hubs, forming a higher level peer to peer. This is also in accordance to how 
CERTs operate and share information, which is done on a peer to peer basis but also within their level 
of operation (e.g. national, organisational, etc.). Allowing some degree of centralisation will also enable 
centralised decision making and support the emergence of Coordination Centres. A hub could 
represent a variety of communities, such as a specific sector, an interest group or a national point. It 
is recommended that each hub will refer to organisations of common characteristics, goals or sector, 
simplifying its management, internal governance and deployment complexity.  This would be inline 
with the EWS architecture supporting tenants allowing also seamless integration through the sharing 
API capability that will connect EWS instances.  
 From a governance perspective, the immediate consequence of this would be to have trust realms, 
two tiers of cross organisational boundaries. 
 Information sharing stakeholders: 
o CERTS/CSIRTS 
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 National/EU CERTS – protect national and critical infrastructure  
 ISP CERTS – protect Internet related services and backbone  
 Organisational CERTS – protect organisation  
 ICT Vendor CERTS – protect products  
 Academic CERTS – protect academic infrastructure, facilitate research and 
innovation   
o Public safety organisations: Law enforcement Agencies. These are secondary users that may 
be involved when handling incidents. As such, the E-EWS will allow the collection and 
preservation of evidence in a forensically sound manner.  
o Information sharing entities: Individuals, Researchers, Organisations, National, Private, 
Critical infrastructure, Research 
 ECHO is underpinned by a series of privacy statements. These comply with the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) and are managed and overseen by the Data Controller and Data 
Protection Officer (DPO) for the project, RHEA System SA (RHEA).  
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Annexes 
 
Annex 1 – Systematic literature review sources 
This annex consists relevant sources and analysed documents concerning this deliverable. 
Main research were made by using words and sentences; cybersecurity Information sharing, features of cyber 
exchange models, cybersecurity information sharing governance and sharing technologies for cybersecurity. 
After that in each case, the search queries like “cybersecurity information sharing” was entered with no 
temporal limitation. A query without quotation marks returns some variations, where the search engine allows 
for permutations and inflections.  
Initial search in Springerlink returned 1612 results for “cybersecurity information sharing” within content 
computer science and it returns 31 researches with quotations as table TableA1 illustrates.  There were few 
main tasks in the research: Identifying existing early warning systems and frameworks within public safety 
organisations, Identifying information sharing models and governance models in private and public safety 
organisations, Identifying features of cyber exchange models e.g. best practices and defensive measures and 
Different classification concerning phenomena like events, incidents, vulnerabilities threats and others. 
Sharing technologies without word “cybersecurity” returned 517 results. Features of cyber information sharing 
models without quotations returned 279 results. 
Item Title Publication Title Authors Year 
Network Externalities in 
Cybersecurity Information Sharing 
Ecosystems 
Economics of Grids, Clouds, 
Systems, and Services 
Zahid RashidUmara 
NoorJörn Altmann 
2019 
Risk Management Using Cyber-
Threat Information Sharing and 
Cyber-Insurance 
Game Theory for Networks Deepak K. ToshSachin 
ShettyShamik 
SenguptaJay P. 
KesanCharles A. 
Kamhoua 
2017 
Using Incentives to Foster Security 
Information Sharing and 
Cooperation: A General Theory and 
Application to Critical Infrastructure 
Protection 
Critical Information 
Infrastructures Security 
Alain MermoudMarcus 
Matthias 
KeuppSolange 
GhernaoutiDimitri 
Percia David 
2017 
Three Layer Game Theoretic 
Decision Framework for Cyber-
Investment and Cyber-Insurance 
Decision and Game Theory for 
Security 
Deepak K. ToshIman 
VakiliniaSachin 
ShettyShamik 
SenguptaCharles A. 
KamhouaLaurent 
NjillaKevin Kwiat 
2017 
Distributed, Collaborative and 
Automated Cybersecurity 
Infrastructures for Cloud-Based 
Design and Manufacturing Systems 
Cloud-Based Design and 
Manufacturing (CBDM) 
J. Lane Thames 2014 
Toward a Safer Tomorrow: 
Cybersecurity and Critical 
Infrastructure 
The Palgrave Handbook of 
Managing Continuous 
Business Transformation 
Solomon KarchefskyH. 
Raghav Rao 
2017 
IoT: Privacy, Security, and Your 
Civil Rights 
Women Securing the Future 
with TIPPSS for IoT 
Cynthia D. Mares 2019 
Part 2: Legal and Regulatory 
Framework 
Transatlantic Data Protection 
in Practice 
Rolf H. WeberDominic 
Staiger 
2017 
Cybersecurity in the US: Major 
Trends and Challenges 
The New US Security Agenda Brian 
FonsecaJonathan D. 
Rosen 
2017 
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Item Title Publication Title Authors Year 
Cyber Attacks, Prevention, and 
Countermeasures 
Counterterrorism and 
Cybersecurity 
Newton Lee 2015 
Regulation of Cyberspace and 
Human Rights 
Public International Law of 
Cyberspace 
Kriangsak 
Kittichaisaree 
2017 
Toward a Holistic Approach of 
Cybersecurity Capacity Building 
Through an Innovative Transversal 
Sandwich Training 
Industry Integrated 
Engineering and Computing 
Education 
Jessica El 
MelhemAbdelaziz 
BourasYacine Ouzrout 
2019 
Frameworks and Best Practices Cyber Resilience of Systems 
and Networks 
Brianna KeysStuart 
Shapiro 
2019 
Economic valuation for information 
security investment: a systematic 
literature review 
Information Systems Frontiers Daniel SchatzRabih 
Bashroush 
2017 
Main Initiatives to Safeguard 
Cyberspace Sovereignty 
Cyberspace  Sovereignty Binxing Fang 2018 
Transatlantic Cooperation in 
Cybersecurity: Converging on 
Security as Resilience? 
Cybersecurity in the European 
Union 
George Christou 2016 
Learning quasi-identifiers for 
privacy-preserving exchanges: a 
rough set theory approach 
Granular Computing C. Wafo SohL. L. 
NjillaK. K. KwiatC. A. 
Kamhoua 
2018 
IT-Security in Critical 
Infrastructures Experiences, 
Results and Research Directions 
Distributed Computing and 
Internet Technology 
Ulrike Lechner 2019 
Proposed Model for a Cybersecurity 
Centre of Innovation for South 
Africa 
ICT and Society Joey Jansen van 
VuurenMarthie 
GroblerLouise 
LeenenJackie 
Phahlamohlaka 
2014 
Trends in Cyber Operations: An 
Introduction 
Current and Emerging Trends 
in Cyber Operations 
Frederic Lemieux 2015 
Cybersecurity in the U.S. The Quest to Cyber Superiority Nir Kshetri 2016 
Sharing Cyber Threat Intelligence 
Under the General Data Protection 
Regulation 
Privacy Technologies and 
Policy 
Adham AlbakriEerke 
BoitenRogério De 
Lemos 
2019 
Vanishing Boundaries of Control: 
Implications for Security and 
Sovereignty of the Changing Nature 
and Global Expansion of Neoliberal 
Criminal Justice Provision 
The Private Sector and 
Criminal Justice 
Robert P. Weiss 2018 
International Cyberspace 
Governance 
World Internet Development 
Report 2017 
 2019 
The Role of Blockchain in 
Underpinning Mission Critical 
Infrastructure 
Industry 4.0 and Engineering 
for a Sustainable Future 
Hamid 
JahankhaniStefan 
Kendzierskyj 
2019 
Cyber Attacks, Prevention, and 
Countermeasures 
Counterterrorism and 
Cybersecurity 
Newton Lee 2013 
Interpretation of the Concept of 
“Cyberspace Sovereignty” 
Cyberspace  Sovereignty Binxing Fang 2018 
Dark Web: Deterring Cybercrimes 
and Cyber-Attacks 
Technology-Enhanced 
Methods of Money Laundering 
Fausto Martin De 
Sanctis 
2019 
Towards a Systematic View on 
Cybersecurity Ecology 
Combatting Cybercrime and 
Cyberterrorism 
Wojciech 
MazurczykSzymon 
DrobniakSean Moore 
2016 
More Than Humans Digital Urban Acupuncture Salvatore 
IaconesiOriana 
Persico 
2017 
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Item Title Publication Title Authors Year 
Digital Security – Wie Unternehmen 
den Sicherheitsrisiken des digitalen 
Wandels trotzen 
Digitalisierung in Industrie-, 
Handels- und 
Dienstleistungsunternehmen 
Alexander Weise 2018 
Table A1: Relevant Springelink research publications 
IEEE Xplore returned 147 results by using words: cybersecurity, information and sharing together. We got 
access to 129 files data: Conferences (82), Journals (28), Magazines (16), Courses (15), Early Access Articles 
(3), Books (2). Features of cyber exchange models returned 29 results. Information sharing returned 36 results 
and both cyber information sharing and cyber information exchange returned 5 results in which one was same, 
as Table A2 illustrates. 
Document Title Authors Publication Title Year 
"Cybersecurity information sharing" 
A System Architecture of 
Cybersecurity Information 
Exchange with Privacy (CYBEX-
P) 
F. Sadique; K. 
Bakhshaliyev; J. 
Springer; S. Sengupta 
2019 IEEE 9th Annual Computing 
and Communication Workshop and 
Conference (CCWC) 
2019 
Privacy-preserving 
cybersecurity information 
exchange mechanism 
I. Vakilinia; D. K. Tosh; 
S. Sengupta 
2017 International Symposium on 
Performance Evaluation of 
Computer and Telecommunication 
Systems (SPECTS) 
2017 
A coalitional game theory 
approach for cybersecurity 
information sharing 
I. Vakilinia; S. 
Sengupta 
MILCOM 2017 - 2017 IEEE Military 
Communications Conference 
(MILCOM) 
2017 
An evolutionary game-theoretic 
framework for cyber-threat 
information sharing 
D. Tosh; S. Sengupta; 
C. Kamhoua; K. Kwiat; 
A. Martin 
2015 IEEE International Conference 
on Communications (ICC) 
2015 
Developing a cyber threat 
intelligence sharing platform 
for South African organisations 
M. Mutemwa; J. 
Mtsweni; N. Mkhonto 
2017 Conference on Information 
Communication Technology and 
Society (ICTAS) 
2017 
"Cybersecurity information exchange" 
3-Way game model for privacy-
preserving cybersecurity 
information exchange 
framework 
I. Vakilinia; D. K. Tosh; 
S. Sengupta 
MILCOM 2017 - 2017 IEEE Military 
Communications Conference 
(MILCOM) 
2017 
Attribute based sharing in 
cybersecurity information 
exchange framework 
I. Vakilinia; D. K. Tosh; 
S. Sengupta 
2017 International Symposium on 
Performance Evaluation of 
Computer and Telecommunication 
Systems (SPECTS) 
2017 
Privacy-preserving 
cybersecurity information 
exchange mechanism 
I. Vakilinia; D. K. Tosh; 
S. Sengupta 
2017 International Symposium on 
Performance Evaluation of 
Computer and Telecommunication 
Systems (SPECTS) 
2017 
Structured cybersecurity 
information exchange for 
streamlining incident response 
operations 
T. Takahashi; D. 
Miyamoto 
NOMS 2016 - 2016 IEEE/IFIP 
Network Operations and 
Management Symposium 
2016 
A System Architecture of 
Cybersecurity Information 
Exchange with Privacy (CYBEX-
P) 
F. Sadique; K. 
Bakhshaliyev; J. 
Springer; S. Sengupta 
2019 IEEE 9th Annual Computing 
and Communication Workshop and 
Conference (CCWC) 
2019 
Table A2: Specified IEEE returns 
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JYKDOC returned 9 results by using words: cybersecurity, information and sharing together. “We got access 
to 9 files data. Separate words cyber exchange models returned 22 results. ”information sharing technologies” 
returned 268 results.  
  
AI tool “iris” requires title of research question and problem statement. We have used follow words to describe 
our problem: “The research question of the literature review is “What are the main features of cyber exchange 
models?" In order to capture a reasonably full range of the literature concerning the main features of cyber 
exchange models. Identifying information sharing models. Identifying features of cyber exchange models.  
Early warning solution will deliver a secure sharing support tool for personnel to coordinate and share 
information in near real time. It will support information sharing across organisational boundaries and provide 
sharing of both general cyber information as a reference library. It will also ensure secure connection 
management from clients accessing the early-warning system.” AI tool “IRIS” returned 270 results by using 
following words in title: cybersecurity, information and sharing together as Figure A1 illustrates. Almost all were 
relevant material. The system calculates the relevance percentage for the results. All relevant results were 
between 78% and 95%.  
 
Figure A1: Identified papers by AI tool IRIS 
  
Several studies were based on fundamental level public-related sources, which formed the main frame of the 
research. Most relevant public-related documents in this research are follows: 
 Department of Homeland Security, "NIPP 2013 - partnering for critical infrastructure security and 
resilience," DHS, U.S., 2013. 
 MITRE, "Trusted Automated eXchange of Indicator Information — TAXII™ Enabling Cyber Threat 
Information Exchange," 2018. 
 NIST, "Guide to cyber threat information sharing," National Institute of Standards and Technology, 
Gaithersburg, Tech. Rep. NIST Special Publication 800-150, 2016. 
 Johnson et al, "Guide to cyber threat information sharing. NIST special publication (NIST SP) 800–
150." NIST, 2016. 
 OASIS Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) TC, DHS (CS&C), "TAXII™ version 2.0. committee 
specification 01," OASIS Open, Tech. Rep. taxii-v2.0-cs01, 2017. 
 OASIS Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) TC, DHS (CS&C), "STIX™ version 2.0. part 2: STIX objects," 
OASIS open, Tech. Rep. stix-v2.0-wd03-part2-stix-objects, 2017. 
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Annex 2 – Analysed information sharing and trust models: technologies and 
frameworks 
 
The systematic review of scientific articles included studies and evaluations of hundreds of information sharing 
and trust models. During the case studies, the following technologies, structures, models and frameworks were 
analysed in more detail: 
 Structured Threat Information eXpression (STIX™) 
STIX 1.1.1: https://stixproject.github.io/about/ 
STIX 2.0: https://oasis-open.github.io/cti-documentation/ 
 Malware Attribute Enumeration and Characterization (MAEC™) 
MAEC 5.0: https://maecproject.github.io/ 
 Incident Categories 
FIRST CASE Classification: www.first.org 
 Traffic Light Protocol (TLP) 
TLP 1.0: https://www.first.org/tlp/ 
 NATO Cyber Rapid Reaction Team (RRT) that protect its critical infrastructure. 
 NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD COE) 
 European Public-Private Partnership for Resilience (EP3R)  
 Schengen Information Systems (SIS)   
 European Information Exchange Model (EIXM) 
 Europol’s Secure Information Exchange Network Application (SIENA); enables authorities to 
exchange information with each other, with Europol, and with a number of third parties.  
 U.S. Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC) for telecommunications 
 Communications Information Sharing and Analysis Center (Comm-ISAC)  
 EU-U.S. Privacy Shield 
 ENISA: ISAC member driven organisation model. (Country-Focused ISAC, sector-specific ISAC and 
International ISAC) - Sharing knowledge about incidents. 
 ENISA PPP – cooperative model incident handling and crisis management. 
 NIST Cybersecurity Framework  
 MITRE: CORA (Cyber Operations Rapid Assessment)   
 MITRE: TISCO Threat-informed model 
 UN-NATO information sharing International organisation as UN (United Nations) and NATO are the 
connecting factors concerning harmonization of information sharing procedures in the EU and USA 
and between them 
 UN-NATO-EU-USA information sharing 
 NIST: RAF (Risk Assessment Framework) 
 NIST: RMF (Risk Management Framework) 
 CYBersecurity information EXchange with Privacy (CYBEX-P) ; a structured information sharing 
platform with integrating privacy-preserving mechanisms.  
 Cyberx industrial cybersecurity platform 
 CybOX - The Cyber Observable eXpression. Standadised language   
 TAXII Trusted Automated eXchange of Indicator Information 
 OpenIOC an open framework for sharing threat intelligence information 
 VERIS The Vocabulary for Event Recording and Incident Sharing 
 MAEC Malware Attribute Enumeration and Characterization 
 SCAP Methods and components e.g. for using automated vulnerability management 
 IODEF Incident Object Description Exchange Format 
 MARISA Maritime Information sharing model and toolkit developed by MARISA project 
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 RANGER Surveillance platform that will offer features for the information sharing   
 Health Information Exchange (HIE) 
 Laboratory information system (LIS) 
 EUCISE Information Sharing between the maritime authorities  
 Trust models in national level 
 Trust models in cross boarding situations 
 Cyber information sharing between situation centers 
 Cyber information sharing within emergency response procedures 
 National cyber-threat prevention mechanism HAVARO 1.0 
 National cyber-threat prevention mechanism HAVARO 2.0 
 The EaP Rapid Response Mechanism for civil society organisations  
 Information Against Hate Crimes Toolkit (INFAHCT)  
 The Camden Asset Recovery Inter-Agency Network (CARIN) 
 The Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units - a network of financial intelligence units                     
from all States  
 The Global Focal Points Initiative (GFPI) – INTERPOL 
 The Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative (StAR)  
 Mutual legal assistance (MLA) for the G7 and G20 countries 
 Cyber Information Sharing and Collaboration Program (CISCP)  
 The Critical Infrastructure Key Resources (CIKR)  
 CRAMM - CCTA Risk Analysis and Management Method is a risk management methodology 
 OCTAVE - Method for the define and share threat information between the teams within the 
organisation 
 SOMAP - The Security Officers Management & Analysis Project  
 OGRCM3 - Open Governance, Risk and Compliance Maturity Management Methodology  
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multi-sector collaboration. One important tool for this aim is the ECHO Early 
Warning System (E-EWS). The development of the E-EWS will be rooted in a com-
prehensive review of information sharing and trust models from within the cyber 
domain, as well as models from other domains. In 2009, the Commission 
adopted a Communication Towards the integration of maritime surveillance in 
the EU: “A common information sharing environment for the EU maritime do-
main (CISE),” setting out guiding principles towards its establishment. The aim of 
the COM(2010)584 final was to generate a situational awareness of activities at 
sea and impact overall maritime safety and security. As a outcome of 
COM(2010)584 final, the EUCISE2020 project has developed a test-bed for mar-
itime information sharing. This case study analyses information sharing models 
in the maritime domain, the EUCISE2020 test bed and the CISE itself as an alter-
native for cyber information sharing system. The maritime sector represents a 
suitable research case because it is already digitized in many aspects.  
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Introduction 
Cybersecurity is critical to both our prosperity and our security, because our daily 
lives and economies become increasingly dependent on digital technologies.11 The 
main prerequisite towards cybersecurity is situational awareness (SA). Without 
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cyber SA, it is impossible to systematically prevent, identify, and protect the sys-
tem from the cyber incidents and if, for example, a cyber-attack happens, to re-
cover from the attack. SA involves being aware of what is happening around your 
system to understand how information, events, and how your own actions affect 
the goals and objectives, both now and in the near future. It also enables to select 
effective and efficient countermeasures, and thus, to protect the system from var-
ying threats and attacks. From research point of view, some aspects of the cyber 
SA area are more mature than others: there is plenty of work dedicated to cyber 
SA in industrial control systems, but less research has been devoted to areas such 
as information exchange and sharing for cyber SA.12  
On the other hand, sharing of proper cyber SA information is the key element 
of cybersecurity,5 and it has been noticed recently by public administrations. In the 
U.S., two laws about sharing the information on cyber SA were recently signed: 
The Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act requires the parties to develop proce-
dures for sharing threat information of cyber security between different stake-
holders, whereas the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act obliges the 
parties to provide sharing of situational information of cyber threats in real-time 
between nominated stakeholders. The European Commission notes that “cooper-
ation and information sharing between the public and private sectors faces a num-
ber of obstacles. Governments and public authorities are reluctant to share cyber-
security-relevant information for fear of compromising national security or com-
petitiveness. Private undertakings are reluctant to share information on their 
cyber vulnerabilities and resulting losses for fear of compromising sensitive busi-
ness information, risking their reputation or risking breaching data protection 
rules. Trust needs to be strengthened for public-private partnerships to underpin 
wider cooperation and sharing of information across a greater number of sectors. 
The role of Information Sharing and Analysis Centres is particularly important in 
creating the necessary trust for sharing information between private and public 
sector. Some first steps have been taken in respect of specific critical sectors such 
as aviation, through the creation of the European Centre for Cybersecurity in Avi-
ation, and energy, by developing Information Sharing and Analysis Centres. The 
Commission will contribute in full to this approach with support from ENISA, with 
an acceleration needed in particular with regard to sectors providing essential ser-
vices as identified in the NIS Directive.”11 
The ECHO (European Network of Cybersecurity Centres and Competence Hub 
for Innovation and Operations) project started in 2019. It aims at organizing and 
coordinating an approach to strengthen proactive cyber security in the European 
Union, through effective and efficient multi-sector collaboration. One important 
tool for this aim is the ECHO Early Warning System (E-EWS). The development of 
the E-EWS will be rooted in a comprehensive review of information sharing and 
trust models from within the cyber domain, as well as models from other domains. 
This paper analyses information sharing models in maritime sector that is already 
digitized on many aspects, and it continues its digital transformation, at the same 
pace as the rest of the world. This sector includes various activities such as: 
• Shipping (bulk, liquid, gas, containers, RO-RO); 
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• Passengers transportation and cruises (over 20 million passengers in 2013); 
• Ports and Shipyard; 
• Fishing and related activities, Offshore platforms, Renewables Maritime Ener-
gies and Submarine cables. 
The sum of these activities makes up a major economic sector and, in some 
cases, belongs to the domain of strategic activities for the survival of the nation. 
Marine Transportation System (MTS) is a major component of the world’s overall 
transportation and energy system. It is a dominant factor in the global supply chain 
that connects businesses and individuals all over the world. U.S. economic pros-
perity is highly dependent upon maritime trade and the ships, boats, terminals, 
and related maritime critical infrastructure that support their many tributaries. 
According to the U.S. Maritime Administration, waterborne cargo and associated 
activities contribute more than $ 649 billion to the U.S. Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) sustaining more than 13 million jobs. Many thousands of vessels, from tugs 
and barges to ocean going ships complete this system. By volume, over 90 % of 
U.S. overseas trade travels by water.24 At the international level, the maritime do-
main is in full growth and sustains a worldwide economy of 1.5 trillion euros. The 
stakes are huge and the increasing digitization of this domain will increase the 
cyber risk. As early as 2011, ENISA, in a report on maritime cybersecurity, rung the 
alarm bell on the massive under protection of maritime systems.8 The US Coast 
Guard and other authorities have document-ed cyber-related impacts on technol-
ogies ranging from container terminal operations ashore to offshore platform sta-
bility and dynamic positioning systems for offshore supply vessels.24 
This paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 includes a quick summarization of the 
field’s knowledge about this research topic. Section 3 outlines the case study 
method used in this study. Section 4 contains the main contribution: analysis of 
information sharing models as may be applied to the ECHO Network including re-
lated trust models and needs for granular control of information sharing and in-
formation distribution in maritime sector. The findings are discussed and con-
cluded in Section 5. 
Related Work 
Information Sharing in Maritime Domain 
Maritime surveillance is essential for creating maritime awareness, in other words 
“knowing what is happening at sea.” Integrated maritime surveillance is about 
providing authorities interested or active in maritime surveillance with ways to 
exchange information and data. Support is provided by responding to the needs 
of a wide range of maritime policies – irregular migration/border control, maritime 
security, fisheries control, anti-piracy, oil pollution, smuggling etc. Also, the global 
dimension of these policies is addressed, e.g. to help detect unlawful activities in 
international waters. Sharing data will make surveillance cheaper and more effec-
tive. Currently, EU and national authorities responsible for different aspects of sur-
veillance, e.g. border control, safety and security, fisheries control, customs, envi-
ronment or defence, collect data separately and often do not share them. As a 
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result, the same data may be collected more than once. A common information-
sharing environment (CISE) is currently being developed jointly by the European 
Commission and EU/EEA member states with the support of relevant agencies 
such as the EFCA. It will integrate existing surveillance systems and networks and 
give all those authorities concerned access to the information they need for their 
missions at sea. The CISE will make different systems interoperable so that data 
and other information can be exchanged easily through the use of modern tech-
nologies. 
Cybersecurity Information Sharing Governance Structures 
Almost all the business areas are using networked systems or services and the ser-
vices provided by globally interconnected, decentralized IT systems and networks, 
the cyberspace, play a prominent role in our world. Cyberspace reaches all corners 
of human access and encompasses all interconnected devices into one large vir-
tual entity. To understand the complexity and issues associated with cybersecu-
rity, one must be knowledgeable about the evolution and growth of cyberspace, 
and the fact that cyberspace is mostly unregulated and uncontrolled.19 Cyber 
threats, cyberattacks, or more commonly intrusions, might affect to the continuity 
of business in all sectors. The dilemma of digitalisation poses the requirement for 
comprehensive situational awareness in cyber security as a backbone for decision 
making. The dependence on these services requires the high-level security of cy-
berspace that can be ensured by a broad cooperation of different organisations. 
Information sharing is a vital component of cyber risk management, and has ben-
efits in both preventing incidents, and managing them when they do occur. The 
actors sharing or exchanging information related to cyber intrusions would use it 
as an early warning information for immediate intrusion mitigation and threat re-
sponse activities. Of course information sharing can also be useful after an inci-
dent. “Zero Day Attacks” are attacks that exploit previously unknown vulnerabili-
ties. Reporting these incidents can help spread the word to others and enable 
them to prepare. Reporting incidents to trade associations, regulators, and others 
may also provide access to mitigation measures.24 The systematic review of the 
literature with regard to cyber SA by Franke and Brynielsson found that one way 
of gaining increased cyber SA is to exchange information with others.12 Table 1 
summarises their findings in that area.  Successful and efficient cooperation can-
not be achieved without a similar level of information exchange between the ac-
tors, and their IT systems that requires interoperability of these systems.20 Infor-
mation exchange receives much attention in the national strategies. Information 
related to cyber threat is often sensitive and might be classified, so when that in-
formation is shared with other organisations, there is a risk of being compro-
mised.18  
Information sharing among industry peers, and with government agencies, can 
allow a company to identify possible vulnerabilities in their systems, anticipate at-
tacks, and provide access to software patches and other mitigation tools. Some 
reports indicate that as much as 8 % of successful cyber breaches are in part pre-
ventable in that they exploit known vulnerabilities for which software patches  
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Table 1. Articles with regard to cyber SA information exchange.  
 
Article Content 
Klump and Kwiatkowski 16 An architecture for information exchange about incidents in the 
power system. 
Hennin 14  Sharing of information about suspicious IP addresses. 
Brunner, et al.3 Principled problems as they ponder the trade-off between the 
increased awareness gained by sharing data and the loss of pri-
vacy entailed. Combining peer-to-peer networking and tracea-
ble anonymous certificates, they propose a collaborative and 
decentralized concept for an exchange platform. 
National Coordinator for Se-
curity and Counterterror-
ism 21 
The Netherlands find “information-exchange between the vari-
ous players” to be “of the utmost importance” for fighting cy-
bercrime. 
Australian Government, At-
torney-General's Depart-
ment 1  
The Australian government strives to foster “more intensive 
trusted information exchanges with high risk sectors to share 
information on sophisticated threats”, aiming primarily at tele-
communications, banking and finance, and owners of industrial 
control systems. 
Cyber Security Strategy 
Committee, Ministry of De-
fence 4 
 
Estonia highlights the importance of exchanging expert infor-
mation within the frameworks of the international network of 
national CERTs, the network of government CERTs, Interpol, Eu-
ropol and organizations dealing with critical information infra-
structure protection. 
 
have been available for at least a year.24 There are different types of cybersecurity-
related information that could be shared to improve cybersecurity defences and 
incident response. Munk divides this information into four major groups: infor-
mation related to events, to vulnerabilities, to threats, and other information.20 
The classification proposed by Sedenberg and Dempsey 23 includes incidents (in-
cluding attack methods), best practices, tactical indicators, vulnerabilities, and de-
fensive measures. According to them, organizations are engaged in sharing tactical 
indicators (“indictors of compromise”, IOCs). IOCs are artefacts that relate to a 
particular security incident or attack, such as filenames, hashes, IP addresses, host-
names, or a wide range of other information. Cybersecurity defenders may use 
IOCs forensically to identify the compromise or defensively to prevent it.23  
Sedenberg and Dempsey 23 identified seven different cyber information sharing 
models in the U.S. that are summarised in Table 2. Their taxonomy of cybersecurity 
information sharing structures may help illustrate how different design and policy 
choices result in different information sharing outcomes. Based on the governance 
models described, they identified a set of factors or determinants of effectiveness 
that appear in different cybersecurity information sharing regimes.23  
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Table 2. Taxonomy of Information Sharing Models.23  
 
Classification Organizational Units Example 
Organizations 
Governance types 
Government-
centric 
Government operated; 
private sector 
members can be corpo-
rations, private sector 
associations (e.g., 
ISACs), 
non-profits (e.g., univer-
sities), or individuals 
DHS AIS; US-CERT; 
ECTF; FBI’s e-guard-
ian; 
ECS 
Federal laws and policies; 
voluntary participation; 
Rules range from open sharing 
subject to traffic light protocol or 
FOUO (for official use only) to clas-
sified information restrictions 
(ECS) 
Government-
prompted, 
industry-centric 
Sector or problem spe-
cific 
ISACs; ISAOs  
 
Sector or problem specific; 
voluntary participation; 
generally organized as non-profits, 
use terms of service or other con-
tractual methods to enforce limits 
on re-disclosure of information 
Corporate-initi-
ated, peer-based 
(organizational 
level) 
Specific private compa-
nies 
Facebook 
ThreatExchange; 
Cyber Threat Alliance 
Reciprocal sharing; closed 
membership; information con-
trolled by contract (e.g., 
ThreatExchange Terms and Condi-
tions) 
Small, highly vet-
ted, 
individual-based 
groups 
Individuals join, take 
membership with them 
through different jobs 
OpSec Trust; secre-
tive, adhoc groups 
Trust based upon personal rela-
tionships and vetting of members; 
membership and conduct rules 
Open-source 
sharing plat-
forms 
 Spamhaus Project Information published and open 
to all; no membership but may be 
formed around community of ac-
tive contributors and information 
users; one organization may man-
age platform infrastructure 
Proprietary 
products 
Organization or individ-
uals participate by pur-
chasing the product 
AV and firewall 
vendors 
Information via paid interface; re-
sponsibility and security manage-
ment still in house 
Commercialized 
services 
Organizations purchase 
service 
Managed Security 
Service Providers 
Outsourcing of security 
 
 
Always, when dealing with information exchange and sharing, the main ques-
tion is “trust.”22 The lack of trust in information propagation is the key to a lack of 
robust security.19 Lack of trust is the primary reason cyber vulnerability and threat 
data is not shared within and between the public and private sectors.13 Sedenberg 
and Dempsey 23 identify that trust within cybersecurity information sharing must 
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be bidirectional, meaning that 1) the sharing entity needs to trust that the infor-
mation will not be used against it for regulatory or liability purposes, obtained by 
adversaries and exploited against it as a vulnerability, or disclosed publicly to hurt 
the reputation of the sharer; and 2) the recipient of information needs to trust the 
integrity of the information shared. Also, reciprocity is important; parties need to 
trust that other participants will contribute roughly equivalent information.23 
Reporting to law enforcement and government agencies is required in some in-
dustries, and can help public servants “connect the dots” if there is a pattern to 
attacks that suggests further attacks (including physical attacks) are likely, or can 
help authorities identify the perpetrators.24 In the U.S., the Cybersecurity Infor-
mation Sharing Act (CISA) attempts to alleviate trust burdens that accompany 
sharing private sector information with the government, by limiting public disclo-
sure through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and by offering protections 
against liability and regulation. Sedenberg and Dempsey 23 found no evidence to 
indicate that CISA has succeeded in encouraging increased cybersecurity infor-
mation sharing, and their research highlights some of the limitations of the stat-
ute’s approach: “By focusing on concerns over liability exposure, especially related 
to privacy laws, CISA failed to take into account other issues relevant to the sharing 
of private sector data with the federal government in a post-Snowden reality—
particularly issues of public perception. Aside from the negative implications of 
sharing with the government, CISA did not account—and perhaps no law could 
account—for companies’ fears about the reputational harm they might incur 
should their vulnerability become publicly known, or their fears about future 
attacks if vulnerabilities fall into the wrong hands. If indeed CISA has failed to 
induce more cybersecurity information sharing, it may be because it did not take 
into account these foundational elements of trust.” Sedenberg and Dempsey 23 
research points toward a clear trade-off between membership size and the 
amount and sensitivity of information shared: “Governance and policy structures 
can generate trust by limiting membership with some level of vetting and by 
requiring active participation. These dimensions of trust should be taken as 
governance design choices that can be worked into any organizational structure.” 
Sharing Technologies for Cyber Security Information 
Kokkonen et al. implement and evaluate a model for creating the information 
sharing communities for the cyber security situational awareness information.18 
Table 3 presents the most popular technical standards for sharing the information 
of cyber security required in cyber situational awareness. 
The U.S Department of Homeland Security uses a system called Automated In-
dicator Sharing for providing the bidirectional sharing of the cyber security threat 
indicator information utilizing TAXIITM capability and STIXTMprofile.18 Figure 2 
demonstrates STIXTM use cases where also cyber security information sharing be-
tween organisations is implemented.2 
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Table 3. Technical standards for sharing cyber information. 
 
Standard Description 
Structured Cyber Observable eX-pression 
(CybOXTM) 
https://cybox.mitre.org/about/  
A language for standardized structured infor-
mation of cyber observables. It is not tar-
geted at a single cyber security use case but 
to be flexible for offering a common solution 
for all cyber security use cases requiring the 
ability to deal with cyber observables. By 
specifying a common structured schematic 
mechanism for cyber observables, the intent 
is to enable the potential for detailed au-
tomatable sharing, mapping, detection and 
analysis heuristics.  
Threat Information eXpression (STIXTM), 
https://makingsecuritymeasurable.mitre.org/
docs/stix-intro-handout.pdf  
A language for standardized structured com-
munication of cyber threat information for 
improving interoperability and cyber security 
situational awareness. It consists of eight 
constructs, which are utilized to the XML 
schema: Observable, Indicator, Incident, TTP 
(tactics, techniques, and procedures), Ex-
ploitTarget, CourseOfAction, Campaign and 
Threat-Actor (see Fig. 1). 
Trusted Automated eXchange of Indicator In-
formation (TAXIITM), https://www.mitre.org/ 
sites/default/files/publications/taxii.pdf   
A framework for exchanging cyber threat 
information that determines the set of 
messages, protocols, and services. It supports 
following information sharing models: hub-
and-spoke, peer-to-peer and source-
subscriber. 
 
Kokkonen and co-authors have developed a model for constructing the topol-
ogy of the information sharing community.18 Their model is based on the assump-
tion: a predefined risk level exists for sharing the information between organisa-
tions. They use TAXIITM peer-to-peer information sharing model with STIXTM archi-
tecture; risk level values are required to have the same scale and organisations are 
sharing information only to trusted partners. Figure 3 presents a real-life scenario 
applying this model: Three different national CERTs act as the highest national au-
thority, the national and international Internet Service Providers (ISPs) act as the 
next level and the lowest level of information sharing organisations are various 
national and international enterprises. Every peer-to-peer TAXIITM link has risk 
level value of [1, 20], where the risk values are defined as 1 = min-risk and 20 = 
max-risk. Fig. 4 shows the information sharing topology with a minimum risk level 
implementation applying Dikstra’s shortest path algorithm. Even if there are no 
direct connections between all the organisations, the data flow still goes to every 
organisation in that community.18  
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Figure 1: Architecture of STIXTM.18 
 
 
Figure 2: Example of STIXTM use case.18 
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Figure 3: Cyber security information sharing community.18 
 
Figure 4: Cyber security information sharing topology with a minimum risk level imple-
mentation.18  
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The Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) has released Traffic 
Light Protocol (TLP) that facilitates a four-colour category for information sharing 
(red, amber, green, white). Red means “not for disclosure, restricted to partici-
pants only” and the meaning of white is “disclosure is not limited.” The TLP cate-
gories can be applied as a part of information sharing rules and topology construc-
tion for filtering data between organisations.17  
Cyber Information Sharing in Maritime Domain 
Cyberspace in the maritime domain comprises ports and harbours, shipping, off-
shore facilities, and autonomous ships, and the satellites that keep these systems 
connected to the deepest depths of the ocean where autonomous underwater 
vehicles navigate.19 The global maritime system—including all civilian, commer-
cial, and military ship traffic—is a system of systems, in which each system can be 
described as a set of components and the communication pathways between 
those components.15 The maritime transportation system is increasingly a target 
of cyberattacks.15  The ECHO project’s maritime sector use case focuses on the 
commercial ship that is itself a complex cyber-physical system (CPS) with a large 
variety of communication systems for crew, passengers, external sources, and in-
ternal operations. According to Kessler et al.,15 the ship’s CPS includes: 
• Bridge Navigation Systems (e.g., GPS, Electronic Chart Display and Information 
System /ECDIS/, AIS, LRIT) 
• External Communication Systems (e.g., satellite communications, FleetBroad-
band, Internet) 
• Mechanical Systems (e.g., main engine, auxiliary engine, steering control, bal-
last management) 
• Ship Monitoring and Security Systems (e.g., closed‐circuit television, Ship Se-
curity Alert System /SSAS/, access control systems, sensors) 
• Cargo Handling Systems (e.g., valve remote control systems, level/pressure 
monitoring systems) 
• Other specialized networks (e.g., Combat Command & Control Systems on 
warships, Entertainment Systems and Point‐Of‐Sale terminals on passenger 
vessels; Vessel Management Systems on commercial fishing vessels).  
The maritime industry has a long history of success in risk management. While 
physical and personnel risks are relatively easy to identify, cyber risks pose a 
unique challenge.24 In modern ships, IT technology and operational technology 
(OT) on board are networked and highly integrated, so in order to maintain the 
naval survivability main aspects (susceptibility, vulnerability, recoverability), the 
underlying IT Infrastructure must be designed to assure the cyber security triad 
(availability, confidentiality and integrity) of any information and IT service, appli-
cation, industrial control. The starting point is a cyber-risk assessment of the IT 
infrastructure, of the organization and of the available operators’ skill, in order to 
evaluate the risk posed by the cyber threats or change on the services in all the 
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possible operational conditions and finds, in each case, the most appropriate strat-
egy of prevention, control and reaction. The scope of the risk management must 
encompasses all digital systems on vessels. These systems can be divided in two 
main categories: 1) the IT networks, the hardware and software dedicated to man-
age and to exchange information; and 2) the Operational Technology (OT) net-
works, the hardware and software dedicated to detecting or causing changes in 
physical processes through Industrial Control Systems which direct monitor and 
control the physical devices such as engines, rudder, valves, conveyors, pumps, 
etc.6 
When the cyber risks are recognized, the organization can select mitigation 
strategies to reduce that risk. Policy enforcement controls required for risk mitiga-
tion that include Technical Cyber Security Controls and Procedural controls. The 
Cyber Security policy adopted should be defined and distributed over five different 
levels: Secure by Design, Access Control Management, Proactive Protection, Con-
tinuous Threat Monitoring and Disaster Recovery Procedure.6 
Study Methods 
This case study analyses the information sharing models applied in maritime do-
main. The purpose of the paper is to be a background study for the development 
of a secure sharing support tool enabling personnel to coordinate and share cyber-
sensitive information in near real time. The applied research methods are case 
study research in general,25 and in the cyber security domain.7 The main research 
question is “how can cyber information sharing models be understood in maritime 
domain?” 
Research data was collected during the EUCISE2020 project in which all the au-
thors participated in different roles, as well as the following documents:1) reports 
of CooP, MARSUNO and BlueMassMed projects, 2) EUCISE DOW, 3) EUCISE2020 
D8.3 Dissemination plan with Policy recommends and governance model, 4) EU-
CISE2020 Technical documents stored in EUCISE2020 intranet, 5) Discussions with 
The Finnish Transport Infrastructure Agency and Finnish Boarder Guard (FBG) rep-
resentatives (April 17, 2019; April 25, 2019). 
In addressing the research question presented above, the qualitative data anal-
ysis was continuously involved in organising, accounting for, and explaining the 
collected data, and making sense of the data in terms of situation, themes, cate-
gories, entities, relations, and regularities. 
Study Results 
Who are the Main Shareholders of Sensitive Cyber Information Sharing in the 
Maritime Domain? 
On 15 October 2009 the European Commission adopted a “Communication To-
wards the integration of maritime surveillance in the EU: A common information 
sharing environment for the EU maritime domain (CISE),”9 setting out guiding prin-
ciples towards its establishment. The aim of COM(2010) 584 final was to “generate 
a situational awareness of activities at sea” and impact overall maritime safety 
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and security. The aim of the integrated maritime surveillance is to increase sec-
toral maritime awareness pictures of the EU’s and European Economic Area (EEA) 
States’ sectorial user communities cross-sectoral and cross-border. COM(2010) 
584 final identified members of the Common Information Sharing Environment 
(CISE) and named CISE members as User Communities. Following functions were 
performed: 1) Maritime Safety including Search and Rescue (SAR) and prevention 
of pollution caused by ships; 2) Fisheries control; 3) Marine pollution preparedness 
and response in Marine environment: 4) Customs; 5) Border control; 6) General 
law enforcement; and 7) Defence. These User Communities are the shareholders 
of sensitive cyber information sharing in maritime domain.9 
Function 1 Maritime safety is covered by the European Vessel Traffic Monitoring 
Directive and the system is operational. Function 2 Fisheries control’s main initia-
tives are Fisheries Information System and Vessel monitoring System. Function 3 
Marine environment use, among other systems, European Marine Observation 
and Data Network (EMODNet) and European platform for maritime data exchange 
named CleanSeaNet. Function 4 Customs have European Customs Information 
System (CIS), Customs Risk Management system and DG TAXUD managed Com-
mon Communication Network and Common Systems Interface (CCN/CSI). Func-
tion 5 Border control is covered by European Border Surveillance System (EURO-
SUR) and Visa Information System (VIS). Function 6 General Law enforcement is 
covered by internal security responsibilities dealt with European Law Enforcement 
Agency (EUROPOL) and other agencies. Systems used for General Law enforce-
ment are Secure Information Exchange Network Application (SIENA), Europol In-
formation System (EIS), and Europol Platform for Experts (EPE) and the Schengen 
Information System (SIS). Function 7 Defence improve maritime picture by linking 
existing military networks and systems.10  
Table 4 introduces User Communities’ EU wide organisations and their used IT 
systems. It presents only European level organisations and their IT systems. How-
ever, there are many regional and national systems in use.  
How Can the CISE Environment be Applied for Sharing Sensitive Cyber Infor-
mation in the Maritime Domain? 
Political consensus and common understanding of information sharing necessity 
has been build up among EU maritime authorities during several cooperation pro-
jects, e.g. BluemassMed, MARSUNO and CoopP. The CISE environment could be 
applied for sharing the sensitive cyber information by following the CoopP and 
EUCISE 2020 projects. CoopP support the first phase where the overall objective 
of the Cooperation Project was to support further cross-border and cross-sector 
operational cooperation between public authorities (including EU Agencies) in the 
execution of the defined maritime functionalities, with a focus on information 
sharing across sea-basins.  
The information sharing cooperation was to be envisaged in the context of op-
erational situations (use cases), and identify needs for improved information ex-
changes and the associated costs and benefits. In concrete terms the project was 
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Table 4. European wide User Communities’ organisations and used IT systems. 
 
User 
Community 
EU organisation System(s) 
Maritime 
safety & 
security  
European Maritime 
Safety Agency (EMSA) 
EU Vessel traffic information (SafeSeaNet), Long-range 
identification and tracking (LRIT), Thetis, alert and 
notifications application (CECIS) 
Fisheries 
control 
European Fisheries 
Control Agency (EFCA) 
EFCA Fisheries Information System (Fishnet collaboration 
tool, Vessel monitoring System (VMS), EFCA Electronic 
Recording and Reporting System, EFCA Electronic 
Inspection Report System) 
Marine 
environment 
European Environment 
Agency 
The European Marine Observation and Data Network 
(EMODNet), European Pollutant Release and Transfer 
Register (E-PRTR), Shared Environmental Information 
System (SEIS), CleanSeaNet, European system for 
monitoring the Earth (Copernicus) 
Customs EU taxation and 
customs union DG 
TAXUD 
European Customs Information System (CIS), Customs 
Risk Management system, Common Communication 
Network and Common Systems Interface (CCN/CSI) 
Border Control European Border and 
Coast Guard Agency 
(FRONTEX) 
European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR), the 
Visa Information System (VIS) 
General law 
enforcement 
European Union 
Agency for Law 
Enforcement 
Cooperation 
(EUROPOL) 
Secure Information Exchange Network Application 
(SIENA), Europol Information System (EIS), Europol 
Platform for Experts (EPE), The Schengen Information 
System (SIS) 
Defence European Defence 
Agency (EDA) 
Maritime Surveillance (MARSUR) 
 
 
meant to define a number of information services and their data specifications (i.e. 
common data formats and common semantics) which may not be dependent upon 
existing systems.  
Overall Objectives were to be accomplished by executing the Specific Objec-
tives, namely defining and agreeing on a selection of use cases with related infor-
mation services and attached access rights, defining common data formats and 
semantics, and contributing to the cost-benefit analysis of Integrated Maritime 
Surveillance.  
The second phase of applying the CISE for sharing the sensitive cyber infor-
mation could be to follow the EUCISE2020 project and utilized the solution build 
during the EUCISE2020 project. EUCISE 2020 is a Security Research project of the 
European Seventh Framework Program, which aims to achieve the pre-opera-
tional Information Sharing between the maritime authorities. EUCISE2020 is one 
important milestone for implementation of the European CISE – Common Infor-
mation Sharing Environment. 
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EUCISE2020 project built and tested the Test-Bed for maritime information 
sharing. The test-bed includes both unclassified and classified network but only 
the unclassified network is online. The technical specification for the classified net-
work exist and the system has been tested during the Factory Acceptance Test. 
The security level of the classified solution is EU-Restricted but after all the level is 
matter of crypto device and network solution. Both networks are equal, the only 
difference is the crypto device which encrypts the information before sending it in 
the EUCISE2020 Virtual Private Network (VPN). 
In theory, EUCISE2020 test-bed could be applied for sharing cyber information 
while the main goal of the EUCISE2020 network is to allow data exchange among 
the Legacy Systems (LS). This section includes a short introduce to EUCISE2020 
Test-Bed infrastructure and services for supporting the discussion how it could be 
applied to cyber information sharing. 
The Legacy Systems participate in the exchange of information by providing and 
receiving data and services; they are the fundamental elements of the CISE envi-
ronment, but are considered elements external to the EUCISE2020 network. The 
EUCISE2020 system configurations include the following components:  
• CISE adaptor allows a LS to connect to a CISE Gateway (GW). It translates the 
LS data into the common CISE Data Model and adapts the internal protocol 
of the LS into the protocol of the GW.  
• CISE Gateway implements the CISE messaging and network protocols to ex-
change data with the CISE adaptor and with the other CISE Gateways/ Nodes.  
• CISE Node (NODE) is an enhanced gateway, capable of performing added val-
ues services such as data fusion and storing of information. 
The services implemented by the EUCISE2020 are grouped into the following 
categories:  
• Core Services are infrastructure services that provide common facilities. 
These services are devoted to enables the connection of the EUCISE2020 Par-
ticipants through the EUCISE2020 Network. Transferring data among EU-
CISE2020 Participants and allowing the availability of pertinent data to EU-
CISE2020 services.  
• Common Services are application services that provide the capability to ex-
change data in the EUCISE2020 Network. Consequently, these services man-
age EUCISE2020 data model entities.  
• Advanced Services are application which compose and orchestrate services 
to implement added value functionalities.  
The Member State has three different models to connect to the EUCISE2020 
network. The three different configurations are: 
• Configuration A: a single Public Authority belonging to a single Member State 
will connect to EUCISE2020 contributing with a single Legacy System. The 
Legacy System provides and consumes EUCISE2020 services available from 
other European Public Authorities through only one Adaptor 
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• Configuration B: each Public Authority of the same Member State taking part 
in the EUCISE2020 information exchange connects its own Legacy System to 
a dedicated Adaptor; several Adaptors connect to a EUCISE2020 Gateway 
type B that will access the EUCISE2020 Network 
• Configuration C: the Public Authorities of the same Member State taking part 
in the EUCISE2020 information exchange connect to the EUCISE2020 Net-
work through a single EUCISE2020 Node. The configuration C includes also a 
Light-Client which provides a human interface for graphical presentation of 
georeferenced data. 
Figure 5 describes the logical architecture of EUCISE2020 configurations. Inside 
the redline components were developed through the joint European tender and 
outside the red line the interfaces with national legacy systems were developed 
through the national procurements.  
The system uses EUCISE2020 data model for information exchange. The data 
model is based on the CISE data model version 1.0 that was defined in the CoopP 
Project and modified in partnership with Joint Research Centre (EUCISE2020 D4.3 
Annex B). The CISE Data Model designed in CoopP Project identified seven core 
data entities (Agent, Object, Location, Document, Event, Risk and Period) and 
eleven auxiliary ones (Vessel, Cargo, Operational Asset, Person, Organization, 
Movement, Incident, Anomaly, Action, Unique Identifier and Metadata).  
 
 
 
Figure 5: Logical Architecture of EUCISE2020 configurations A, B and C. 
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Figure 6 shows the EUCISE2020 data model. It is based on the same data entities 
(7+11), but in order to take into account additional data sources (meteo-oceano-
graphic), EUCISE2020 defined additional attributes to some of the above men-
tioned data entities. 
 
 
Figure 6: CISE data model (EUCISE2020 D4.3 Annex B). 
 
The solution includes the elements, principals and technics for cyber infor-
mation sharing but has to be updated or improved for cyber information ex-
change. The standardized language used for information exchange has to be de-
cided as well as messages, protocols and services to use and systems software has 
to update to understand these. Earlier in chapter 2.3 mentioned STIXTM and TAXI-
ITM are considerable alternatives. Depending on each partner’s cyber information 
Legacy System (LS) data model the adaptor between LS and Node/GW has to up-
date to “translate” LS data to chosen exchange data model and to understand the 
messages and services used in information sharing.  
Lessons learned from the EUCISE2020 project were that special attention has to 
be paid on the information exchange network reliability and in cyber case also to 
security. The EUCISE2020 network is a peer-to-peer network where the amount of 
VPN connections per partner increase significantly and makes the network vulner-
able. 
Discussion 
CISE is not only a technical solution of information sharing. The fundamental part 
of CISE and the principle of Responsibility to Share is even more mandatory to un-
derstand and adopt for information sharing. The information sharing policy “Re-
sponsibility to Share” is a cornerstone of CISE vision which clearly indicate the 
change in information exchange policy and constitutes the basis for reliable and 
trustworthy CISE information exchange. It also accounts for the fact that the party 
needing a certain piece of information might not know that the information exists 
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in the first place, much less where it is kept, and thus might be unable to actively 
search the missing information.  
The EUCISE2020 project has faced the phase where the network controlling will 
be mandatory to all Member States. The maritime information is shared in Test-
Bed network, which is controlled by MS according the national rules and methods.  
During the EUCISE2020 Transition Phase and before the operational phase the net-
work will be certificated, rules for network controlling will be agreed which means 
that cyber information sharing in maritime domain will be under discussions and 
guidelines how the maritime consortium act to cyber threats will be decided (Dis-
cussions with Finnish Transport Infrastructure Agency, EUCISE2020 meeting on 
December 3, 2018.) 
Information sharing limitations in maritime domain could be divided in at least 
in technical and organisational limitations. The actualized CISE network do not 
support classified information sharing as mentioned earlier. However, the EU-
CISE2020 Deliverable D8.3 “Dissemination plan with Policy recommendations and 
Governance model” states that CISE must allow the exchange of classified data, 
for instance in a parallel embedded secure network architecture, as significant 
amount of maritime reporting and surveillance data are treated confidentially. 
The organisational limitation is based on observation in which the maritime au-
thorities have outsourced the network controlling and therefore co-operation 
might be limited between the actors. On the other hand, CISE network itself and 
the traffic inside the network has to be controlled by the Members States and 
whenever a cyber-threat is found in one MS it should be informed to the other 
MSs. In other words, it is mandatory for CISE operational phase on 2020 to start 
building up the cyber information sharing network among the maritime authori-
ties. A wide scale of open or undiscussed issues of cyber information exchange 
exists among maritime CISE consortium. The common understanding or agree-
ment which data model should be used for sharing has not been determined so 
far as well as the information type which will be shared. 
The next recommended steps for this are (not in order of importance): 
• Identify the maritime cyber organisations and actors 
• Follow network control related actions on EUCISE2020 transition phase 
• Identify the cyber information sharing related projects outside CISE  
• Identify maritime sensitive cyber information 
• Identify the information to share 
• Open the discussions about the information sharing importance, meaning, 
interests, what, how when etc. 
• Identify and introduce the existing information sharing tools to cyber infor-
mation organisations 
• Investigate the technical updates needed for sharing the cyber information 
using existing information sharing systems.  
CISE is a transmission channel between user communities and it’s not a system 
or platform for data storing. Each user community gathers and stores its data by 
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its sectoral systems and security standards. Data classification levels are missing 
due to fact that same data may be classified differently by the different user com-
munities. Common ontology for data classification levels on cross-sectoral infor-
mation exchange should develop. CISE roadmap explained data classification lev-
els and access profiles as “In order to facilitate cross-sectorial information ex-
change, User Communities should develop a common approach when attributing 
classification levels.”9  
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A B S T R A C T : 
Cybersecurity-related capabilities play an ever-growing role in national security, 
as well as securing the functions vital to society. The national cyber capability 
includes the resilience of companies running critical infrastructures, their cyber 
situational awareness (SA) and the sharing of cybersecurity information required 
for cyber SA. As critical infrastructures become more complex and interdepend-
ent, ramifications of incidents multiply. The EU Network and Information Secu-
rity Directive calls for cybersecurity collaboration between EU member states re-
garding critical infrastructures and places the most crucial service providers and 
digital service providers under security-related obligations. Developing better SA 
requires information sharing between the different interest groups and en-
hances the preparation for and management of incidents. The arrangement is 
based on drawing correct situation-specific conclusions and, when needed, on 
sharing critical knowledge in the cyber networks. The target state is achieved 
with an efficient process that includes a three-level—strategic, operational and 
technical/tactical—operating model to support decision-making by utilizing na-
tional and international strengths. In the dynamic cyber environment strategic 
agility and speed are needed to prepare for incidents.  
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Introduction 
The capability related to national cybersecurity plays an even more important role 
when it comes to the overall security and securing the crucial functions of society 
in the future. The national capability consists of most of the resilience of the critical 
infrastructure companies and the situational awareness of the cyber environment, 
they constantly maintain.  
The critical infrastructures become more complex and their parts are even more 
strongly dependent on each other, and that way, the ramifications of the incidents 
can be multiple compared with the original impact. The operation of critical infra-
structure and the threats having an impact on them are not limited to organiza-
tions or administrative borders.18 
The EU Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive 4 increases the collab-
oration between the member states in the important field of cybersecurity. It puts 
the most crucial service providers (critical industries such as energy, transport, 
health, and financing) and digital service providers (online marketplaces, search 
engines, and cloud computing) of society under the security-related obligations. 
The application of the Directive results in imposing the security and information 
requirements concerning the aforementioned operators. The goal is to develop 
even better situational awareness and information sharing. The critical infrastruc-
ture consists especially of the crucial service providers defined by the NIS Di-
rective. In Finland, the administrative sector coordinates the operations required 
by the Directive, when both monitoring and the duty to notify are decentralized. 
The National Cyber Security Centre Finland builds situational awareness. 
Principally, the functional observation and analysing ability collected from the 
different trust circles gives a good basis for the development of Finland's national 
situational awareness, and information sharing.9 Critical infrastructure can be de-
scribed as a three-levelled system of systems (Fig. 1); efficient and appropriate 
operations can be targeted at its three levels, from bottom to the top: power grid, 
data transmission network, and services.14  
The situational awareness of critical infrastructure is emphasized also in the Se-
curity Strategy for Society,16 as part of maintaining vital national operations. Effi-
cient incident management requires tight collaboration between the manage-
ment, situation awareness and communication. Good management requires: 
• unquestionable managerial responsibility, the casting of different operators 
and the decision-making ability of the ministerial authority 
 
 
Figure 1: Plain structure of critical infrastructure. 
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• building of situation awareness (situational understanding, evaluation of situ-
ational development) 
• crisis communication 
• information sharing, and supporting technical solutions 
• business continuity management 
• co-operation. 
Research Purpose, Research Questions, and Article Structure 
The research questions deal with the situational awareness and understanding of 
an organization, as well as the data analysis and information sharing between the 
different interest groups. The aim is to develop the preparation for incidents and 
their management in the whole society. The arrangement is based on drawing cor-
rect situation-specific conclusions and, when needed, on sharing critical know-
ledge in the cyber networks of society. 
The research questions are: 
1. How the cyber situational awareness of an organization can be developed? 
2. How do the organizations exchange their cybersecurity-related information? 
3. Can an organization’s cybersecurity capability be utilised more extensively? 
This paper is a continuum of the research “Cyber strategic management in Fin-
land,”10 in which one task was to formulate management proposals for the man-
agement of nationally pervasive incidents concerning cyber environment. Good 
situational awareness and information sharing between the different interest 
groups have an essential impact on incident management. The research method 
was an open theme interview with material-based content analysis. All three levels 
of the critical infrastructure system of systems (see Figure 1) were represented. 
There were altogether 40 interviewees from 25 private or public organizations, 
which were leaders or persons responsible for the information/ cybersecurity of 
their organizations. 
In Finland, the significance of the private businesses is emphasised in the oper-
ation of critical infrastructure, since approximately 80 % of the operations can be 
estimated to belong to their responsibility. Researchers interviewed six private 
businesses, as well as public authorities, such as the National Cyber Security Cen-
tre Finland and the National Emergency Supply Agency. 
Section 2 deals with the need for situational awareness, and related decision-
making levels and the theory of situational awareness. In Section 3, the infor-
mation sharing needs of an organization are explored, ever since the national and 
European Union needs. Section 4 describes the formation of situational awareness 
into the different levels of an organization, and the information-sharing proce-
dures at the national level. Finally, Section 5 concludes with the conclusion. 
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Situational Awareness 
To function, every organization needs information about its environment and hap-
penings, and also about its impact on its operation. An appropriate and fast situa-
tional awareness is based on correct information and evaluations, and it is empha-
sized in the case of incidents when very pervasive decisions must be made quickly. 
To make correct solutions, decision-makers have to know the base for their deci-
sions, consequences how the others react to them and what risks the decisions 
include. For that reason, decision-makers must have sufficient situational aware-
ness and understanding of all the operational levels, which enables timely deci-
sion-making and operation. Situational awareness and understanding require col-
laboration and expertise, which enables the comprehensive monitoring of the op-
erational environment, data analysis, and aggregation, information sharing, recog-
nition of the research needs and network management. The information systems 
must enable the systematic use of information sources and collaboration and the 
flexible sharing of situation information related to it.11  
The organizations' and decision-makers' formation of situational awareness is 
supported by the situation awareness arrangements. In general, situation aware-
ness means the description of the dominant circumstances and the operational 
preparedness of different operators aggregated by the specialists, the happenings 
caused by an incident, its background information and the evaluations concerning 
the development of a situation. In addition, data analysis based operational rec-
ommendations may be related to situation awareness. The general view is consti-
tuted by utilizing a networked operational model based on different sources. The 
process consists of data acquisition, information aggregation, classification and 
analysis, and of a timely and efficient sharing of the analysed information with 
those in need. The surrounding data space is organised such that the information 
is understood correctly, and that the operators have a chance to get the infor-
mation important to their operation.11  
The pervasive incidents targeting society are a challenging cyber environment 
when it comes to the critical reaction speed required by the situation manage-
ment. Advanced Persistent Threats (APT) are unfamiliar attacks to the traditional 
protection ways and can proceed quickly when fast information sharing and good 
situational awareness play an important role in incident management. In a worst-
case scenario, the delegation of responsibility should be able to make possible in 
a few minutes, the response evoked without delay, and the abilities and tools put 
to use.12  
Decision-making levels 
Organizations operate in very complex, interrelated cyber environments, in which 
the new and long used information technology system entities (e.g. a system of 
systems) are utilized. Organizations are depended on these systems and their ap-
paratus to accomplish their missions. The management must recognize that clear, 
rational and risk-based decision are necessary for business continuity. The risk 
management at best combines the best collective risk assessments of the organi-
zation's individuals and different groups related to strategic planning, and also the 
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operative and daily business management. The understanding and dealing of risks 
are an organization's strategic capabilities and key tasks when organizing the op-
erations. This requires, for example, the continuous recognition and understand-
ing of the security risks on the different levels of the management. The security 
risks may be targeted not only at the organization's operation but also at individ-
uals, other organizations and the whole society.8  
Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative recommends implementing the or-
ganization’s cyber risk management as a comprehensive operation, in which the 
risks are dealt with from the strategic to tactical level.8 That way, risk-based deci-
sion-making is integrated into all parts of an organization. In Joint Task Force 
Transformation Initiative’s research, the follow-up operations of the risks are em-
phasised in every decision-making level. For example, in the tactical level, the fol-
low-up operations may include constant threat evaluations about how the 
changes in an area can affect the strategic and operational levels. The operational 
level’s follow-up operations, in turn, may contain for example the analysis of the 
new or present technologies to recognize the risks to the business continuity. The 
follow-up operations of the strategic level can often concentrate on the organiza-
tion's information system entities, the standardization of the operation and for 
example on the continuous monitoring of the security operation.8  
From the necessity of the organization's risk, follow-up operations can be drawn 
the necessity of the whole organization's situational awareness. As mentioned, the 
formation of the organizations’ and decision-makers’ situational awareness is sup-
ported by the situation awareness arrangements. Thus, an appropriate situational 
awareness supports cyber risk management and more extensively the evaluation 
of the organization’s whole cyber capability. 
Theory of Situational Awareness 
Mica Endsley has developed a situational awareness model when working on sev-
eral different research assignments in the service of the United States Air Force.3 
Figure 2 describes the general structure of the model. The core of situational 
awareness consists of three basic elements: detection (Level 1), situational under-
standing (Level 2) and its impact assessment towards the future (Level 3). This sit-
uational awareness provides the foundation for conclusions and the following de-
cision-making. Depending on the situation, the assignment- and system-specific 
features and the decision-maker’s experience and evaluation ability bring their im-
pacts on the table. Decision-making, in turn, guides the operation that reflects the 
observed operational environment. 
Sid Faber regards the situational awareness development operations, concern-
ing both public and private businesses, as one of the most significant near-future 
goals aiming to improve cybersecurity.5 He recommends applying Endsley's model 
to the follow-up needs of a cyber-operational environment. 
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Figure 2: Situational awareness and dynamic decision-making (adapted from Endsley 3). 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Framework for forming situational awareness. 
 
The general structure of Endsley’s situational awareness model is applied when 
solving our research questions.3 The framework for forming the critical infrastruc-
ture situational awareness is introduced in Figure 3. The detection part (Level 1) 
of Endsley’s structure is presented as the organization-specific detection needs of 
the strategic (S), operational (O) and technical/tactical (T) decision-making levels. 
The goal is to gain a perception that serves each decision-making level. The situa-
tion awareness that is formed of observations is a prerequisite for understanding 
the observations (Level 2). After that, the impact analysis and assessment of the 
observations are made possible by utilizing the understanding about situation 
awareness (Level 3). There, analysis capability plays an important role. The final 
goal is to make appropriate and situation-specific decisions on each decision-mak-
ing level and conduct the operations followed by the decisions. 
General Requirements for Situation Awareness 
Horsmanheimo and co-workers set some requirements for the situation aware-
ness in their research: 6 
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▪ Situation awareness is a series of presentations whose shape does not matter. 
It is more essential than somebody manages it, makes analysis and decisions. 
▪ Information is brought to the situation awareness system in collaboration. 
Every operator is independently responsible for the production and validity of 
the information related to their knowledge area. 
▪ The information must be processed, analysed and understandable. It has to 
be meaningful for both oneself and other receivers. 
▪ The information must be performed visually and clearly. 
▪ The information must be performed without unnecessary technical details. 
The information must be understandable for people from other industries. 
▪ Situation awareness system should be dynamic and tailored by users and in-
dustries. Information should be able to put on different views. 
▪ Terminology and classifications should be uniform. 
▪ Situation awareness system should be able to be included in the organization 
processes such that the maintenance of the situation awareness system 
would not become an extra task in grand incidents. 
▪ Different operators should be able to define what kind of information they 
need and what kind of information they can input to the system. 
▪ Situation awareness system should be able to be utilised for information ex-
change between different operators on different organization levels. Infor-
mation should be able to be shared also with the supervisory organizations. 
▪ The situational awareness system should be able to make predictions of what 
is happening by 3, 6 or 12 hours. 
▪ The situational awareness system should be able to perform a temporal di-
mension to how the things have developed – whether the direction is worse 
or better. 
Information Sharing Needs of an Organization 
The EU Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive increases the collabora-
tion between the member states in the important field of cybersecurity. It puts 
the most crucial service providers (critical industries such as energy, transport, 
health, and financing) and digital service providers (online marketplaces, search 
engines, and cloud computing) of society under the security-related obligations. 
The application of the Directive results in imposing the security and information 
requirements concerning the aforementioned operators. Also, the Directive sup-
ports in developing nationally better situational awareness. 
The operations of the concerned Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Par-
liament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 have been carried out nationally since 
2018. The Directive states the subject matter and scopes the following: 4 
1. This Directive lays down measures to achieve a high common level of security 
of network and information systems within the Union to improve the functioning 
of the internal market. 
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2. To that end, this Directive: a) lays down obligations for all Member States to 
adopt a national strategy on the security of network and information systems; b) 
creates a Cooperation Group to support and facilitate strategic cooperation and 
the exchange of information among the Member States and to develop trust and 
confidence amongst them; c) creates a computer security incident response teams 
network (‘CSIRTs network') to contribute to the development of trust and confi-
dence between the Member States and to promote swift and effective operational 
cooperation; d) establishes security and notification requirements for operators 
of essential services and digital service providers; e) lays down obligations for the 
Member States to designate national competent authorities, single points of con-
tact and CSIRTs with tasks related to the security of network and information sys-
tems. 
Principally, a functioning observation and analysing ability composed from dif-
ferent trust circles provides a good starting point for the development of Finland's 
national situational awareness.9 By the most crucial service providers' and digital 
service providers' duty to notify, the national situational awareness can be devel-
oped. The duty to notify expands the previous procedure considerably and there-
fore covers a significant part of the critical infrastructure by private businesses. 
Also, the operation involves information sharing between the authorities, and 
more than before between the authorities and private business operators. In Fin-
land, the operations required by the Directive relate to sector-specific laws and, 
consequently, their monitoring as well as the duty to notify happen sector-specific. 
The laws include the definitions of the crucial service providers' duty to notify. The 
situational awareness is built by the National Cyber Security Centre Finland. 
The National Cyber Security Centre Finland 
The National Cyber Security Centre Finland (NCSC-FI) is part of the Finnish 
Transport and Communication Agency, Traficom. Traficom is an authority in a per-
mit, license, registration, and monitoring of transport and communication. It pro-
motes traffic safety and the smooth functioning of the transport system and 
speeds up the development of digital society. Also, the agency supports sustaina-
ble development and ensures that everyone in Finland has access to high-quality 
and secure communications connections and services.17  
Nationally, the NCSC-FI plays the most crucial part in forming and analysing the 
cyber situational awareness, and in incident management. It has three main tasks: 
1. The NCSC-FI acts as a national communications security authority (NCSA) and 
is responsible for the security matters related to the electrical data transmis-
sion and processing of the safety-classified material. The NCSA operation is 
part of Finland's security authority organization. 
2. The CERT (Computer Emergency Response Team) operation of the NCSC-FI 
takes care of the prevention, investigation and announcement tasks in case 
of information security breaches. The main purpose of the CERT operation is 
to produce and maintain the cyber situation awareness together with domes-
tic and foreign cooperation partners and counterparts. As an essential part of 
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the CERT operation, the NCSC-FI acts as a national point of contact for infor-
mation security breaches and threats. It also investigates these cases and 
helps the concerned parties. 
3. The NCSC-FI manages the information security regulation tasks of Traficom. 
It acts as a national regulatory authority (NRA), i.e. as a guiding and monitor-
ing authority. 
The NCSC-FI is an authority that aggregates and builds national situational 
awareness. It collaborates closely with other authorities and private business op-
erators. 
HAVARO is a service that detects and warns about information security breach-
es, serves the critical companies for security of supply and the state administra-
tion. From the HAVARO system, the NCSC-FI has visibility to practically all the up-
coming and outgoing traffic (metadata and content data). Many critical companies 
for security of supply and the state administration operators have put to use the 
HAVARO service, which indicates the trust in the NCSC-FI. That way, the infor-
mation security breaches targeted at the organization can be reported automati-
cally to the authority without a chance for censoring the incidents beforehand. 
The system has been implemented in collaboration with the National Emergency 
Supply Agency. 
The companies and public administration operators participate in the HAVARO 
operation voluntarily. The operation of the system is based on the information 
security threat identifiers coming from different sources. With the help of the 
identifiers, harmful or anomalous traffic can be detected from the organization's 
network traffic. The NCSC-FI receives information about the anomalies and anal-
yses them. In case of an information security threat, the organization is warned 
about it. Based on the information got from the HAVARO, also the other operators 
can be warned about the detected threat. That way, the system helps not only 
individual organizations but also in forming a general view about the information 
security threats against Finnish information networks. 
The observation ability of information security threats is an important part of 
comprehensive risk management. For its part, HAVARO secures the organization's 
business continuity against the threats of the operational environment. However, 
HAVARO is not meant to be an organization's only information security solution, 
but it is designed to complete the other information security solutions of infor-
mation security investing organization. 
Also, Traficom provides the GovHAVARO service for the state administration op-
erators. It completes the information and cybersecurity threat detection of the 
state administration's Internet traffic. The service providers are Traficom, Valtori 
– Government ICT Centre and Telia. The GovCERT services, in turn, support the 
state's round-the-clock information security operation by producing the support 
services for preventing, detecting and investigating information security breaches, 
as part of the GovSOC operation. They are provided by Traficom and Valtori.7  
The incident management of the state administration and other public admin-
istration organizations, so-called VIRT operation, is a cross-administrative opera-
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tional level collaboration, which prepares for severe and extensive information se-
curity incidents. It consists of operational planning and rehearsing for different in-
formation security incidents.7  
The industry-specific cyber information-sharing groups (ISAC, Information Shar-
ing and Analysis Centre) are established as collaboration organs between the or-
ganizations of different industries. Their operation enables: 
1. Confidential handling of information security matters between the partici-
pants. 
2. Augmentation of the organizations' information security know-how. 
3. Development of the NCSC-FI's overall situational awareness. 
The ISAC operation is based on regular meetings and specified operational mod-
els and participants. The ISAC information sharing groups have been established 
for the following industries: state administration (VIRT), Internet service providers, 
chemistry and lumber industry, banks, media, energy industry, food production 
and distribution, social and health care, and software manufacturers. 
The National Emergency Supply Agency 
The National Emergency Supply Agency (NESA) is an institution working under the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment of Finland. It is tasked with planning 
and operations related to maintaining and developing the country’s security of 
supply. As part of the security of supply organization, the NESA’s mission is to sup-
port the operation of the pools and sectors and to take care of the other legislative 
tasks given to it. Security of supply means the ability to maintain such economical 
basic operations of society that are necessary for securing the populations' living 
prospects, society's functioning and safety, and the material prerequisite for na-
tional defence in severe incidents and extraordinary circumstances.13  
The national cybersecurity management requires a close-knit collaboration be-
tween the critical infrastructure operators (Public-Private Partnership, PPP). The 
NESA's information society pools take care of the collaboration. 
Formation of Situational Awareness 
The analysed collection of data was created based on interview material, docu-
ment analysis, and international comparison information. The observations, pre-
sentations, and models presented in this article, are based on this data. 
Situational Awareness on a Tactical Level 
Both technical, networked and management situation awareness are emphasized 
when building the situational awareness. During the last years, Finland has formed 
its cyber situation awareness through the information-sharing mechanisms of dif-
ferent operators. It is about national and international collaboration. The improve-
ment of information sharing and perception is still a matter of development when 
it comes to Finland's cybersecurity.9  
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The critical infrastructure operators use such protection techniques in their ICT 
systems that extend from the interface of the Internet and the organization's in-
ternal network right up to the protection of a single workstation or apparatus. 
These technical solutions make it possible to verify different harmful or anomalous 
observations. The typical technologies are related to security products such as net-
work traffic analysis and log management (Security Information and Event Man-
agement, SIEM), firewall protection, intrusion prevention and detection systems 
(IPS and IDS) and antivirus. The situation awareness builds up to centralized mon-
itoring rooms (Security Operations Centre, SOC). These technical solutions can be 
under the organization’s control, or the service can be outsourced to the infor-
mation security operator. A crucial goal is the situational awareness and protec-
tion of the business processes. 
Also, especially the critical companies for security of supply have the HAVARO 
system in the external interface of their network. The system follows the network 
traffic and detects harmful and anomalous traffic. Then, the warnings come from 
the NCSC-FI. 
The observation ability relates also to a so-called advance warning that can be 
received from the organization's international or national operation networks. In 
the centre of operation, there is always the organization's capability to pay atten-
tion to the abnormal operation that possibly occurs in the system. The overall ob-
servation ability is developed for example by benchmarking and practicing. 
The organizations implement the analysis of incidents and anomalies from their 
own starting points, at the hands of their own or carried out by the service pro-
vider. The analysing ability requires more and more the securing of the organiza-
tion’s business process operation. The intensification of protection operations or 
for example the introduction of alternative operational models are the most im-
portant goals of the operation. The analysing capability determines the choice of 
needed operations and, that way plays an important role in the organization's de-
cision-making process. The analysing ability must enable a severity classification 
and so-called cyber-physical view. 
The analysing usually happens in centralized monitoring rooms (Security Oper-
ations Centre, SOC) based on situational awareness. In the monitoring rooms, the 
information coming from different sensors is aggregated and a situation-specific 
analysis is formed. Based on the analysis the needed operations are launched. The 
organization's possibilities to utilize the information gotten from international or 
national operational networks relate to the analysing ability. The personnel's ca-
pability to interpret the available observations correctly has a significant meaning 
in composing situation-specific analyses. 
A typical reaction to an incident or anomalous operation comes at first from an 
incident response manager based on the situation awareness and its analysing. 
The magnitude and severity of an incident have an impact on the operations. Be-
sides fast-reacting, the organization's management can be congregated to decide 
on the extension of the operations, and the allocation of the needed resources. 
Depending on the magnitude of an incident, the whole organization's manage-
ment to the supervising board can be informed. Regarding the publicly traded 
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companies, the organization's external informing is guided by the informing obli-
gations based on the law. 
In the case of a nationally extensive incident, the critical infrastructure organi-
zations keep in touch with the NCSC-FI and utilize not only the authority network 
but also the industry's network and their business networks. In this communica-
tion, the organization's situation awareness and its situation-specific analysing are 
combined. 
Part of the critical companies for security of supply have a communication de-
mand for authorities, such as NCSC-FI, in case of an incident. Based on the NIS 
Directive, an authority can expand this demand to the critical infrastructure organ-
izations whom the duty to notify does not yet apply. 
Developing Competences for Situational Awareness of the Organization 
The nationally significant critical infrastructure organizations have developed in 
forming the cyber situational awareness and observation ability concerning the 
technical and tactical preparedness. It is also improved by the industry-specific and 
even more large-scale networking of the organizations. Networking and infor-
mation sharing are supported by a functional collaboration between the authori-
ties and the private sector. The good situational awareness of different companies 
(situational awareness and its analysing) and the information sharing via their in-
terest groups is, indeed, a crucial factor in the whole national cybersecurity. Figure 
4 sums up the factors that have come up in this research and further the organi-
zation's tactical level cybersecurity. The starting point is always the capability of 
the organization's personnel in recognizing the possible anomalous activity in the 
used systems and in operating reliably and organized in different situations. In an 
ideal case, the operation is supported by the technical systems or the used services 
of the ICT or information security operators or by utilizing the operational net-
work, participating in the authority collaboration, utilizing the consulting services 
or benchmarking or testing and exercising the operation. 
Operational Level Situational Awareness  
The operational level operations are used to advance strategic goals. Comprehen-
sive security- and trust-adding operations require comprehensive cybersecurity 
management. Its starting point has to be the target's risk assessment, and the op-
eration analyses carried out based on it. The operational level's concrete hands-
on operations must be targeted at the confirmation of information security solu-
tions and the composition of the organization's continuity and disaster recovery 
plans. The goal has to be the continuous monitoring of the operational processes’ 
usability, and the decision-making support in case of incidents that require analys-
ing and decisions. 
The NCSC-FI and NESA are identified as state administrative point of contacts 
on the business level. The NESA and different pools, especially the digital pool, 
support companies in developing and maintaining the situation awareness of the 
cyber operational environment. Because of the operation goals, the NESA brings 
together a significant part of the authorities and IT businesses. The private sector  
J. Pöyhönen, V. Nuojua, M. Lehto & J. Rajamäki, ISIJ 43, no. 2 (2019): 236-256 
 
 248 
Figure 4: Development of an organization’s cyber situational awareness as part of com-
prehensive cybersecurity.10 
 
recognizes its tasks in advancing national cybersecurity. The collaboration models 
between the authorities and private businesses have been created, and they are 
internationally comparable. 
With the support of the authorities, have been developed not only HAVARO for 
the security of supply critical operators but also KRIVAT service for critical infra-
structure organizations such that the operators themselves form the network. The 
purpose is to strengthen the collaboration between organizations in grand inci-
dents and speed up the recovery from them. 
The technical protection ability of the most significant critical infrastructure or-
ganizations and the observation ability based on that are on a good level. Different 
collaboration networks are widely used. Organizations and the NCSC-FI keep in 
touch regularly. The analysing ability of anomalous operation and the incident 
management ability base on the capable personnel and functional collaboration 
networks. 
Situational Awareness at Uppermost Management Level 
One of the most fundamental cybersecurity tasks of the organization's uppermost 
management is the continuous development and maintaining of the trust in oper-
ation as part of the national critical infrastructure. The strategic choices relate to 
the reputation of an organization. The management is required to make concrete 
strategic choices and to support and guide the performance of the chosen opera-
tions through the whole organization. An important task of the management is to 
take care of the adequate resourcing of operations. About the chosen operations 
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must be communicated extensively with the organization's personnel and other 
interest groups. 
It is important to create a cybersecurity assessment model for the needs of the 
uppermost management. With the help of that model, for example, other organi-
zations can evaluate their cybersecurity level, become aware of their weaknesses 
and insufficient contingency planning, and take care of at least of the basics. The 
operations require strategic level decisions from the organization's uppermost 
management. 
Finland’s national cybersecurity execution program 2017–2020 aggregates the 
pervasive and significant information and cybersecurity improving projects and 
operations of the state administration, business, and associations, and their re-
sponsibilities. The progress of the execution program can be followed by following 
the development of the different organization's capabilities during the concerned 
inspection period. The execution program includes extensively effective opera-
tions that are developed by other administrative-specific operations, and by the 
work related to the development of cyber and information security and business 
continuity management. At the same time, the follow-up results in the formation 
of national cyber situational awareness.10, 15 
The National Cyber Security Index (NCSI) is developed for the follow-up of the 
national cybersecurity-related capability. It is based on twelve sectors that are 
sorted into four groups as follows: 2 
▪ General cybersecurity indicators 
▪ Cybersecurity basic indicators 
▪ Event and crisis management indicators 
▪ International event indicators 
The NCSI index has four cybersecurity viewpoints per every twelve sections. 
These are the effective legislation, functioning individuals, collaboration arrange-
ments and the results from different processes. The operation of the index is 
based on the evaluations of the specialist group. 
Table 1 introduces a measure that is based on the NCSI index. It measures the 
cybersecurity capability of an organization and is developed for the use of busi-
nesses and other organizations. The evaluation is based on the requirements, busi-
ness, interest group collaboration and results. In this organization measure, the 
twelve sectors of cybersecurity are arranged into four groups as follows: 
1. General indicators 
2. Basic level indicators 
3. Event and incident management indicators 
4. National impact indicators. 
The commissioning of the measure can be seen to be targeted at the national 
cybersecurity execution program’s goal “A national light cybersecurity evaluation, 
by which the organizations can take care of reaching the minimum level of secu-
rity, has been composed.” By the organization-specific commissioning of the  
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Table 1. Structure of an organization-specific measure. 
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Ability to develop the organization’s cybersecurity 
culture 
    
Ability to analyse its cyber environment     
Magnitude of cybersecurity training     
BASIC LEVEL INDICATORS     
Confirmation of operational resources     
Risk assessments     
Quality requirements of the information systems’ 
operation 
    
Operation follow-up and measures     
EVENT AND INCIDENT MANAGEMENT INDICATORS     
Quality of contingency planning for incidents     
Situational awareness 24/7     
Ability to manage incidents     
Ability to recover from incidents     
NATIONAL IMPACT INDICATORS     
Operation in cyber operational networks     
POINTS     
 
measure, the aforementioned goal can be seen as achieved. The widespread com-
missioning of the measure in critical infrastructure organizations would make it 
possible to follow the cybersecurity development of the whole area in the same 
way as it serves the strategic level needs of a single organization. 
Information Sharing on National Level 
The NIS Directive requires explicit, identifiable and concrete operations to develop 
the national situational information sharing. The identification of collaboration 
partners and information producing operators generates prerequisites for soci-
ety’s encompassing information sharing and, that way, for the development of sit-
uational awareness. Figure 5 introduces a national information-sharing structure 
that enables the NIS Directive-based operation. 
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Figure 5: Information sharing on a national level. 
 
The European EECSP report “Cyber Security in the Energy Sector” encourages 
to use the best practices of information sharing through some kind of analysing 
centre or analysing the process. Thus, the best practice sharing via interest groups 
and learning from that can be supported. The challenges related to the introduc-
tion of new technologies, the challenges caused by the mutual dependence of the 
market operators, or the challenges build-up by the links between the energy sys-
tems and networks are typical scenarios that can especially benefit from the shar-
ing of best practices. Also, the procedure can be used for sharing delicate infor-
mation that helps the operators in protecting their network proactively.1  
In national information sharing, a critical infrastructure organization (electricity 
company in Figure 5) forms a cyber situation awareness from its starting points. In 
an ideal case, it bases on the observations from the different levels of the organi-
zation that is strategic, operational and technical/tactical level. Based on the in-
formation, the electricity company maintains its continuous situational awareness 
to support its decisions. In case of a cyber incident, the electricity company deliv-
ers information about its situation-specific analysis, based on the duty to notify, to 
the NCSC-FI and when need also to the responsible ministry. Based on their mutual 
information sharing, the NCSC-FI and responsible ministry form a national situa-
tional awareness about the matter. The responsible ministry takes care of the re-
lated and needed guidance operations to the other interest groups and the organ-
izations of its area of responsibility. The NCSC-FI carries out continuous infor-
mation sharing with the critical infrastructure organizations about the cybersecu-
rity situation.  
Finland’s national strength in the organizations' possibilities in utilizing different 
networks when sharing the cybersecurity information has been emphasized in dif-
ferent researches.9, 10 Here, three confidential information-sharing networks that 
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are utilized actively are introduced. These have been formed in connection with 
business operation, or a separate trust circle has been established between some 
industry’s companies that can reach also into an international collaboration. Also, 
nationally operates a trust circle between the authorities and private sector (Pub-
lic-Private Partnership, PPP). Figure 6 illustrates the aforementioned trust circles 
in the company field. 
The critical infrastructure organizations have functioning situation awareness 
arrangements and analysing capability, and they exchange information by utilizing 
their networks and are capable of incident management based on their starting 
points. The risk assessments and the procedure option analyses based on the eval-
uations are a significant part of the continuity management of the organization's 
business processes. The concrete hands-on operations of the operational level 
must be targeted at securing the information security solutions and composing the 
organization's operational continuity and disaster recovery plans. The goal must 
be in the continuous follow-up of the operational processes' usability, and the con-
tingency planning for incidents. 
The cyber operational environment is dynamic, which means that especially the 
strategic agility is required when preparing for incidents. On the other hand, the 
organization's strategic decision-making level must also have tools for evaluating 
the development of the whole organization's cybersecurity. In this paper, the com-
missioning of the measure that follows the organization-specific capability is rec-
ommended. There, the evaluation is carried out via the requirements set for the  
 
Figure 6: Trust networks related to an organization’s cyber situational awareness devel-
opment. 
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operation, business, interest group collaboration and results by utilizing four indi-
cators. The four indicators have been derived from this cybersecurity measure 
from the international index, and they are the organization's general indicators, 
basic level indicators, event and incident management indicators, and national im-
pact indicators. 
Summary 
The main novelty value of this study is the promotion of their practical measures 
which the NIS Directive required. In the big picture, the different parties related to 
the development of situational awareness must yet be able to improve their op-
eration by even more efficient technical procedures, strengthen the network-like 
operation, and increase the utilization of public sector services. There will be good 
preconditions to the above-mentioned matter when cybersecurity capabilities of 
the organization are widely promoted as a part of the national critical infrastruc-
ture and the common objectives determined by the EU. 
For the first research question, it is stated that as the target state of the organ-
ization’s cyber situational awareness and its interest groups' information sharing 
can be set the operation where the recognition of threatening incidents and re-
acting to them happens in an efficient process. It must include all the organiza-
tion’s decision-making levels (strategic, operational and technical/ tactical) and 
utilize the national and international strengths of information sharing. 
Based on the research the following basic requirements apply to the develop-
ment of the organization’s incident management: 
• Strategic goals: a) Cybersecurity management in all circumstances; b) Strate-
gic choices for operational continuity management 
• Critical success factors: a) Good situational awareness on all the organiza-
tional levels; b) Fast reaction ability and executive guidance; c) Clear opera-
tional models and their sufficient resourcing; d) Good information sharing be-
tween the different interest groups; e) Crisis communication 
• Evaluation criteria and target levels: a) Effectivity of the operation; b) Optimal 
resourcing. 
For the second research question, the techniques used by organizations, proce-
dures developed for incident reacting and different trust circles form a nationally 
useful observation ability. This scattered organization-specific observation ability 
and the analysing information and data reserve it contains can be utilised nation-
ally in the analysing phase for the management of wide-scale incidents. The ar-
rangement requires the creation of mutual operational models for information 
sharing. Because it is very presumable that there are not enough centralized re-
sources to be used for analysing a wide-scale and quickly evolving cybersecurity 
incident, as a solution should be outlined a network-like operation consisting of 
the experts from different organizations (virtual analysing). Then, the data reserve 
should be jointly used, and the experts would use their trust circles that reach to 
the international information sharing relations. The usability of data reserve forms 
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the key for analysing. When building it must take into account not only confiden-
tiality but also the data integrity and amount questions. In the referenced re-
search, the evaluations of i.e. the formation of excessive data amount were pre-
sented, and then the analysing becomes more difficult too. Thus, the different 
technical solutions of data processing should be examined. 
For the third research question, the main conclusion is that the organization-
specific measures, which promote cybersecurity and situational awareness, make 
the filling of the obligations of the NIS directive (Part D) possible. Part D requires 
that the providers of central and/or digital service should take into use the security 
and notification requirements. In every member state, national and EU -level situ-
ational awareness is based on the ability to maintain situation consciousness. 
Thus, the measures presented in this study also will promote other objectives ap-
pointed by the NIS directive. 
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nies has become very important function and operating model to authorities to 
provide cyber-safe atmosphere. The main purpose of this study is to find out 
separating and combining factors concerning cyber information sharing models. 
The aim is also to find out nation level factors, which affect the utilization of a 
common Early Warning system by the ECHO stakeholders.  
Summary of findings: unclear allocation of responsibilities in national gov-
ernment departments prevents authorities from fighting together against cyber 
and physical threats. Cybersecurity responsibilities have been spread too widely. 
Operational work concerning cyber threat prevention between European public 
safety authorities should be more standardized, with more centralized manage-
ment. When the purpose is to protect vital functions of society, public safety or-
ganizations in EU member states need proactive features in their information 
systems. An essential factor in information exchange is the place of registration 
of organizations or companies. Unclear standardization concerning cyber emer-
gency procedures between authorities and organizations and lack of co-opera-
tion between cyber situation centres and cyber emergency response centres 
prevent common situational awareness. 
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Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to assist ECHO and E-EWS developers, European deci-
sion-makers and end users but also provide features of existing information shar-
ing models to identify and to take into consideration territorial, organizational, 
managerial, legal and societal dimensions of the existing information sharing solu-
tions, models and frameworks. The research will comprise new database for the 
Echo Early Warning System concept. E-EWS aims at delivering a security opera-
tions support tool enabling the members of the ECHO network to coordinate and 
share information in near real-time. With the E-EWS ECHO stakeholders can retain 
their fully independent management of cyber-sensitive information and related 
data management. Echo Early Warning System will provide a mechanism for EU 
partners to share incident and other cybersecurity relevant data to partners within 
the ECHO network. 
The sub-research´s question focused on how it is possible to transfer US- and 
NATO-related cyber information sharing models to Europe. The United States of 
America and European Union has a lot of similarities, but many differences. It is 
important to notice how global markets divide and integrate our entities where 
we live. There are territorial and cultural differences between the countries, but 
technological solutions create new kind of opportunities within EU member coun-
tries to reach the same situation as USA have concerning quality and quantity of 
threat-informed data. Comparative research needs equivalences of the concepts 
and other variable factors in other territory – in the area of European Union.  
USA is the main actor in the field of information sharing in the western world. 
Therefor it is important to notice information sharing frameworks and models that 
are already in use in global level. There are many similarities concerning legislation 
and technical solutions between the unions and organizations, but also differ-
ences. It is important to separate predictive and preventive purposes, because leg-
islation differ between the countries. Agencies of The United States of America 
have enough resources to act proactively and use predictive functions in cyber 
space. This research belongs to European network of Cybersecurity centres and 
competence Hub for innovation and Operations, which is part of Horizon2020 pro-
gram. The rest of this paper is divided as follows. Section 2 proposes central con-
cepts. Section 3 handles background of the cyber information sharing. Sections 4 
handles Method and Process. Section 5 presents information sharing models and 
frameworks. Section 6 presents findings. Section 7 presents conclusion about the 
research. 
Alert and Detection System  
An alert and detection system produces information, which makes it possible to 
alert other players about a detected threat and develop better means of detec-
tion. Clients can determine what sort of data the system processes and the own-
ership of the data remains with the company itself, in its own devices. The infor-
mation on situation awareness provided by the system increases understanding 
about the organization’s own and general state of information security.  
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CSIRT (Computer Security Incident Response Team) or CERT (Computer 
Emergency Response Team) 
An organization that provides incident response services to victims of attacks, in-
cluding preventive services (i.e. alerting or advisory services on security manage-
ment). The term includes governmental organizations, academic institutions or 
other private body with incident response capabilities.1 The EU Computer Emer-
gency Response Team (CERT-EU) was set up in 2012 with the aim to provide effec-
tive and efficient response to information security incidents and cyber threats for 
the EU institutions, agencies and bodies. 
Critical Infrastructure protection (CIP) and Critical Information Infrastruc-
ture Protection (CIIP) 
Critical infrastructure (CI) includes Energy production, transmission and distribu-
tion networks, ICT systems, networks and services (including mass communica-
tion), financial services, transport and logistics, water supply, construction and 
maintenance of infrastructure, waste management in special circumstances. 
Transforming the nation's aging electric power system into an interoperable smart 
grid enabling two-way flows of energy and communications. That smart network 
will integrate information and communication technologies with the power-deliv-
ery infrastructure.2, 3 According to the Secretariat of the Security Committee of 
Finland, Critical infrastructure refers to the structures and functions which are nec-
essary for the vital functions of society.4 They comprise fundamental physical fa-
cilities and structures as well as electronic functions and services. 
Critical Information Infrastructure means any physical or virtual information 
system that controls, process, transmits, receives or stores electronic information 
in any form including data, voice or video that is vital to the functioning of critical 
infrastructure. Those interconnected information systems and networks, the dis-
ruption or destruction of which would have a serious impact on the health, safety, 
security, or economic well-being of citizens, or on the effective functioning of gov-
ernment or the economy.5 
Cyber Threats in Critical Infrastructure 
Cyber threats include denial of service (DoS), unauthorized vulnerability probes, 
botnet command and control, data exfiltration, data destruction or even physical 
destruction via alternation of critical software/data. These threats can be initiated 
and maintained by a mixture of malware, social engineering, or highly sophisti-
cated advanced persistent threats (APTs) that are targeted and continues for a 
long period of time. Channel jamming is one of the most efficient ways to launch 
physical-layer DoS attacks, especially for wireless communications.  
According to the US National Institute of Standards and Technology,6, 7 Cyber-
Physical attacks can be classified into three broad sections:  
J. Simola, ISIJ 43, no. 2 (2019): 175-195 
 
 178 
Physical attacks informed by cyber 
The use of information gathered by cyber means that allows an attacker to plan 
and execute an improved or enhanced physical attack. For example, if an enemy 
has decided to destroy components within a substation though they are not sure 
which substation or components would have the greatest impact. They could ac-
cess confidential information or aggregate unprotected information by cyber and 
they could then physically attack that specific substation and lines. 
Cyber-attacks enhancing physical attacks  
An enemy uses cyber means to improve the impacts of a physical attack by either 
making the attack more successful (e.g., greater consequences) or interfering with 
restoration efforts (thereby increasing the duration of the attack). Inadvertent ac-
tions could also cause such an attack. One example is an enemy tampering with 
the integrity of protective relay settings prior to a physical attack on power lines. 
Although the original settings were designed to contain the effects of a failure, the 
tampered settings allow the failure to cascade into impacts on a wider segment of 
the grid. 
Use of a cyber-system to cause physical harm 
An adversary uses a cyber-system that controls physical equipment in such a man-
ner to cause physical harm/damage. An example of this is the burner management 
system for a natural gas generator. In this case, an adversary or a careless operator 
could attempt to turn on the natural gas inflow without an ignition source present. 
As the burner unit fills with natural gas, the adversary could turn on the ignition 
source, potentially causing an explosion. 
Good cyber, physical and operational security planning and implementations 
can minimize these impacts of cyber physical attacks. Defensive measures that can 
be used to minimize the likelihood of successful cyber-attacks and physical attacks 
will also work to minimize the impacts of a cyber-physical attack. 
ENISA  
The European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) is a 
centre of network and information security expertise for the EU, its member 
states, the private sector and Europe’s citizens. ENISA works with these groups to 
develop advice and recommendations on good practice in information security. It 
assists EU member states in implementing relevant EU legislation and works to 
improve the resilience of Europe’s critical information infrastructure and net-
works. ENISA provides recommendations on cybersecurity, supports policy devel-
opment and its implementation, and collaborates with operational teams 
throughout Europe.8 
National Regulatory Authority (NRA) 
NRAs can play different roles in relation to cybersecurity. In Finland, for example, 
the tasks are: Steering and supervision of telecoms operators' operations, infor-
mation security and preparedness, for example, monitoring compliance with the 
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information security regulation, steering and supervision of strong electronic iden-
tification and the provision of qualified certificates, for example, monitoring com-
pliance and carrying out annual audits of certification authorities providing quali-
fied certificates.9 
The European Cyber Security Organization (ECSO)  
It represents the contractual counterpart to the European Commission for the im-
plementation of the Cyber Security contractual Public-Private Partnership (cPPP). 
ECSO members include a wide variety of stakeholders such as large companies, 
SMEs, research centres, universities, end-users, operators, clusters and associa-
tion as well as European Member State’s local, regional and national administra-
tions, countries part of the European Economic Area (EEA) and the European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA) and H2020 associated countries. 
Information Sharing and Analysis Centres (ISACs)  
ISAC is collaboration community created for sector-specific national or interna-
tional information sharing. Information Sharing and Analysis Centres are trusted 
entities to foster information sharing and good practices about physical and cyber 
threats and mitigation. The ISAC could support the implementation of new Euro-
pean legislation, e.g. NIS Directive,10 or support economic interests.11  
Information Sharing and Analysis Organization (ISAO) 
An ISAO is any entity or collaboration created or employed by public- or private 
sector organizations, for purposes of gathering and analysing critical cyber related 
information in order to better understand, security problems and interdependen-
cies related to cyber systems to ensure their availability, integrity, and reliability.12  
Industrial Internet of Things (IIOT)  
IIOT collects data from connected devices (i.e., smart connected devices and ma-
chines) in the field or plant and then processes this data using sophisticated soft-
ware and networking tools. The entire IIOT requires a collection of hardware, soft-
ware, communications and networking technologies. The major area where IOT 
deals with energy management systems is the smart grid. IOT extends the benefits 
of smart grid beyond the automation, distribution and monitoring being done by 
the utilities.13 
Risk Assessment Framework (RAF)  
According to the National Institute of Standards and Technology,14 the purpose of 
risk assessments is to inform decision makers and support risk responses by:  
• Identifying relevant threats to organizations or threats directed through or-
ganizations against other organizations;  
• Identifying vulnerabilities both internal and external to organizations;  
• Impact to organizations that may occur given the potential for threats exploit-
ing vulnerabilities and  
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• Likelihood that harm will occur.  
The result is a determination of risk. 
Risk Management Framework (RMF) 
Comprehensive risk management process by NIST, which integrate the risk man-
agement framework into the system development lifecycle. 
Standard ISO/IEC 27010:2015 (ISO/IEC 2700 family) 
Is a key component of trusted information sharing is a “supporting entity”, defined 
as “A trusted independent entity appointed by the information sharing community 
to organise and support their activities, for example, by providing a source anon-
ymization service.”15 
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) 
The behaviour of an actor: A tactic is the highest-level description of this behav-
iour, while techniques give a more detailed description of behaviour in the context 
of a tactic, and procedures an even lower level, highly detailed description in the 
context of a technique.16 
Threat Information 
Any information related to a threat that might help an organization protect itself 
against a threat or detect the activities of an actor. Major types of threat infor-
mation include indicators, TTPs, security alerts, threat intelligence reports, and 
tool configurations.17 
Organizational Bases of Cybersecurity within the USA, NATO and EU  
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the U.S. Federal Government focal 
point of the U.S. cyber information-sharing ecosystem. It is responsible for the 
government´s operational responses to major cybersecurity incidents, analysing 
threats and exchanging critical cybersecurity information with the owners and op-
erators of critical infrastructures and trusted worldwide partners. DHS as part of 
U.S Government and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Union) have developed ad-
vanced situational awareness systems within cyber ecosystem. NATO is develop-
ing a Cyber Rapid Reaction Team (RRT) that protect its critical infrastructure. U.S. 
Cyber Command’s Cyber Protection Teams (CPTs) creates security for all states in 
USA. NATO does not have an inherent cyber offensive capability, as the U.S Cyber 
CPT has. 
NATO CCD COE’s mission is to enhance cooperation and information sharing 
between NATO member states and NATO’s partner countries in the area of cyber 
defence by virtue of research, education and consultation. The Centre has taken a 
NATO-oriented interdisciplinary approach to its key activities, including academic 
research on selected topics relevant to the cyber domain from the legal, policy, 
strategic, doctrinal and/or technical perspectives, providing education and train-
ing, organizing conferences, workshops and cyber defence exercises, and offering 
consultations upon request.18 NATO does not have own cyber weapons against 
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cyber-attacks. The U.S.-led alliance established an operations centre on August 31, 
2018 at its military hub in Belgium and the USA, Britain, Estonia and other allies 
have since offered their cyber capabilities.19 
The MITRE Corporation is a private, not-for-profit organization that manages 
and operates federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs) that 
support United States (U.S.) government sponsors. FFRDCs serve as long-term 
strategic partners to the government, providing objective guidance in an environ-
ment free of conflicts of interest. MITRE has substantial experience as a trusted, 
independent third party providing secure stewardship, sharing, and transforma-
tional analyses of sensitive information in USA.20 
Background of Information Exchange among USA and EU 
Are there differences between information sharing, transferring information and 
information exchange? In 2009 ENISA, the European Network and Information Se-
curity Agency, defined the difference as follows: An information exchange is a form 
of strategic partnership among key public and private stakeholders. The common 
goal of the information exchange is mostly to address malicious cyber-attacks, nat-
ural disasters and physical attacks. The drivers for this information exchange are 
the benefits of member countries working together on common problems and 
gaining access to information, which is not available from any other sources.21  
The European Commission presented the cybersecurity strategy of the Euro-
pean Union in 2013. It sets out the EU approach on how to best prevent and re-
spond to cyber disruptions and attacks as well as emphasizes that fundamental 
rights, democracy and the rule of law need to be protected in the cyber-atmos-
phere. Cyber resilience as one of the strategic priorities. That means effective co-
operation between public authorities and the private sector is crucial factor – the 
national Network and Information Sharing competent authorities should collabo-
rate and exchange relevant information with other regulatory bodies.22 
The European Public-Private Partnership for Resilience (EP3R) was established 
in 2009 and was the very first attempt at Pan-European level to use a Public-Pri-
vate Partnership (PPP) to address cross-border Security and Resilience concerns in 
the Telecom Sector. After the EP3R the main principles for setting up a PPP eco-
system in Europe are to provide legal basis of cooperation. It is also important to 
ensure open communication between public and private sector. Involvement of 
Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in the process of PPP building is also crucial, 
since they are the backbone of the European economy.23, 24 
Development of Information Exchange in Law Enforcement  
How to prevent criminal activities has been one of the main questions when public 
safety authorities have tried to solve a common problem within EU countries. 
Hague Programme and Stockholm Programme introduced the principle of availa-
bility as the guiding concept for information exchange of law enforcement. Infor-
mation that is available to law enforcement authorities in one Member State 
should be made accessible to law enforcement authorities or public safety author-
ities in other Member States.25  
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Regulations and Policy Documents. European Regulation and policy documents 
were considered as sources for legal definitions and to cover the gaps left by the 
vocabularies extracted from standards when dealing with non-technical defini-
tions.26  
The Schengen Information Systems (SIS) is widely used information sharing tool 
today. Law enforcement authorities can use it to consult alerts on wanted persons 
etc. both inside the EU and at the EU external border. The SIS improve information 
exchange on terrorist suspects and efforts Member States of EU invalidate e.g. the 
travel documents.27  
The European Commission has adopted a Communication on the European In-
formation Exchange Model (EIXM). The instruments covered by EIXM allows other 
to exchange automatically fingerprints, DNA and vehicle registration data (Prum 
decision). The Swedish decision sets out how information should be exchange be-
tween EU Member States.28 
Europol supports Member States of the European Union as the information hub 
for EU law enforcement. Its Secure Information Exchange Network Application (SI-
ENA) enables authorities to exchange information with each other, with Europol, 
and with a number of third parties. Europol’s databases help law enforcement 
from different countries to work together by identifying common investigations, 
as well as providing the basis for strategic and thematic analysis.29 
Legislation and regulation concerning information exchange in USA and 
Europe 
Regulation in the USA 
The White House designated the National Coordinating Center for Communica-
tions (NCC) as Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC) for telecommunica-
tions in accordance with presidential Decision Directive 63 in 2000.  
The communications Information Sharing and Analysis Center (Comm-ISAC) in-
corporating dozens of organizations. It has facilitated the exchange of information 
among industry and government participants regarding vulnerabilities, threats, in-
trusions and anomalies affecting the telecommunications infrastructure.  
The exchange of information between the EU and the US has been regulated 
among other things, as follows; The European Commission and the U.S. Govern-
ment reached a political agreement on a new framework for transatlantic ex-
changes of personal data for commercial purposes named the EU-U.S. Privacy 
Shield. The European Commission adopted the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield on July of 
2016.30 
The framework protects the fundamental rights of anyone in the EU whose per-
sonal data is transferred to the United States as well as bringing legal clarity for 
businesses relying on transatlantic data transfers. 
The EU-U.S. Privacy Shield based on the principles: Obligations on companies 
that handle data. a) The U.S. Department of Commerce will conduct regular up-
dates and reviews of participating companies to ensure that companies follow the 
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rules they submitted themselves to. b) Clear safeguards and transparency obliga-
tions on U.S. government access: The US has given the EU assurance that the ac-
cess of public authorities for law enforcement and national security is subject to 
clear oversight mechanisms. c) Effective protection of individual rights: citizen who 
thinks that collected data has been misused under the Privacy Shield scheme will 
benefit from several accessible dispute resolution mechanisms. It is possible for a 
company to resolve the complaint by itself or give it to The Alternative Dispute 
resolution (ADR) to be resolved for free. Citizens can also go to their national Data 
Protection Authorities, who will work with the Federal Trade Commission to en-
sure that complaints by EU citizens are investigated and resolved. The Ombudsper-
son mechanism means that an independent senior official within the U.S. Depart-
ment of state will ensure that complaints are properly investigated and addressed 
in a timely manner.31 
Regulation in European Union 
The list of the most relevant regulation taken into consideration in EU level. 
NIS Directive 
ENISA, Europol/EC3 and the EDA are three agencies active from the perspective of 
NIS, law enforcement and defines respectively. These agencies have Management 
Boards where the Member States are represented and offer platforms for coordi-
nation at EU level.  
Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 
July 2016 concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and 
information systems across the Union, or the NIS Directive is the first piece of EU-
wide cybersecurity legislation. The goal is to enhance cybersecurity across the EU. 
The NIS directive was adopted in 2016 and subsequently, because it is an EU di-
rective, every EU member state has started to adopt national legislation, which 
follows or “transposes” the directive. EU directives give EU countries some level 
of flexibility to take into account national circumstances, for example to re-use 
existing organizational structures or to align with existing national legislation.32 
The European Parliament resolution on the European Union’s cyber security strat-
egy states e.g. that the detection and reporting of cyber-security incidents are cen-
tral to the promotion of information networks Sustainability in the Union.33  
The NIS Directive consist of three parts: 
1.National capabilities: EU Member States must have certain national cyberse-
curity capabilities of the individual EU countries, e.g. they must have a na-
tional CSIRT, perform cyber exercises, etc. 
2.Cross-border collaboration: Cross-border collaboration between EU coun-
tries, e.g. the operational EU CSIRT network, the strategic NIS cooperation 
group, etc. 
3.National supervision of critical sectors: EU Member states have to supervise 
the cybersecurity of critical market operators in their country: Ex-ante super-
vision in critical sectors (energy, transport, water, health, and finance sector), 
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ex-post supervision for critical digital service providers (internet exchange 
points, domain name systems, etc). 
General Data Protection Regulation 
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 
April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of such data and repealing Directive 
95/46/EC, or the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) replaced the Data 
Protection Directive 95/46/EC and was designed to harmonize data privacy laws 
across Europe, to protect and empower all EU citizens’ data privacy and to reshape 
the way organizations across the region approach data privacy. GDPR applies to all 
businesses offering goods and/or services to the EU. That means that the organi-
zations do not have to reside in the EU area or even in Europe, if you are holding 
private information about an EU citizen whom you provide services, GDPR ap-
plies.34 The Regulation introduces stronger citizens’ rights as new transparency re-
quirements. It strengthens the rights of information, access and the right to be 
forgotten. The GDPR protects personal data regardless of the technology used for 
processing that data. The law is technology neutral and applies to both automated 
and manual processing if the data is organized in accordance with pre-defined cri-
teria.35 It also does not matter if the data is stored in an IT system through video 
surveillance, or on paper. In all these cases personal data is subject to the protec-
tion requirements set out in the GDPR. Personal data consists of, for example; 
name, address, email address, an internet protocol address, location data on a 
mobile phone and a cookie ID, and the advertising identifier of your phone. 
Other Relevant Regulations 
• Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic 
transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC (eI-
DAS).  
• European Parliament resolution of 12 June 2012 on critical information infra-
structure protection – achievements and next steps: towards global cyberse-
curity (2011/2284(INI)) (CIIP)  
• COM(2017) 477 final 2017/0225 (COD) Proposal for a Regulation of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council on ENISA, the “EU Cybersecurity Agency,” 
and repealing Regulation (EU) 526/2013, and on Information and Communi-
cation Technology cybersecurity certification (“Cybersecurity Act”) 
• COM(2016) 705 final Communication from the commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and 
the Committee of the Regions “Space Strategy for Europe” 
• JOIN(2014) 9 final - Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the 
Council “For an open and secure global maritime domain: elements for a Eu-
ropean Union maritime security strategy” 
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• JOIN(2016) 18 final Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the 
Council “Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats a European Union re-
sponse” 
• EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework [Concilium 15585/14] and Joint Commu-
nication on “Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and 
Secure Cyberspace,” February 2013 [JOIN(2013)1].36  
Method and Process 
Case study illustrates the attempt to produce a profound and detailed information 
about the object under research. The materials collected for this case study based 
on scientific publications, collected articles and literary material. The research is 
focused on how it is possible iterate USA-related research concerning cyber infor-
mation sharing models in Europe. Yin identifies five components of research de-
sign for case studies: 37 (1) the questions of the study; (2) its propositions, if any; 
(3) its unit(s) of analysis; (4) the logic linking the data to the propositions; and (5) 
the criteria for interpreting the findings. This case study is carried out following 
the guidance by Yin. 
There are country-specific differences, institutional differences, etc. legislative 
differences in legislation, etc. The purpose is to categorize things into their own 
groups. Some models are simple diagrams, some are ready-made templates, and 
some information sharing models have concrete instruments and tools. The pur-
pose of the analysis is to find out about the functionalities and features of infor-
mation sharing systems in the EU, USA and NATO. The results of the research will 
be utilized in developing the echo early warning system. 
Definition of information sharing 
According to NIST,38 the organization should establish goals and objectives that 
describe the desired outcomes of threat information. These objectives will help 
guide the organization through the process of scoping its information sharing ef-
forts, joining sharing communities and providing ongoing support for information 
sharing activities.  
Define information sharing goals 
According to Skopik and co-authors,39 the primary dimensions of security infor-
mation sharing can be divided as follows: a) Cooperation and coordination eco-
nomic need for coordinated cyber defence. There exists variety of classification of 
information that are viable for a wide range of stakeholders: indicators of compro-
mise, technical vulnerabilities, zero-day exploits, social engineering attacks or crit-
ical service outages; b) Legal and Regulatory Atmosphere: information sharing re-
quires a legal basis. Therefore, the European Union and its Member States and the 
US, have already done a set of directives and regulations; c) Standardization Efforts 
means enabling information sharing, standards and specifications need to stand-
ardize that are compliant with legal requirements (e.g. NIST, ENISA, ETSI and ISO); 
d) Regional and International Implementations means taking these standards and 
specifications, organizational measures and sharing structures need to be realized, 
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integrated and implemented. CERTs and national cyber security centres work on 
this issue; e) Technology Integration into Organizations means sharing protocols 
and management tools on the technical layer need to be selected and set into 
operation. 
Identify Internal Sources of Cyber Threat Information 
The CORA (Cyber Operations Rapid Assessment) methodology was developed to 
study issues and best practices in cyber information sharing. In addition, it consists 
as an engagement tool for assessing and improving threat-based security de-
fences. CORA identifies five major areas of cyber security where the proper intro-
duction of threat information can have tremendous impact on the efficacy of de-
fences: External Engagement – Tools and Data Collection – Tracking and Analysis 
– Internal Processes – Threat Awareness and Training. 
The TICSO gather cyber threat intelligence and information from a variety of 
sources including open source reporting by researchers and consultants, govern-
ment and law enforcement sources (USCERT, INFRG), fee-for-service threat intel 
feeds from vendors and industry sector and regional threat sharing communities 
such as ISACs and ISAOs. The TICSO focuses collection efforts on the most relevant 
information by defining prioritized intelligence requirements (PIR), and continu-
ously evaluating the quality of intelligence from different sources in terms of rele-
vance, timeliness, and accuracy.40 Examples of PIRs include:  
• Threats and threat actors that have attacked your specific organization previ-
ously 
• Vulnerabilities and exploits that pertain to technology specific to your organ-
ization or industry 
• Threats and attacks against industry/sector peers or business partners.41 
A first step in any information sharing effort is to identify sources of threat in-
formation within an organization. By conducting an inventory of internal threat 
information sources, an organization is better able to identify knowledge gaps. The 
process of identifying threat information sources includes the following sections: 42  
a) Identify sensors, tools, data feeds, and repositories that produce threat infor-
mation and confirm that the information is produced at a frequency, precision, 
and accuracy to support cybersecurity decision-making; 
b) Identify threat information that is collected and analysed as part of an organ-
ization’s continuous monitoring strategy; 
c) Locate threat information that is collected and stored, but not necessarily 
analysed or reviewed on an ongoing basis; 
d) Identify threat information that is suitable for sharing with outside parties 
and that could help them more effectively respond to threats. Examples of se-
lected Internal Information Sources. 
Table 1 provides illustration through modified examples of selected internal cy-
bersecurity-related information sources with human factors from NIST.  
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Table 1. Examples of cyber threat sources (modified from NIST).43 
Human Factors & Network Data Sources Human Factors & Host data Sources 
Sources Examples Sources Examples 
Router, firewall, equip-
ment, Wi-Fi, remote 
services (such as re-
mote login or remote 
command execution), 
and Dynamic Host Con-
figuration Protocol 
(DHCP) server logs 
Timestamp Source and 
destination IP address 
Domain name TCP/UDP 
port number Media Ac-
cess Control (MAC) ad-
dress Hostname Action 
(deny/allow) Status 
code Other protocol in-
formation 
Operating 
system and 
application 
configuration 
settings 
states and 
logs 
Bound and established 
network connection and 
port Process and thread 
Registry setting, 
Configuration file entry, 
Software version and 
patch level information 
Hardware information, 
User and group File 
attribute (e.g., name, hash 
value, permissions, 
timestamp, size) File 
access System event (e.g., 
startup, shutdown, 
failures), Command 
history 
Diagnostic and moni-
toring tools (network 
intrusion detection and 
prevention system), 
packet capture & pro-
tocol analysis 
IP address, port, and 
other protocol infor-
mation Network flow 
data Packet payload 
Application-specific in-
formation Type of at-
tack (e.g., SQL injec-
tion, buffer overflow) 
Targeted vulnerability 
Attack status (suc-
cess/fail/blocked) 
Antivirus 
products 
Hostname, IP and MAC 
address, Malware name 
and type (e.g., virus, 
hacking tool, spyware, 
remote access) File name 
and location (i.e., path) 
File hash Action taken 
(e.g., quarantine, clean, 
rename, delete) 
Human Factors & Other Data Sources Web 
browsers 
Browser history and cache 
including:  Site visited; 
Forms, Social media 
platforms, Object 
downloaded; Object 
uploaded; Browser 
extension installed or 
enabled; Cookies; 
Transactions 
Security Information 
and Event Manage-
ment (SIEM) 
Summary reports syn-
thesized from a variety 
of data sources (e.g., 
operating system, ap-
plication, and network 
logs) 
Email systems Email messages: Email 
header content -
Sender/recipient email 
address - Subject line - 
Routing information At-
tachments, URLs, Em-
bedded graphic 
Help desk ticketing sys-
tems, incident manage-
ment/tracking system 
and human activity 
within the organization 
Analysis reports and 
observations regarding:  
TTPs, campaigns, affil-
iations, motives, exploit 
code and tools, 
Response and mitiga-
tion strategies, Recom-
mended courses of ac-
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tion, User screen cap-
tures (e.g., error mes-
sages or dialog boxes) 
Forensic toolkits and 
dynamic and/or virtual 
execution environ-
ments 
Malware samples, sys-
tem artifacts (network, 
file systems, memory) 
  
 
Handling requirements for shared threat information 
There are many methods to share designations of threat information. The TLP 
specifies a colour-based set of restrictions that indicate which restrictions apply to 
a particular record. The Traffic Light Protocol provides a framework for expressing 
sharing designations.44  
The TLP is widely used mechanism to classify threat information. Despite the 
mechanism, it would be necessary identify a mechanism to ensure that the confi-
dentiality of TLP-marked information was not compromised through Freedom of 
Information (FOI) e.g. National Act on the openness of government activities. It is 
good to conclude anonymization by National Regulatory Authority (NRA) when 
sharing information at the European level.  
In the TLP, red specifies the most restrictive rule with information sharable only 
in a particular exchange or meeting, not even within a participant’s own organiza-
tion. TLP consists four colours for different threat levels. The amber, green, and 
white colour codes specify successively relaxed restrictions. RED It is not for dis-
closure and it is restricted to participants only. Sources may use RED when infor-
mation cannot be effectively acted upon by additional parties and could lead to 
impacts on a party´s privacy, reputation or operations if misused. TLP-AMBER il-
lustrates limited disclosure and it is restricted to participants’ and organizations. 
Sources may use TLP-AMBER when information requires support to be effectively 
acted upon, yet carries risks to privacy or operations if shared outside of the or-
ganizations involved. TLP-GREEN is for limited disclosure and it is restricted to the 
community. Sources may use TLP-GREEN when information is useful for the 
awareness of all participating organizations but also with peers within the com-
munity or sector. TLP-WHITE is not limited. Sources mays use TLP-WHITE when 
information carries minimal or no foreseeable risk of misuse.  
Comparing features of the information sharing models 
The main international working groups are Association for Computing Machinery 
(ACM), National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Institute of Electrical 
and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) European Telecommunications Standards Insti-
tute (ETSI), international Federation for Information Processing (IFIP). NIST Frame-
work is most commonly used of these mentioned above.  
There are several different information sharing models in the world. The most 
important thing was to choose such cyber information sharing models that are 
widely used in the European Union countries, USA and NATO. It is not necessary 
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to compare all models or frameworks because availability of information varies a 
lot. Usually the information-sharing model is incomplete frame that is believed to 
solve all the problems concerning cyber security. Table 2 illustrates five different 
type of models has chosen to more detailed review. 
 
Table 2. Examples of information sharing models. 
 
Organization // 
Name // 
System/model or 
framework type 
Main tasks/ 
features 
Special tasks Major areas 
of cyber 
impacts 
Instruments 
MITRE// 
CORA // 
Assessment of cyber 
operations 
Developed for to 
study issues and 
best practices in 
cyber infor-
mation sharing 
  External En-
gagement  
Tools and 
Data Collec-
tion 
Tracking and 
Analysis 
Internal Pro-
cesses 
Threat 
Awareness  
Using indica-
tors to scan 
networks and 
systems – Re-
porting new in-
dicators about 
attacks on its 
own networks 
Based on NIST Special 
Publication 800-150: 
Guide to Cyber Threat 
Information Sharing.  
MITRE is not-for-profit 
organization. 
It serves as an 
engagement tool 
for assessing and 
improving 
threat-based se-
curity defences 
MITRE// 
TISCO// 
Threat-Informed 
Model 
It collects cyber 
threat intelli-
gence and infor-
mation from a 
variety of 
sources including 
open source re-
porting by re-
searchers and 
consultants (in-
corporates 
threat infor-
mation into its 
regular security 
practices). 
External En-
gagement  
Tools and 
Data Collec-
tion 
Tracking and 
Analysis 
Internal Pro-
cesses 
Threat 
Awareness  
Sensors (IDS, 
HIDS); (IOC) or 
attack activity 
such as phish-
ing email ad-
dresses, IP ad-
dresses and 
URLs of mali-
cious sites, 
host-based in-
dicators such 
as files, registry 
keys, and pro-
cess elements. 
  
ENISA// 
ISAC//  
Member driven organi-
zation model 
Sharing 
knowledge about 
incidents and cy-
bersecurity. It 
helps raise the 
level of cyberse-
curity in the 
member organi-
zation and pre-
vent/ respond to 
ISAC gives the 
public sector 
access to 
knowledge 
about the cy-
bersecurity 
level in critical 
sectors. It 
provides in-
formation 
a) a common 
practice to 
establish so 
called “circles 
of trust.” 
Some infor-
mation (e.g. 
technical de-
tails about 
threats and 
incidents) 
can be 
shared 
web por-
tal/platform 
(following a 
specific tem-
plate) and en-
crypted emails 
ENISA is a centre of ex-
pertise for cyber secu-
rity in Europe 
Country-focused ISAC 
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the incidents 
which occur  
(ISAC is a fast 
and efficient way 
to get all the 
knowledge and 
experience 
which normally 
takes a lot of 
time. ISAC is a 
good way of net-
working and 
meeting people 
from different 
organizations. It 
also provides 
knowhow) 
about threats 
and incidents.  
(close cooper-
ation with the 
industry, pub-
lic entities get 
better under-
standing of 
the private 
sector) 
widely with 
all members 
Sector specific ISAC//  
Focused on the secto-
rial level of critical in-
frastructure or essen-
tial/vital sector 
b) the shared 
information 
is more de-
tailed in in-
ternal circle 
International ISAC c)use of the 
(TLP) to share 
information 
 
ENISA// 
PPP// 
Cooperative model 
Access to public funds  Incident han-
dling and cri-
sis manage-
ment, Infor-
mation ex-
change, Early 
warnings, 
Technical 
evaluation, 
Defining 
standards 
etc. 
Help desk 
helps PPP´s 
members. PPP 
does not con-
sist real-time 
instruments 
against 
cyberattacks 
 
Opportunity to influence national 
legislation and obligatory stand-
ards. Access to public sector 
knowledge and confidential infor-
mation (EU legislation, fighting 
against cybercrime)  
Helps to achieve resilience in the 
cyber ecosystem  
PPP Increase the trust between 
public-public-private – allows to 
meet different people and get to 
know them; because of that, it al-
lows to have better information 
and proactive attitude in case of 
crisis. 
NIST// 
Framework// 
Framework 
NIST FW targeting on risk manage-
ment, procedures and privacy 
preservation aspects. The guide-
lines included in the ISO/IEC27010 
standard, itis oriented toward the 
protection of the data exchanged 
in the information sharing pro-
cess, as well as to the collection, 
analysis and correlation of cyber 
incidents in order to obtain an ef-
fective mitigation strategy. 
Techniques 
standards 
and protocols 
for systems 
monitoring, 
threat detec-
tion, vulnera-
bility inven-
tory and inci-
dent ex-
change 
Framework 
adds consist 
different kind 
of tools, but 
only frame-
work does not 
offer protec-
tion for shared 
information or 
information for 
incident han-
dling process 
The National Institute 
of Standards and Tech-
nology is part of U.S 
Department of Com-
merce 
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Findings 
Mechanism type of the ISAC concerns the overall structure that is used to ex-
change information. This type of mechanism often has a central hub that receives 
data from the participants. The hub can redistribute the incoming data directly to 
other members, or it can provide value-added services and send the updated in-
formation or data to the members. The hub may act as a “separator” that can fa-
cilitate information sharing while protecting the identities of the members. One of 
the main tasks of ISACs is sharing information on intrusions and vulnerabilities. 
These types of information are usually troublesome; therefore, companies often 
decide to keep silent. ISAC hub system relies on the functionality of the hub, which 
makes the system vulnerable to delays and systemic failures.45 The entire infor-
mation-sharing mechanism will not work well if the hub is not working well. Im-
portant information is often unnecessary to achieve, delays in information sharing 
can reduce the benefits of the information-sharing hub mechanism. In post to all 
model information is shared among stakeholders. There must be deeper trust in 
environment. Environment should be strengthened through face-to-face meetings 
and individuals who have a long history of personal rapport. MITREs model is one 
kind of hybrid information sharing model. It is a partner for helping private or pub-
lic organizations stand-up and run information sharing exchanges. Mechanism of 
MITRE use automated processing of information. This work has enabled security 
automation in vulnerability management, asset management, and configuration 
management though the Security Content Automation Protocol program. Mem-
bers of MITRE do not share information. Each participant sends its sensitive data 
to MITRE, and MITRE works diligently to ensure that member data is kept confi-
dential.  
There is a need to develop Public-Private information-sharing models in EU level 
because public safety organizations of the Department of the Homeland Security 
in USA are capable to handle external threats more effectively. There are interna-
tional organizations which have formulated co-operational working environment 
such a way that western world could operate for the common purpose. The nota-
ble problem is that all countries in EU are not full member of NATO. Most of the 
member countries of European Economic Union belongs to NATO alliance. Organ-
izational aspect does not mean that Finland or Sweden are outsiders in all sectors 
in this military alliance. Partnership makes it possible to utilize ready-made infor-
mation sharing networks developed by NATO. It is important to understand the 
difference between a partnership and a membership. International organizations 
like UN (United Nations) and NATO are the connecting factors concerning harmo-
nization of information sharing procedures in the EU and USA and between them, 
not forgetting NATO. In this author’s view, the so-called “triangle” should be called 
a “square.” NATO is currently dependent on the cyber defence ability of the United 
States and the EU has no ability to respond to external cyber threats. 
As many politicians and officers has mentioned functionalities between cyber 
situation centres within European Union are too scattered. Separate functionali-
ties in the member states are not only problem. When the common goal is to im-
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prove cyber situational awareness, it is important to deepen the cooperation be-
tween western stakeholders. Major problem of information sharing models is re-
lated lack of real-time cyber information between participants. There is essential 
problem with features of information sharing models. When the purpose is to pro-
tect vital functions of society, public safety organizations in European Union mem-
ber states needs proactive features in their information systems. A shared com-
mon cyber situational awareness means that real time communication links be-
tween the states must exist. 
Conclusions 
There is tendency in Europe that private actors are allowed more rights to handle 
citizens’ privacy data. For example, the bank sector has had opportunity to process 
and handle account data of customers. At the moment, this right is being ex-
panded to other activities. Legislation is not the only factor which affects the 
chances to completely secure the cyber ecosystem. It is important to notice that 
information sharing systems or frameworks are useless without features and func-
tionalities. The USA and its public safety cyber defence organizations have ability 
to combat cyberattacks against vital functions, but also to counterattack. This is 
one of the most important features in protecting the western world. Cooperation 
and collaboration in triangle EU-NATO-USA is therefore particularly important. Uti-
lizing the best features of the information sharing models will ensure procedures 
of continuity management. It is therefore important to place EU countries in the 
right context. Legislation has been harmonized, but trust organization’s function-
alities is occasional. What are the organisations, which handle the databases con-
cerning privacy issues and what for they handle it? Where companies and organi-
sations are registered? Does it cause obstacles and can they be overcome when 
the aim is to catch cyber criminals or find out state level actor utilising cyber or 
hybrid attacks. The differences between the functionalities and features of infor-
mation sharing models in USA and NATO versus European Union models for infor-
mation exchange are converging only if EU develops towards a federal state.  
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